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Abstract 
 
 
Tax noncompliance is a problem that is inherent in the taxation system itself—the 
history of tax evasion is as old as the history of taxation. While tax evasion is a problem 
for both developed and developing countries, it is more acute in developing countries, 
which have high rates of tax noncompliance. Several theories and models have been 
presented in an attempt to analyse the problem of tax compliance, with the main three 
theories being the economic deterrence theory of tax compliance, psychological theory 
and sociological models. The deterrence theory emphasises punishment for 
noncompliance, while the psychological theory emphasises persuasion, rather than 
deterrence. In contrast, sociological models tend to view compliance behaviour within 
the structure of the social system, considering tax evasion a social phenomenon. 
However, no single theory has been able to explain the phenomenon in its entirety. 
Thus, a comprehensive approach that combines all theories is considered necessary to 
improve compliance. The Australian Taxation Office (ATO) model is based on the 
responsive regulatory theory. It offers a comprehensive approach that combines 
persuasion and punishment in a pyramidal manner, given that empirical research has 
found that persuasion alone does not work—it must be accompanied by deterrence. 
 
Against this backdrop, the purpose of this thesis is to suggest a comprehensive 
approach for Bangladesh based on the ATO compliance model, and to argue that the 
relationship between taxpayers and the state is a fiduciary one. While doing so, this 
thesis aims to critically discuss different theories of tax compliance, including the ATO 
enforcement pyramid. It also examines some legal tools employed by the income tax 
administration of Bangladesh to ensure compliance. These tools include tax amnesty 
and the third-party tax information reporting system. This thesis argues that tax 
amnesty has failed to be an effective legal mechanism to prevent tax evasion. In 
addition, this thesis argues that the current law regarding third-party information 
reporting is insufficient. By examining tax information reporting regimes in different 
countries, such as Australia, India, New Zealand and the United States, this thesis 
suggests best practice for Bangladesh. In the context of Bangladesh, no temporary 
solution to the problem of tax compliance will work effectively. Rather, a sustainable 
and pragmatic approach is necessary to improve compliance in the long term. In 
ii 
consideration of that goal, this thesis also presents some policy suggestions for the 
income tax administration of Bangladesh. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
 
1.1 Background to the Research 
 
The main purpose of taxation is to finance government expenditure,1 with taxation 
being fundamental to sustainable economic development. In a classic articulation of 
this point Kaldor states, ‘Indeed the importance of public revenue from the point of 
view of accelerated economic development could hardly be exaggerated’.2 Taxation 
determines a government’s control over society’s wealth, and the amount of wealth 
left with the discretionary control of private citizens.3 Taxation also plays a role as a 
catalyst for more responsive and accountable governments, and for expanding state 
capacity.4 Taxation is essential for the effective functioning of the state because of the 
contractual relationship between the state and taxpayers.5 Taxation also helps to 
increase efficiency when markets fail to price factors such as pollution or congestion, 
or the health costs of particular types of behaviour, such as tobacco consumption.6 
 
Developed countries have been using taxation for centuries as a generally effective 
means of collecting much-needed revenue to fund government expenditure and 
increase state capacity to achieve fiscal freedom.7 In contrast, developing countries, 
such as Bangladesh, have thus far been unable to collect sufficient revenue through 
taxation for economic development. It is generally accepted that this is due to 
widespread tax evasion8 and other forms of noncompliance. For example, a joint report 
                                                          
1 Richard FE Warburton and Peter Handy, International Comparison of Australia’s Taxes (2006) 
Commonwealth of Australia, 22 
<http://comparativetaxation.treasury.gov.au/content/report/downloads/CTR_full.pdf>. 
2 Nicholas Kaldor, ‘Taxation for Economic Development’ (1963) 1(1) The Journal of Modern African 
Studies 7. 
3 Liam Murphy and Thomas Nagel, ‘Taxes, Redistribution, and Public Provision’ (2001) 30(1) 
Philosophy & Public Affairs 53–54. 
4 OECD, Citizen-State Relations Improving Governance through Tax Reform (2010) 9 
<http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/19/60/46008596.pdf>. 
5 IMF et al, Supporting the Development of More Effective Tax Systems (2011) 8 
<http://www.oecd.org/ctp/48993634.pdf>. 
6 Warburton and Handy, above n 1, 22. 
7 In 2011, the average tax ratio–gross domestic product of Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development countries stood at 33.8 per cent. The Treasury, Pocket Guide to Australian Tax 
System(January 2013) <http://www.treasury.gov.au/Policy-Topics/Taxation/Pocket-Guide-to-the-
Australian-Tax-System/Pocket-Guide-to-the-Australian-Tax-System/Part-1.>. 
8 James Alm and Jeorge Martinez Vazques, ‘Institutions, Paradigms and Tax Evasion in Developing 
Countries’ in Jorge Martinez-Vazquez (ed), Public Finance in Developing and Transitional 
Countries: Essays in Honour of Richard Bird (Edward Elgar Publishing, 2003) 146, 147. 
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of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development (OECD) and World Bank states: 
Significant progress has been made by many developing countries but weak 
capacity, corruption and the missing reciprocal link between tax and public 
and social expenditures remain as challenges. The vicious circle of low tax 
morale and compliance—which reduces the lifeblood for funding public 
services—needs to be broken.9 
While tax noncompliance is more serious in developing countries, it is not specific to 
developing countries alone—it is also a problem for developed countries10 and is an 
issue encountered worldwide.11 However, it remains most acute in developing 
countries. For example, in Bangladesh, of the 145 million people in the population, 
only 3.5 million are income taxpayers (holders of a taxpayer identification number 
[TIN]) and only 1.8 million people submit an income tax return. Thus, less than one 
per cent of the population pays income tax in Bangladesh. It however transpires that 
the number of people paying taxes as against total persons having Taxpayers 
Identification Number (TIN) remains around 47 percent. But the number of taxpayers 
should be more as compared to the people eligible to pay tax. Against the total 
population of about 160 million more than 30 million people are capable to pay income 
tax. But the NBR statistics show that more than 80% of the people capable of paying 
taxes are not doing so.  Another alarming situation is that out of 35 million 
businessmen in the country, only 1.34 million have electronic TINs. 12 As such, tax 
noncompliance is a formidable problem in this country.  
 
There are multiple causes for tax noncompliance, and several theories of tax 
compliance that deserve attention. The main causes of tax noncompliance in 
Bangladesh include corruption in the income tax department,13 lack of political will to 
                                                          
9 OECD, above n 4, 10. 
10 Gerald Chau and Patrick Leung, ‘A Critical Review of Fischer Tax Compliance Model: A Research 
Synthesis’ (2009) 1(2) Journal of Accounting and Taxation 40. 
11 Jeyapalan Kasipillai, ‘Malaysia’s Hidden Economy and Tax Evasion’ in Chris Evans and Abe 
Greenbaum (eds), Tax Administration: Facing the Challenge of the Future (Prospect Media, 1998) 
115. 
12 Syed Md Aminul Karim and Md Alauddin, ‘Emerging Tax Issues in Asian Countries’ (Paper 
presented at the IMF Japan High Level Tax Conference for Asian and Pacific Countries 31, 3 
February 2012) <http://www.imf.org/external/np/seminars/eng/2012/asiatax/pdf/bangladesh.pdf.>. 
Also Shafiqul Islam, Only 1% of Bangladeshis pay taxes, Dhaka Tribune 31 March, 2105 
<http://www.dhakatribune.com/bangladesh/2015/mar/31/only-1-bangladeshis-pay-taxes>. 
13 Mohammad Mohabbat Khan, Political and Administrative Corruption: Concepts, Comparative 
Experiences and Bangladesh Case (A paper prepared for Transparency International—Bangladesh 
Chapter) <unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/.../UNPAN019105.pdf>; Habib 
Zafarullah and Noore Alam Siddiquee, ‘Dissecting Public Sector Corruption in Bangladesh: Issues 
and Problems of Control’ 1(4) Public Organization Review 465. 
3 
enforce tax compliance,14 prevalence of an informal economy,15 inefficiency of the tax 
administration16 and lack of proper enforcement of the tax law.17 Against this 
backdrop, this thesis attempts to systematically identify and discuss the different 
causes of noncompliance in the context of the income tax regime of Bangladesh. This 
research focuses on personal income tax issues in Bangladesh. It examines a variety 
of conceptual approaches to tax compliance, and seeks to determine whether tax 
compliance in Bangladesh would be improved through tax law reform and the 
enforcement of tax laws. In order to do so, this thesis focuses specifically on two 
issues. The first is the role of the state–taxpayer relationship in shaping tax compliance 
behaviour. Specifically, this thesis endeavours to define the state–taxpayer relationship 
as a ‘fiduciary’ relationship. The government is a fiduciary for taxpayers, while 
taxpayers are the beneficiaries, in recognition of paying tax to the government. In light 
of the above, the second issue examined in this thesis is the best strategy to improve 
the current poor state of income tax compliance in Bangladesh. 
 
Following the analysis of the taxation system as a fiduciary relationship, this thesis 
examines the possibility of adopting the Australian Taxation Office (ATO) 
enforcement pyramid of compliance in Bangladesh’s income tax administration. The 
ATO compliance model is based on the responsive regulation theory of compliance 
proposed by Ayres and Braithwaite in 1992.18 Thus, this theory is critically discussed. 
In addition, this thesis investigates the applicability of the ATO regulatory pyramid 
model of compliance in the context of the tax administration of a developing country, 
such as Bangladesh. The problems of the regulatory pyramid are also discussed in 
detail to consider whether the model can be replicated in Bangladesh. 
 
The responsive regulatory model of compliance—particularly in the field of 
taxation—is a relatively recent theory of regulation that offers a comprehensive 
approach that combines both instrumental and non-instrumental psychological and 
                                                          
14 Asian Development Bank (ADB) et al, Joint Evaluation of Support to Anti-Corruption Efforts 
Bangladesh Country Report (Report 6/2011—Study) 
<http://www.oecd.org/countries/tanzania/48912863.pdf>; Md Swakat Ali Waresi, ‘The Black 
Economy of Bangladesh: Taxing Missed Millions’ (2010) The Cost and Management 16. 
15 Sangheon Kim, ‘Does Political Intention affect Tax Evasion’ (2008) 30(3) Journal of Policy 
Modeling 401. 
16 IMF et al, above n 5. 
17 National Board of Revenue, Outline of Modernization Plan (2011–2016), 19<www.nbr 
bd.org/tender/NBR_Modernisation_Plan_Final_draft.pdf>. 
18 Ian Ayres and John Braithwaite, Responsive Regulation: Transcending the Deregulation Debate 
(Oxford University Press, 1992). 
4 
social factors to secure satisfactory tax compliance.19 A critical analysis reveals that 
this theory retains the traditional deterrence model of tax compliance that emphasises 
punishment as an effective means of ensuring tax compliance. At the same time, the 
responsive regulation theory recognises the validity of other compliance theories in 
the field, such as social and psychological models of tax compliance, and thus presents 
a pragmatic model. The responsive regulatory theory, as adopted by the ATO, is 
suggested by researchers as an alternative solution to the problem of tax 
noncompliance.20 However, the perspective of developing countries has largely been 
overlooked. This thesis argues that, despite the limitations of the regulatory pyramid 
model, it is the most useful instrument in understanding and seeking to influence tax 
regulation. Thus, it may be the best available option to conceptualise and seek to 
facilitate suitable tax administration in Bangladesh. 
 
The final focus of this thesis is to analyse the probable effectiveness of some specific 
legal tools that could be better used by the government of Bangladesh. The specific 
legal tools discussed are tax amnesty programs and the tax information reporting 
regime under the income tax law of Bangladesh. In addition, this thesis examines the 
current practices and laws regarding tax information return systems in different 
developed countries, such as Australia, New Zealand, Canada, the United States (US) 
and other OECD countries. These are compared to those employed in Bangladesh, and 
their relevance and applicability to Bangladesh is examined. 
 
This research employs a novel approach in the field of taxation research by examining 
the state–taxpayer fiduciary relationship. Although important contributions have 
previously been made in relation to the general state–citizen fiduciary relationship,21 
insufficient attention has been given to the specific state–taxpayer fiduciary 
relationship. Thus, this research is important to enable better understanding of tax 
administrations around the world. In addition, this research examines tax 
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20 Ibid. 
21 Evan Fox-Decent, Sovereignty’s Promise: The State as Fiduciary (Oxford University Press, 2011); 
Evan Fox-Decent, ‘From Fiduciary States to Joint Trusteeship of the Atmosphere: The Right to a 
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(eds), Fiduciary Duty and the Atmospheric Trust (Ashgate, 2011) 253; Evan Fox-Decent, ‘The 
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noncompliance in the field of personal income tax in Bangladesh. It investigates why 
there is widespread tax noncompliance in developing countries such as Bangladesh, 
and how the situation can be improved. Tax noncompliance remains central to the 
fiscal problems in Bangladesh, and demands thorough analysis. Understandings of 
noncompliance in developing countries such as Bangladesh remain severely limited, 
while the occurrence of noncompliance in developed countries such as Australia and 
New Zealand has generated substantial research.22 It should be noted that the National 
Board of Revenue (NBR) of Bangladesh has thus far not undertaken or supported any 
substantial study on the subject of tax compliance in Bangladesh,23 and academic 
research is lacking. Against this backdrop, this research is believed to be the first of its 
kind. 
 
1.2 Literature Review 
 
Taxpayer compliance can be thought of as an example of general obedience to the 
law.24 In an attempt to explain why people obey the law, and particularly why people 
pay tax, legal scholars, social scientists and economists have proffered many theories 
and models. However, no single theory has been able to explain the dynamics of 
people’s compliance behaviour in their entirety. The burgeoning tax compliance 
literature discusses economic, social and psychological aspects of tax compliance 
behaviour.25 However, one important aspect appears to have been neglected, or at least 
underemphasised, in the approaches deriving from these various disciplines. This 
study argues that the state–taxpayer relationship has not been adequately examined, 
                                                          
22 Colin Fong, ‘Taxation Scholarship in Australia and New Zealand: A Preliminary View’(2002) 5(2) 
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even though it appears to be vital to shaping taxpayers’ compliance behaviour. 
However, there have been important recent developments in the examination of the 
state–citizen relationship as a fiduciary relationship. These recent developments are 
complex and present a range of contesting theories, yet, generally, they propose a novel 
theory of the state–taxpayer fiduciary relationship. Before discussing this in more 
depth, it is first necessary to review the more general theories of obedience to the law. 
 
Fox-Decent argues that constituent elements of state discretionary power inevitably 
lead to a free-standing and overarching fiduciary relationship between the state and 
each person, subject to its powers.26 This relationship is actual, rather than 
hypothetical. It shapes the state’s capacity to make and enforce laws, and thereby 
maintain the rule of law in society. Although Fox-Decent propounds a free-standing 
fiduciary relationship between state and citizens, the claim is yet to be substantiated 
and more examinations are imperative. Riddle and Fox-Decent argue that the state 
exercises sovereign power as a fiduciary of the people who are nationals of the state. 
They contend that, as a fiduciary, the state must abide by the norms of public 
international law that are ‘peremptory’ (or jus cogens).27 Similarly, Wood argues that 
government officials have trust duties related to handling natural resources. This duty 
is considerably heightened by their general duty to be performed in line with their 
oaths of office—this is the fiduciary duty of public trust, which is owed to the people 
as beneficiaries.28 
 
Wake argues that the fiduciary theory commands the government to respect citizens’ 
rights to improve their lives. Accordingly, the state must refrain from taking actions 
that infringe individuals’ liberties and proprietary interests.29 Fox-Decent argues that, 
under the fiduciary theory of public authority, all states are obliged to guarantee a 
healthy environment for their citizens.30 States are joint trustees for the global 
atmosphere, and citizens are the beneficiaries. However, Clark argues that, in the area 
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of climate change, a legally binding fiduciary duty is unlikely to be effective and may 
even violate the principles of the rule of law.31 However, Clark’s arguments should be 
evaluated in the context of Australian law because they are presented from the 
Australian perspective, in which fiduciary law has somewhat limited application; is 
proscriptive rather than prescriptive;32 and sets its face against extension of the 
doctrine, even though such extension is not impossible. According to the proscriptive 
principle, no positive duties are imposed on the fiduciary in relation to the 
beneficiaries; rather, it must maintain loyalty to the beneficiaries. The principle is only 
triggered when the fiduciary tries to take advantage of the relationship, to the detriment 
of the beneficiaries’ interest.33 In contrast, prescriptive obligations require the 
fiduciary to produce definite beneficial outcomes for the beneficiaries.34 
 
Regarding the state–citizen relationship, Fox-Decent argues that there is an 
overarching fiduciary relationship between the state and its citizens. Traditionally, in 
a domain of private law settings, the fiduciary relationship is imported to public law 
settings when explaining the state–citizen relationship. It is contended that the 
government in power is the trustee for the people.35 Leib, Ponet and Serota contend 
that, despite having its roots in private law, the fiduciary principle can be used to 
provide a descriptive explanation and normative frame to explain the state–citizen 
relationship.36 Gold observes that fiduciary law presents a rich set of principles to 
address legal questions—one that has gained recognition for its relevance to multiple 
settings, including the state–citizen fiduciary relationship.37 The fiduciary principle 
has also been applied in administrative law, election law, and the practice of judging, 
among other fields.38 However, the application of the fiduciary principle in public 
settings—rather than private settings—is yet to be established and recognised by 
jurisdictions around the world. Though the legal luminaries as mentioned above made 
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a commendable attempt to import the private fiduciary into the public domain, it would 
be difficult, particularly in jurisdictions that stick to the proscriptive theory of fiduciary 
law, to sell the concept since it would open a new era of governmental obligations 
towards the citizens calling for new mechanism of standing to enforce that law. 
 
It is unclear why people choose to obey the law, and the sociologist of deviance, 
Becker, argues that obedience to the law must not be taken for granted. For example, 
Becker argues that criminals behave rationally39—they commit a crime if the expected 
utility from doing so exceeds the utility they could obtain by using the same time and 
other resources in the pursuit of other activities. Consequently, it is evident that some 
people indulge in criminal activities not because their basic motivation differs to that 
of other people, but because they have a different view regarding the benefits and costs 
of criminal acts.40 Becker’s theory offers an economic analysis of why people obey the 
law. It ignores the psychological, moral and social factors that also explain why people 
obey the law. People do not always think about costs and benefits from the criminal 
acts but other factors contribute to the commission of such acts. For example, one 
might kill his wife being enraged after altercations at the heat of the moment. Again 
some people obey law because they think that law should be followed since it is law 
and it behests order and discipline in the societal system 
 
Smith observes that people obey the law because they have consented to the obligation 
to obey the law.41 Raz states that people have moral and prudential reasons to obey the 
law; however, Raz argues that there is no prima facie obligation to do so. Raz states: 
I shall argue that there is no obligation to obey the law. It is generally agreed 
that there is no absolute or conclusive obligation to obey the law. I shall 
suggest that there is not even a prima facie obligation to obey it … I shall 
argue that there is no obligation to obey the law even in a good society whose 
legal system is just. In other words, whatever ones view of the nature of the 
good society or the desirable shape of the law it does not follow from those 
or indeed from any other reasonable moral principle that there is an 
obligation to obey the law.42 
Philosophically, it is argued that the obligation to obey the law is based on the 
proposition that the government is essential to safeguard society from such evils as the 
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violation of human rights and the obstruction of personal freedom.43 The argument 
might be true philosophically, but opposite view can be put forward since some 
governments, particularly in the third world countries governments are accused of 
violating human rights and impeding personal liberties of citizens for various reasons.  
 
Tyler offers two main explanations as to why people obey the law. One explanation 
derives from an instrumental perspective (forced compliance) and the other from a 
normative perspective (procedural justice).44 According to Tyler, deterrence theory 
forms the basis of the instrumental perspective. This theory considers that people 
mould their conduct to be responsive to incentives and punishments in order to obey 
the law. Under this theory, executive authority acts on the belief that an increase in the 
certainty and severity of punishment for committing crimes will reduce the rate of 
crime in the community. Consequently, executive authority favours the instrumental 
perspective.45 In contrast, Klosko argues that citizens have a moral obligation to obey 
the law. It is people’s consent that lays the foundation of a strong moral obligation to 
obey the law.46 The debate between instrumentality and morality however, appears to 
be never ending each having its own merits though not holistic in explicating the law 
abiding behaviour of people.  
 
There are two main schools of thought in the research literature regarding tax 
compliance. One school is based on the theory of crime and punishment, which posits 
that taxpayers make decisions to comply or not comply based on the probability of 
being caught, and on the benefit achieved through noncompliance. The other school is 
based on theories of psychology and sociology that attempt to explain the varying 
levels of taxpayer compliance. 
 
Based on the neoclassical theory of crime and punishment proffered by Becker in 
1968,47 Allingham and Sandmo48 state that tax noncompliance is a rational decision 
taken by defiant taxpayers who weigh profit and gain against punishment in the event 
of being caught, and successful escape from detection. Consequently, a rational 
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45 Ibid. 
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taxpayer attempts to evade or avoid tax if the gain outweighs the probable punishment 
for this law-defying, undesired demeanour. A number of researchers find support for 
this theory, including Srinivasan;49 Kolm;50 Yitzhaki;51 Spicer and Becker;52 
Clotfelter;53 Beck and Jung;54 Klepper and Nagin;55 Beck, Davis and Jung;56 and 
Hasseldine and Bebbington.57 
 
Although there are theoretical arguments and empirical evidence that deterrence 
works, the economic deterrent theory has its limitations. First, Skinner and Slemrod 
observe that this model ignores the number of honest taxpayers.58 Second, Sheffrin 
and Triest argue that the theory fails to provide strong predictions about the 
socioeconomic determinants of tax evasion.59 Third, Weigel, Hessing and Elffers state 
that the absence of a motivational concept remains one of the weaknesses of the 
economic deterrence model.60 Finally, Lederman argues that, although the economic 
model of tax compliance is important in expounding some variables of the tax 
compliance behaviour of taxpayers, it cannot explain all tax compliance issues that 
encompass income from all sources.61 This is somewhat true that some taxpayers base 
their compliance on the probability of being caught and the cost of punishment, it 
seems that not all patterns of tax compliance behaviour can be explicated by this 
deterrent theory. There are taxpayers who pay tax considering that as their duty without 
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preference to profit and loss from tax evasion. The following theories try to explain 
tax compliance behaviour from perspective other than deterrent theory. 
 
The social and psychological theories of tax compliance view compliance from a social 
and psychological perspective, rather than an economic perspective. According to 
Lederman, research on taxpayers’ behaviour reveals that taxpayers’ compliance occurs 
in response to a norm.62 According to Wenzel, perceived social norms about tax 
compliance affect taxpayers’ compliance decisions, and misperceptions about the 
social norm of compliance might generate a detrimental effect on taxpaying 
behaviour.63 Scholz argues that there is a contract between taxpayers and the state. 
Taxpayers contribute to the government treasury, and the government provides 
benefits and services to the people.64 This is the tax contractarian theory of tax 
compliance. Feld and Frey extend the contractual obligation to what they call the 
‘psychological contract’.65 Some of the offshoots of social and psychological theories 
are the shame and guilt theory, procedural fairness model, motivational posture model, 
organisational culture model, social identity theory, positive incentive theory, prospect 
theory and religious theory.66 
 
Alm, Sanchez and Juan67 use an experimental method to determine the major 
economic and non-economic factors that influence tax compliance behaviour. While 
acknowledging that reliable data on individual income tax compliance cannot be easily 
procured, they report strong evidence that both economic and non-economic factors 
play a vital role in shaping compliance behaviour. Factors such as detection and 
punishment, the burden of taxation, public good provision, overweighting of low 
probabilities, and social norms influence compliance decisions. However, the authors 
acknowledge that these identified factors do not form an exhaustive list of the 
influences outside the laboratory. Many other factors may play an important role in 
compliance behaviour, such as religion, morality and guilt. Alm, Sanchez and Juan 
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conclude by suggesting that governments create a multifaceted compliance strategy 
that embraces both economic and non-economic factors, including detection, 
punishment and social and psychological considerations.68 
 
Ayres and Braithwaite developed the responsive regulation model of compliance, 
which is a blend of the economic and social–psychological theories of compliance.69 
In 1998, the ATO developed a tax compliance framework based on the responsive 
regulatory theory. Ayres and Braithwaite argue that responsive regulation requires 
regulators to be responsive to the conduct of those they seek to regulate in deciding 
whether a more or less interventionist response is required.70 Heimer comments that 
responsive regulatory theory suggests that a regulator will be most successful in 
inducing a regulated party to comply with regulations by beginning with dialogue, and 
only escalating pressure in response to apparent reluctance or resistance by the 
regulated party.71 Parker states that a responsive regulation model builds a moral 
commitment to comply with the law.72 For the ATO, this model prescribes a new 
method of regulation in addition to the existing traditional or conventional method of 
regulatory responses.73 Critics are quick to comment on the responsive regulatory 
theory. For example, Gunningham, Grabosky and Sinclair argue that responsive 
regulation is too focused on state regulation.74 In addition, Freigang contends that 
responsive regulation is not compatible with the rule of law, and has inherent 
constitutional problems that cause judicial and doctrinal challenges.75 Freedman 
argues that it is difficult to apply to corporate taxpayers, and that it encourages tax 
corruption and creates disequilibrium in treatments.76 
 
For the responsive regulation model to succeed, Waller argues that institutional 
integrity, fairness in the tax system, trust and respect for the tax authority, and 
                                                          
68 Ibid. 
69 Ayres and Braithwaite, above n 18. 
70 Ibid. 
71 Carol A Heimer, ‘Disarticulated Responsiveness: The Theory and Practice of Responsive 
Regulation in Multi-Layered Systems’(2011) 44 University of British Columbia Law Review 663. 
72 Christine Parker, ‘The “Compliance” Trap: The Moral Message in Responsive Regulatory 
Enforcement’ (2006) 40(3) Law and Society Review 591. 
73 Ibid. 
74 Neil Gunningham, Peter Grabosky and Darren Sinclair, Smart Regulation: Designing 
Environmental Policy (Clarendon Press, 1998) 399. 
75 Jan Freigang, ‘Scrutiny: Is Responsive Regulation Compatible with the Rule of Law?’ (2002) 8(4) 
European Public Law 463. 
76 Judith Freedman, ‘Responsive Regulation, Risk and Rules: Applying the Theory to Tax Practice’ 
(2011) 44(3) University of British Columbia Law Review 627. 
13 
detection of noncompliance are essential.77 Mendeloff states that the success of 
responsive regulation depends on a number of factors, including the tax agency’s 
resources, size of the regulated population, types of standard imposed, observability 
of noncompliance, costs of compliance, financial assistance available for compliance 
and penalty structure.78 Kornhauser argues that the responsive regulation theory drives 
the tax authority to operate in a narrow strait between Scylla and Charybdis—it 
prevents the authority becoming either too flexible or too strict in its behaviour towards 
taxpayers.79 Odinkonigbo argues that this model may not work for developing 
countries because it is derived from the context of developed economies.80 Since 1970s 
research on tax compliance behaviour appears to be booming in the arena though no 
single theory is capable of explaining the issue in its totality. Each has its merit and 
demerit calling for extended debate and new theories. 
 
In an attempt to improve compliance in the field of income tax, one widely employed 
legal tool is the tax amnesty scheme. Previous research argues that tax amnesty 
improves compliance;81 however, critics present evidence that compliance gradually 
diminishes and that the scheme fails to gather sufficient revenue for the government.82 
Alm and Beck find a positive effect of tax amnesty on revenue collection when 
combined with increased enforcement measures.83 Parle and Hirlinger observe that 
amnesty programs are revenue yielding, though in low volume, and appear to be low-
cost, low-risk political undertakings that increase compliance and minimise budget 
shortfall.84 Through an empirical study, Rakhmindyarto identifies the factors creating 
a successful tax amnesty program in Indonesia.85 Rechberger et al. study the influence 
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of the perceived justice of tax amnesty on future tax compliance, and find that post-
amnesty tax compliance is positively influenced by the perceived justice of tax 
amnesty.86 The fairer the tax amnesty was perceived, the more honestly people 
reported their income in the post-tax amnesty periods. 
 
Luitel argues that tax amnesty augments government revenue and ensures income 
distribution in society. It creates an opportunity for delinquent taxpayers to change 
their behaviour and act honestly in terms of tax compliance, which helps alleviate guilt 
among citizens.87 Baer and Le Borgne observe that tax amnesty is an efficient tool to 
generate internal revenue in both the short and long term.88 Saracoglu and Kasakurlu 
contend that, in the short term, tax amnesty increases tax compliance by bringing the 
taxpayers from informal economy through detection.89 Boise states that tax amnesty 
can generally lead to a transition to a new tax enforcement regime that features more 
stringent enforcement activities.90 Lederman contends that increased enforcement 
necessitates changes in norms, and that amnesty works as a transition relief.91 Bose 
and Jetter find that citizens are motivated to participate in a tax amnesty because the 
changing circumstances cause taxpayers’ previous noncompliance decisions to 
become inefficient.92 The new situation inspires taxpayers to consider it wise to 
comply through participation in the tax amnesty. 
 
In contrast, Alm, Martinez-Vazquez and Wallace’s study on the tax amnesty 
implemented by the Russian Federation concludes that tax amnesties produce little 
short- or long-term effect on revenue.93 They conclude that, as a policy instrument, a 
                                                          
86 Silvia Rechberger et al, ‘Tax Amnesties, Justice Perceptions, and Filing Behavior: A Simulation 
Study’ (2010) 32 Law & Policy 214. 
87 Hari Sharan Luitel, Essays on Value Added Tax Evasion and Tax Amnesty Programs (PhD Thesis, 
West Virginia University, 2005) 2 
<http://wvuscholar.wvu.edu:8881//exlibris/dtl/d3_1/apache_media/L2V4bGlicmlzL2R0bC9kM18xL2
FwYWNoZV9tZWRpYS8yMDczMg==.pdf>. 
88 Katherine Baer and Eric Le Borgne, Tax Amnesties: Theory, Trends, and Some Alternatives 
(International Monetary Fund, 2008). 
89 Osman Fatih Saracoglu and Eren Kasakurlu, ‘Tax Amnesty with Effects and Effecting Aspects: Tax 
Compliance, Tax Audits and Enforcements Around: The Turkish Case’ (2011) 2(7) International 
Journal of Business and Social Science 95. 
90 Craig M Boise, ‘Breaking Open Offshore Piggybanks: Deferral and the Utility of Amnesty’ (2007) 
14 George Mason Law Review 667. 
91 Leandra Lederman, ‘The Use of Voluntary Disclosure Initiatives in the Battle against Offshore Tax 
Evasion’ (Research Paper No 200, Indiana University, January 2012). 
92 Pinaki Bose and Michael Jetter, A Tax Amnesty in the Context of a Developing Economy 
<https://research.stlouisfed.org/conferences/.../Amnesty_Paper_Feb18.pdf>. 
93 Alm, Martinez-Vazquez and Wallace, above n 82. 
15 
tax amnesty for Russia is not helpful.94 Torgler, Schaltegger and Schaffner’s cross-
cultural comparative study with data from European and Latin American countries 
reveals that tax compliance increased significantly when people had the opportunity 
to vote for or against a tax amnesty, independently from whether a tax amnesty was 
rejected or not. The expectation of further tax amnesties had a negative effect on tax 
compliance.95 Through a study of Michigan tax amnesty programs, Fisher, Goddeeris 
and Young find that amnesty programs could not substantially increase the number of 
taxpayers. Instead, existing taxpayers took advantage of the program by paying their 
unpaid tax debts.96 Joulfaian notices the same trend in Massachusetts tax amnesty 
programs.97 Christian, Gupta and Young’s study uses data from Michigan state to 
ascertain the effect of tax amnesty on subsequent return filing.98 They find that two-
thirds of new taxpayers and nine-tenths of previous taxpayers who filed amended tax 
returns under the amnesty program filed a state income tax return after the amnesty 
period was over. Meanwhile, Uchitelle finds that tax amnesties have mixed success. 
Some programs have failed to widen the tax base, while some have succeeded, and 
some programs could raise revenue, while others could not.99 
 
Martinez notes that states without tax amnesty programs also experienced an increase 
in revenue and compliance rates like the states having same with amnesty programs 
by implementing enforcement measures.100 In an analysis with US data, Alm, McKee 
and Beck find that compliance decreased after the tax amnesty period because of the 
expectation of further amnesty, and that post-amnesty revenue increased if strong 
enforcement measures were implemented.101 Alm argues that tax amnesty produces 
limited revenue, and there is exaggeration in presenting revenue data collected through 
amnesty programs.102 Repeated amnesties are even less effective; consequently, tax 
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amnesty should not be regarded an efficient revenue raising tool. Gupta and 
Mookherjee’s study in India examines the effect of revenue collection of tax amnesty 
programs, and finds an insignificant effect of amnesty on revenue collection, except 
for one sudden boost in revenue collection.103 Luitel and Sobel present evidence 
regarding state tax amnesty programs that indicates that repeated amnesty programs 
reduce state revenue collection.104 
 
Through empirical research, Fox and Murray find that the tax amnesty programs 
conducted by US states over a long period depend largely on economic, fiscal and 
political factors.105 They also find that the initial tax amnesty increases revenue 
collection, while later amnesties produce less revenue. Mikesell and Ross find tax 
amnesty programs to be the norm for US state tax collection systems.106 Jacques 
Malherbe et al. contend that, as a result of tax amnesty, honest taxpayers might be 
encouraged to reduce their compliance because they perceive the amnesty to be an 
unfair tax concession for delinquent taxpayers, and consequently might perceive tax 
evasion as a profitable activity.107 Vihanto argues that the decision of taxpayers to 
evade tax depends on their perception of the fairness of the tax system, and tax amnesty 
can make the system appear unfair.108 Hasseldine argues that tax amnesty reduces tax 
evasion guilt among the delinquent taxpayers.109 Torgler, Shaltegger and Schaffner 
find that an initial tax amnesty increases tax compliance, while recurring amnesties 
have a negative effect on the compliance rate.110 
Stella argues that the enforcement capacities of different US states have made amnesty 
programs successful, while developing countries lack adequate enforcement 
capabilities.111 Bayer, Oberhofer and Winner find that the policy of tax amnesty arises 
first from the government’s fiscal necessity, and second from taxpayers’ expectation 
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of further amnesties.112 Since the benefits of tax amnesty remain modest and often 
below the cost of conducting the programs, governments should consider not offering 
tax amnesty because it may enhance pressure on future budgets. Under such 
circumstances, governments should not implement tax amnesty. Rather, appropriate 
legislation should be introduced to improve compliance. However, Bayer, Oberhofer 
and Winner do not indicate what the nature and extent of such legislation should 
encompass. 
 
When a tax system announces a tax amnesty program, it indicates that tax evasion 
prevails in the country. The government of Bangladesh offers tax amnesty on a regular 
basis, with the hope of augmenting revenue and gaining more taxpayers. However, no 
marked improvement has been observed, despite repeated amnesty programs.113 
Rather, the amnesty program appears to be used as a tool to ‘whiten black money’.114 
However, no substantial work has been found investigating the effect of tax amnesty 
programs in Bangladesh. 
It is observed that tax amnesty has many faces and impacts on tax compliance in the 
tax administrations around the world. While it seems to generate revenue in short term, 
repetitive amnesty programs encourage tax evasion. Particularly in developing 
countries like Bangladesh such tax amnesty programmes can be one probable means 
of turning black economy into white one. 
 
Another ‘silver bullet’ legal tool to improve tax compliance is the tax information 
reporting return system. Although this is widely used in developed countries such as 
Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the US, in a developing country such as 
Bangladesh, the legal regime is not sufficiently strong and broad to combat tax 
noncompliance. Tax experts and tax administrations around the world have expressed 
consensus about the effectiveness of information reporting systems in tackling the 
problem of non-compliance. Heiberg identifies third-party tax information reporting 
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as a primary tax enforcement tool.115 Highfield states that information reporting 
obligations refer to a statutory requirement on payers of specific categories of income 
to report to the tax authority relevant information about the taxpayers’ income.116 Such 
obligations might form an important component of a withholding regime or as a 
separate standalone requirement in relation to prescribed categories of payments made 
to taxpayers. 
 
Kleven et al. find that the compliance rate is high for income that is subject to third-
party reporting, as compared to self-reporting income. They conclude that it was not 
the unwillingness of taxpayers to evade tax, but the pervasive use of a third-party 
reporting system, that encouraged taxpayers to more fully comply.117 Brookes suggests 
that an information reporting system is one of the most effective tools to increase 
voluntary compliance.118 According to Brooke, taxpayers tend to ‘cheat’ if they get an 
opportunity, and a good tax system must seek to deny taxpayers the opportunity to 
cheat—tax information reporting is a tool that reduces this opportunity. The US 
Government Accountability Office (GAO) observes that information reporting is a 
powerful tool that reduces tax evasion and helps taxpayers comply voluntarily.119 
 
Kreiner argues that attempts to declare less income than third-party reported income 
rarely occur.120 Lederman argues that there is always information asymmetry between 
the tax office and taxpayers. This asymmetry of information between the tax official 
and taxpayer creates an easy avenue for tax evasion, and an information reporting 
system can be a solution to this type of information problem.121 Olson observes that 
approximately one-third of the tax gap arises from unreported transactions. She argues 
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that tax revenues would increase if every taxable transaction was subject to third-party 
reporting requirements.122 
 
Highfield argues that an efficient and broad information reporting regime can 
substantially tackle the problem of noncompliance. In regard to the Australian tax 
information reporting regime,123 Highfield notes that the insufficient coverage of an 
information reporting system in Australia is seriously and negatively affecting the 
level of compliance.124 This remains one of the weaknesses of the Australian taxation 
system. The more the information reporting regime is broadened and the more income 
is brought in the purview of the reporting regime, the more positive results can be 
achieved to increase taxpayers’ voluntary compliance. 
 
The 2009 OECD report finds that New Zealand’s tax information reporting regime is 
very broad and effective. According to New Zealand’s Inland Revenue Department 
(IRD), the information regime helps the tax department locate taxpayers who are not 
in the tax net. Data collected through information reporting is used to pre-fill summary 
of earnings forms and personal tax summary forms that are provided to taxpayers.125 
In Canada, the Canada Revenue Agency (CRA) effectively uses the information 
gathered through the third-party information reporting system to address issues of 
noncompliance. The CRA has been very successful in combatting tax con-compliance 
through using this system. However, Morse argues that the costs of administering an 
additional third-party reporting system by the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) might 
outweigh its benefits.126 
 
Reluctance from politicians to extend the information reporting regime constitutes one 
of the major obstacles to this system. In addition, public tolerance of an informal 
economy might be a reason for not introducing a comprehensive information reporting 
regime.127 Kamdar contends that expanding information reporting requirements places 
an additional burden on the third parties who must file the requisite forms. However, 
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he does not discuss the long-term benefits of successful tax information reporting.128 
The OECD notes that the costs of administering an information reporting regime might 
be one of the factors deterring revenue authorities from implementing this.129 This 
appears to be particularly true for developing countries that suffer from a lack of 
resources to introduce reform. Bartlett identifies lack of political will as an impediment 
to introducing a wide-ranging information reporting regime in the US.130 This may be 
even more problematic in developing countries, such as Bangladesh. Political will 
seems to remain one of the important factors to introduce a brad based tax information 
reporting system. But this is not the only factor. Lack of expertise, lack of resources 
and lack of cooperation from the stakeholders can also be identified as factors that 
limit government capacity to implement such a reform. 
 
Pomeranz, Carrillo and Singhal observe that third-party information is critical for tax 
enforcement and the growth of state capacity.131 However, they argue that the 
effectiveness of third-party reporting may be limited due to taxpayers making 
offsetting adjustments on less verifiable margins. When the tax authority notifies 
taxpayers about discrepancies, they report increased revenue, but claim higher 
expenses. For example, when anomalies in income reporting are revealed in firms, 
they claim costs of 96 cents for every dollar of revenue adjustment, thereby resulting 
in minor increases in their total tax collection. The implication is that, even though 
firms cannot suppress their true income due to information reporting, they avoid 
paying high tax by claiming high and inflated expenditures, thereby resulting in less 
taxable income. Pomeranz, Carrillo and Singhal suggest that this margin-offsetting 
problem can be tackled through proper audits by the tax authority; however, this 
research was confined to taxpaying firms in Ecuador.132 
 
It is observed from the above discussion that there has been a remarkable development 
in the tax compliance literature. The economic deterrence theory of tax compliance 
considers the rationality of taxpayers when engaging in a tax evasion game. However, 
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no single theoretical approach is adequate. Thus, this thesis seeks to suggest a 
pragmatic approach for Bangladesh. This approach leans towards a version of the 
responsive regulation theory adopted by the ATO. This thesis also seeks to make a 
novel contribution to the field of tax compliance based on the state–taxpayer 
relationship. It argues that the relationship between the state and taxpayers is a 
fiduciary one, and that any breach of this relationship affects taxpayers’ compliance 
behaviour in a negative manner. This thesis also observes that the legal tools used by 
tax administrations are sometimes effective and sometimes ineffective. For example, 
while there is evidence that the tax amnesty scheme improves compliance, there is 
conflicting evidence that it reduces compliance in the long term. This thesis proposes 
that, in Bangladesh, tax amnesty is no longer a useful tool and should not be employed. 
Instead, Bangladesh should introduce a broad and wide-ranging tax information 
reporting regime, as have OECD countries and other countries. The tax information 
reporting system (TIRS) is a very effective legal tool to improve sustainable taxpayer 
compliance. 
 
1.3 Structure of the Thesis 
 
This thesis focuses on voluntary compliance in the field of personal income tax in 
Bangladesh—a developing country. It presents a theoretical and legal analysis of the 
tax law and policy of Bangladesh, with the aim of identifying a route towards 
sustainable voluntary tax compliance. This thesis identifies the state–taxpayer 
relationship as a fiduciary one. It adopts an approach that has been termed a 
‘comprehensive’, ‘omnibus’ and ‘pragmatic’ approach133 to tax compliance. 
 
Chapter 2 explores the state–taxpayer fiduciary relationship issue. Like the state–
citizen fiduciary relationship, this is a novel attempt to import private fiduciary law 
into the public domain of the state–taxpayer. In this respect, it is argued that the state 
has a fiduciary relationship to taxpayers because taxpayers pay tax to the government 
in anticipation of receiving the necessary services that they could not receive other 
than through the government. Taxpayers trust the government to provide those 
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services. As a result, there exists a fiduciary relationship between the state and 
taxpayers. If the government is in breach of that relationship by not using tax money 
appropriately to provide goods and services, this can affect the tax compliance 
behaviours of the people of that country. This issue is more important and visible in 
developing countries such as Bangladesh, where it is alleged that the state regularly 
defaults in providing goods and services in return for taxpayers’ money. Consequently, 
this negatively affects the tax compliance behaviour of taxpayers. 
 
This thesis seeks to extend the scope of the fiduciary analysis of legal relationships 
beyond the traditional established relationships—such as trustee and beneficiary, the 
law of agency and others—to analyse the state–taxpayer relationship from a new 
perspective. The law of fiduciary, although belonging primarily to the private law 
domain, is expanded to the public law domain. 
 
Chapter 3 of this thesis describes the background of the tax system and administration 
in Bangladesh. It discusses the characteristics of the direct tax system in Bangladesh, 
and identifies the causes of tax noncompliance. One of the major features of the direct 
taxation system in Bangladesh is the prevalence of the ‘black economy’. The black 
economy refers to the business activities performed outside the reach of the 
government.134 This economy is one of the prime causes of tax evasion, and remains a 
global problem. For example, in Europe in 2013, the size of the black economy was 
2.1 trillion euros,135 and the situation is graver in developing countries. For example, 
in Bangladesh in 2011, the black economy grew from comprising 45 per cent to 81 per 
cent of the gross domestic product (GDP).136 The reasons for the existence of the black 
economy are manifold, and the effects are serious. One obvious cause of the black 
economy is widespread tax evasion in Bangladesh, with tax evasion and avoidance 
having become a part of the national culture in Bangladesh.137 This thesis will try to 
reveal the magnitude of this tax evasion, and the causes thereof. The tax administration 
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of Bangladesh has taken many steps over the years to tackle the problem of tax evasion; 
thus, some of these adopted measures will also be critically discussed. 
 
Chapter 4 discusses the different tax compliance frameworks and models developed 
by different international organisations, such as the OECD and ATO’s compliance 
model. In particular, this chapter discusses the probability of replicating the ATO 
compliance model to improve tax compliance in Bangladesh. In addition, this chapter 
critically discusses different theories explaining tax compliance behaviour. It reveals 
that each theory explaining tax compliance has some positive and negative aspects—
no theory is able to address tax compliance in its totality. As a result, each theory 
deserves attention, and a combination of all theories might work best to respond to tax 
compliance problems in developing countries, such as Bangladesh. 
 
The theories discussed in this chapter include the: 
x economic deterrence theory of tax compliance 
x social norm theory 
x psychological contract theory 
x shame and guilt theory 
x procedural fairness model 
x motivational posture model 
x organisational culture model 
x religiosity model 
x social identity theory 
x positive incentive/reward theory 
x prospect theory of tax compliance 
x needs preference theory 
x poverty and extended family burden theory of tax compliance 
x responsive regulation model of tax compliance (the ATO compliance 
paradigm) 
x tax compliance frameworks 
x slippery slope framework of tax compliance 
x OECD compliance risk management model. 
The economic deterrence theory regards taxpayers as rational beings who consider the 
advantages and consequences of tax evasion or avoidance. According to this theory, 
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taxpayers are more willing to comply if the chance of being caught and penalised is 
greater than the consequences of tax evasion. Thus, the theory suggests strict 
enforcement of tax statutes, along with regular audits and penalties. Social norm theory 
is an alternative theory of tax compliance that partially explains why people comply 
and pay tax. According to this theory, taxpayers respond to a compliance norm outside 
the ambit of legal enforcement or the command-and-control regime of tax authorities. 
The psychological contract theory of tax compliance views the relationship between 
taxpayers and the government as a contract. According to this theory, the moral 
contract between the government and taxpayers is important because any breach of the 
contract by one of the parties is accompanied by a resultant breach by the other party. 
 
Different to the traditional deterrence-based or actor model is the shame and guilt 
theory of compliance, which seeks to determine whether taxpayers’ psychological 
attitudes can be manipulated to create greater negative consequences for 
noncompliance. Shaming is a deterrent because it reduces propensity to commit the 
offence. According to the procedural fairness model of tax compliance, taxpayers’ 
perceptions of the fairness of the tax burden imposed on them are very important in 
explicating tax compliance behaviour. A perceived unfair tax system might encourage 
taxpayers to rationalise tax cheating. The motivational posture theory suggests that 
taxpayers maintain a social distance between themselves and the tax authority, 
signalling the nature of that distance through different postures that protect them from 
negative appraisal by the authority. The organisational culture model of tax 
compliance emphasises the organisational structure and behaviour of tax 
administrators, rather than focusing on the behaviour of taxpayers. The religiosity 
model emphasises the religious attitudes of taxpayers in shaping their taxpaying 
behaviour. According to this theory, partnerships between religious organisations and 
the government might be a crucial factor in ensuring compliance with tax laws. These 
types of partnerships have been successful in the US to reduce crime. 
 
None of these theories can provide a complete solution to the problem of tax 
noncompliance—rather, each theory partially explains the problem. In view of the 
inadequacies of the existing theories, this thesis argues that a comprehensive approach 
that combines all theories may be a more successful way to manage the tax compliance 
problem in Bangladesh. In particular, it is observed that the ATO compliance model—
based on the responsive regulatory theory—offers a comprehensive approach that 
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blends the two principal actors (deterrence and persuasion) to ensure tax compliance. 
Thus, after critically discussing the responsive regulatory theory and ATO compliance 
model, Chapter 4 argues that, because the ATO compliance model is currently the best 
option in the field of regulation, it is appropriate to replicate this model for Bangladesh 
tax administration, with some modifications. 
 
Chapter 5 discusses one of the most frequently used tools to improve voluntary 
compliance in the field of income tax in Bangladesh—the tax amnesty program. The 
tax amnesty program is widely used by both developed and developing countries to 
improve voluntary compliance. This chapter observes that the repeatedly used tax 
amnesty programs in Bangladesh have not been able to improve the tax compliance 
culture to the expected level, and not much revenue has been generated. While 
developed countries such as Australia, New Zealand, the US and Italy focus on 
offshore tax compliance programs, Bangladesh is still conducting onshore amnesty 
programs. In Bangladesh, the motivation is more political, rather than focused on 
revenue generation. This chapter argues that onshore tax amnesty is not an effective 
tool for Bangladesh to improve tax compliance. Rather, amnesty programs tarnish the 
principles of justice and fairness, and create resentment among honest taxpayers. As a 
result, honest taxpayers are encouraged to evade tax in anticipation of more lenient 
and repeated amnesty programs. Thus, certain conditions must be met to make these 
programs successful, and tax administrations should focus on offshore tax amnesty, 
following in the footsteps of developed countries, such as Australia, New Zealand, the 
US and other OECD countries. 
 
Chapter 6 presents a detailed discussion of TIRSs. In developed countries such as 
Australia and New Zealand, information reporting systems are effectively used to 
ensure voluntary compliance by taxpayers. Research has shown that income that is 
subject to information reporting is easily visible, which means that evasion can be 
readily detected. In addition, information gathered through the reporting system is used 
to supply a prefilled tax return to taxpayers, which saves their time and money. 
However, thus far, Bangladesh has been unable to use this system effectively to 
improve personal income tax compliance. This chapter argues that, considering the 
success of tax information reporting in developed countries such as the US, Australia 
and other OECD countries, Bangladesh could benefit from the system if appropriate 
legal provisions are made. This chapter explores the tax information reporting 
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provisions of developed countries, and suggests the best practice to be adopted for 
Bangladesh. The existing income tax law of Bangladesh provides for a TIRS, and, in 
2011, there was a change of law regarding tax information reporting. Thus, this law 
will be critically examined to establish its strengths and shortcomings. Finally, this 
chapter makes suggestions for best practice regarding the tax information reporting 
regime. 
 
Chapter 7 draws together the major conclusions from the above analysis and suggests 
some additional policy tools for reforming income tax administration in Bangladesh. 
To increase taxpayers’ compliance in the field of income tax, the NBR should accept 
these policy suggestions. While these tools are not all-encompassing, if implemented 
properly in a pragmatic manner, they will make a substantial contribution to improving 
the taxpayer culture in Bangladesh.  
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Chapter 2: The Fiduciary Aspect of the State–Taxpayer 
Relationship 
 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
Much research has sought to determine what causes the tax compliance behaviour of 
taxpayers in a country, and why some people comply with tax legislation and pay tax, 
while others do not. Although different theories and models of tax compliance have 
evolved, particularly since the late 1970s,138 and offered different explanations 
regarding tax compliance issues from different perspectives, none of these are 
completely satisfactory. Thus, it remains a puzzle as to why people comply and pay 
taxes. The existing tax compliance theories and models can be categorised as economic 
deterrence models, psychological models, sociological models and the responsive 
regulatory model of tax compliance. 
 
A brief review of the available theories indicates the range of explanations that have 
been proffered. Among the theories belonging to the economic models, the economic 
deterrence theory remains prominent.139 This theory argues that people, as rational 
actors, pay tax when they calculate that the expected benefits from evasion are 
outweighed by the attendant risks, and by the positive benefits of paying tax. Tax 
evasion is considered a gamble in which taxpayers either pay lower tax by 
underreporting, or become subject to punishment through detection from the tax 
authority. Taxpayers calculate the cost–benefit effect when making decisions not to 
comply, and enforcement is necessary to ensure compliance.140 This compliance is 
secured through audit and sanctions.141 In relation to this, the positive incentive or 
reward theory emphasises the role of incentives or rewards in affecting compliance 
from taxpayers.142 Sociological models of tax compliance argue that social forces also 
shape taxpayers’ behaviour, such as reward and punishment in economic models. For 
                                                          
138 Brooks, above n 133, 18. 
139 Allingham and Sandmo, above n 25, 323. 
140 Ken Devos, ‘Measuring and Analysing Deterrence in Taxpayer Compliance Research’ (2007) 
10(2) Journal of Australian Taxation 195. 
141 Martina Hartner et al, ‘Procedural Fairness and Tax Compliance’ (2008) 38(1) Economic Analysis 
and Policy 137. 
142 Kent W Smith and Loretta J Stalans, ‘Encouraging Tax Compliance with Positive Incentives: A 
Conceptual Framework and Research Directions’ (1991) 13(1) Law & Policy 35. 
28 
example, according to social norm theory,143 taxpayers respond to compliance norms 
outside legal enforcement or the command-and-control regime of tax authorities as a 
response to social norms.144 The procedural fairness model claims that the fairness of 
the tax system has a substantial effect in shaping compliance behaviour.145 The 
motivational posture theory suggests that taxpayers maintain a social distance between 
themselves and the tax authority, signalling the nature of that distance through 
different postures that protect them from negative appraisal by the authority.146 In 
contrast, the organisational culture model of tax compliance emphasises the 
organisational structure and behaviour of tax administrators, rather than focusing on 
the behaviour of taxpayers. Organisational culture is thought to be important in 
creating an effective and responsive taxation system.147 According to the slippery slope 
framework model of tax compliance, the power of and trust in authorities play a vital 
role in shaping tax compliance behaviour.148 
 
Several theories focus on psychological or subjective processes. The psychological 
contract theory emphasises the subjective contractual relationship between the state 
and taxpayers.149 According to the shame and guilt theory, the psychology of feeling 
guilt and shame plays a very important role in shaping compliance behaviour.150 The 
religiosity model explains that religious affiliation can influence tax compliance 
behaviour.151 Among more complex theoretical approaches, the responsive regulation 
model of compliance152 articulates an ‘enforcement pyramid’ to explain compliance 
behaviour. In some ways, the responsive regulation model combines both economic 
and psychological aspects of punishment and persuasion when seeking to explain tax 
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payer compliance.153 The pragmatic model of tax compliance was suggested by 
Professor Neil Brooks. According to this theory, to tackle the problem of tax 
compliance, tax administrations should craft a comprehensive strategy that seeks to 
reduce the opportunity to evade tax.154 
 
This study seeks to contribute to the theoretical debate on tax compliance by delving 
into the unexplored aspects of the state–taxpayer relationship, proposing that there is 
a fiduciary relationship between the state and taxpayers. This relationship influences 
taxpayers’ behaviour in terms of whether they will comply, and in what way and to 
what degree. While a state–citizen fiduciary relationship was proposed by Fox-
Decent,155 the state–taxpayer fiduciary relationship appears to be novel. This thesis 
borrows from the state–citizen fiduciary relationship theory and applies this in the field 
of tax compliance. It argues that there exists an overarching fiduciary relationship 
between the state and taxpayers, and this relationship shapes taxpayers’ compliance 
behaviour. When the state abides by its fiduciary obligations, taxpayers are more likely 
to comply with their taxpaying obligations. Conversely, if the state is in breach of its 
fiduciary duties towards taxpayers, this may affect the taxpaying culture in a society. 
 
2.2 The State–Citizen Fiduciary Relationship 
 
The concept of the fiduciary has its origins in antiquity.156 It encompasses a rich and 
complex legal history that is enlivened by concerns to guard against the interest arising 
from trust.157 Fiduciary duties have both religious and secular roots.158 Fiduciary is a 
concept in search of a principle.159Although numerous attempts have been made to 
define the fiduciary relationship,160 there is a lack of a suitable definition, and no 
universally accepted definition. According to Frankel, the cause of this lack of any 
general definition of fiduciary relationships can be ascribed to the various situations 
and contexts in which these relationships surface.161 The legal concept of the fiduciary 
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relationship originated in the English law of equity, which developed outside the ambit 
of common law in the fifteenth century and thereafter162 in the law of financial 
relationships, as in the bank–customer fiduciary relationship under banking and 
finance law.163 Fiduciary relationships include those between trustees and their 
beneficiaries, solicitors and their clients, doctors and their patients and so forth.164 
Thus, it can be said that fiduciary remains a prominent feature of the English law of 
equity and common law.165 Although the notion of the fiduciary relationship has been 
incorporated into the common law in England166 and beyond during the last two and 
half centuries,167 the law regarding fiduciary relationship remains unclear.168 DeMott 
states: 
Described instrumentally, the fiduciary obligation is a device that enables the 
law to respond to a range of situations in which, for a variety of reasons, one 
person’s discretion ought to be controlled because of characteristics of that 
person’s relationship with another.169 
 
In contemporary law, a fiduciary relationship is one in which someone in a position of 
trust has rights and powers that he or she is bound to exercise for the benefit of 
another.170 According to Miller, ‘a fiduciary relationship is one in which one party (the 
fiduciary) enjoys discretionary power over the significant practical interests of another 
(the beneficiary)’.171 Frankel suggests that fiduciary duties arise from services that 
involve entrustment of property or power to the fiduciary, who works for the benefit 
of the beneficiary.172A fiduciary relationship manifests when one party becomes the 
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subject of the ongoing administrative power of another, such as in the trustee–
beneficiary relationship.173 Criddle and Fox-Decent argue that the state exercises 
sovereign power as a fiduciary of the people who are nationals of the state.174 They 
further contend that, as a fiduciary, the state must abide by the norms of public 
international law that are ‘peremptory’ (or jus cogens).175 Fox-Decent argues that: 
the conditions inherent to sovereignty disclose a free-standing and 
overarching fiduciary relationship between the state and each person subject 
to its powers. This relationship in turn supplies the content of the rule of law 
which both constitutes and constrains the state’s authority to announce and 
enforce law.176  
Fox-Decent suggests that the state’s fiduciary duties are actual, rather than 
hypothetical. He argues: 
Thus when the state exercises power in a way that respects the fiduciary 
requirements of sovereignty, it exercises authority as well. In turn, the state’s 
conformity to the rule of law and its fiduciary obligations gives us, as 
subjects, a reason to fulfil our legal obligations. Thus, the fiduciary view of 
the state is not only of theoretical importance. Rather, as Chief Justice 
Vanderbilt noted it has practical implications for the ‘soundness’ of 
government, and indeed, for the integrity of any state committed to the rule 
of law.177 
 
Citizens play a role in electing democratic governments, and place their trust in the 
government to provide goods and services. Services that individual citizens can 
provide for themselves might be thought of as outside the scope of this expectation. 
Citizens repose their faith in the government to act for their welfare and as their agent. 
Thus, the government can be regarded a trustee who exerts state power on behalf of 
the people as a whole, and whose duty is to act for the benefit of the people. Arguably, 
the government cannot act legitimately for any other purpose.178 The main spirit of a 
democratic government appears to be implicit in the state–people fiduciary 
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relationship. This is the crux of the fiduciary aspect of the state–taxpayer relationship. 
Unlike members of earlier forms of the state, the citizens of the contemporary state 
expect the state to deliver effective services, which may include security; justice; stable 
economic conditions; public services, such as education, health and communication; 
and so forth.179 People also expect the state to be publicly accountable for upholding 
its expected functions.180 It can be argued that the expectation to receive these services 
is integral to the culture of paying tax, since these services need to be resourced. 
Governments must be capable of supplying the services as articulated by the 
expectations of the population. If the state does not respond adequately to the people’s 
demands, the relationship between the state and citizenry may become fragile. One 
consequence may be that taxpayers stop complying with their tax obligations. 
 
In contemporary states, the government is in many ways in a superior position to 
provide certain types of goods and services, such as infrastructure, health, education, 
economic policy, military activities and other issues of national interest. For these 
types of services, the state may enjoy something like a monopoly. Consequently, 
people have to trust the government. In turn, the government claims the loyalty of 
taxpayers, whose duty it is to pay their tax according to prevailing law. However, a 
government can still breach the fiduciary relationship by not properly performing the 
tasks with which it is entrusted. In such situations, people may find it very difficult to 
seek remedy for this breach. The available remedy would appear to be via the ballot 
box, so that people may dethrone a government that fails to meet its obligations under 
the fiduciary relationship. Wake argues that the fiduciary theory commands the 
government must respect citizens’ rights to improve their lives.181 Accordingly, the 
state must refrain from taking actions that would deprive individuals’ liberties and 
proprietary interests. 
 
2.2.1 The State as Real Fiduciary 
 
As noted earlier, fiduciary is a term that primarily derives from the private law domain, 
such as trust, contract, tort, corporate and financial laws. However, it appears to be no 
longer limited to that area, and the state is regarded as having fiduciary relationship 
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with its people. Leib, Ponet and Serota contend that, ‘Although rooted in private law, 
the fiduciary principle has also been widely employed to provide a descriptive 
explanation of—and normative frame for—the relationship between the state and its 
citizens’.182 Fox-Decent argues that there is an overarching fiduciary relationship 
between the state and its citizens,183 where the government in power is the trustee of 
the people. This is ingrained in political theory dating from the time of Aristotle, 
Cicero and Plato.184 Courts in Anglo-American jurisdictions frequently impose 
fiduciary obligations in relationships where one person places his or her trust in 
another, and subsequently remains vulnerable to harm. 
 
The fiduciary relationship does not arise as a matter of chance. In the state–citizen 
relationship, the fiduciary relationship is a systematic, purposive and clearly visible 
phenomenon. Miller indicates two types of fiduciary relationship185—the first is status 
based, and the second is fact based. According to the status-based approach, certain 
categories of relationship are considered a fiduciary relationship. Examples include 
trust–beneficiary, doctor–patient and attorney–client relationships. This is the most 
common and accepted view of a fiduciary relationship. The second approach of the 
fiduciary relationship suggests that a relationship can be identified as fiduciary if it 
exhibits certain characteristics of a recognised fiduciary relationship. Miller refers to 
Justice Wilson, who, in the Frame186 case, identified three elements to be present in 
the fiduciary relationship. First, a fiduciary is placed in a position where he or she can 
exert discretionary power. Second, the fiduciary can exert this discretionary power 
unilaterally, which can affect the beneficiary’s legal or practical interest. Third, the 
beneficiary or people on whom the discretionary power is exercised are placed in a 
vulnerable position. These are the three elements of a fiduciary relationship—
discretion, vulnerability and trust.187 It should be mentioned that the fact-based 
approach to the fiduciary relationship is complementary to the first element. 
 
The following considers the two types of fiduciary relationships in the state–citizen 
relationship. First, in the status-based approach, the government works as a trustee for 
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the people, who can be considered beneficiaries. The state in which people are born, 
live and die is not terra nullius. In the famous Wewaykum Indian Band v. Canada,188 
the Canadian court held that the relationship between the crown and indigenous people 
is fiduciary. Thus, the people can be regarded clear beneficiaries of the actions of the 
government, which conducts state affairs for the ultimate benefit of the people—
whether municipal or international. In the same way that trustees remain accountable 
to beneficiaries for their deeds, the government is expected to remain accountable to 
the people for its actions. People elect the government through universal franchise, and 
repose their trust to conduct state affairs and provide the requisite services to the people 
during the term of trusteeship. 
 
In the second type of fiduciary relationship, the state always has discretionary power 
regarding state functions, and governments exercise that power while undertaking their 
work. Obviously, discretionary power has limitations that dictate that this power must 
be sparingly and prudently exercised. For example, governments can use discretionary 
power when enforcing the rule of law in the state; however, that discretionary power 
cannot be used to establish rule of power.189 The state uses discretionary power to 
affect the interest of the people. In this respect, it can be argued that the government 
does exercise its discretionary power, which has the effect of changing or influencing 
people’s interests. 
 
The government has the authority to act on behalf of the people, and that authority is 
characterised by discretion by exercising which the government takes decision how to 
act under that authority. There are many instances in which governments’ decisions 
can substantially affect people’s interests. For example, when the government decides 
to allow a tax amnesty to ‘whiten black money’ and gives opportunity to delinquent 
taxpayers to steer away from any legal actions under the tax statutes, this may have a 
negative effect on the compliance behaviour of honest taxpayers. It is as a matter of 
the government’s discretion to decide whether to allow tax amnesty. Likewise, there 
are numerous situations in which the government exercising its discretionary power 
can affect the interests of the people, and place people in a vulnerable position. While 
this vulnerability may not be as visible as it is for individual cases, such as in 
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relationships between trustee–beneficiary, doctor–patient and attorney–client, there 
may be scope for government actions to place the people in a vulnerable position. For 
example, if the government of Bangladesh allows a transit facility to its neighbouring 
country over the land of Bangladesh, this may not appear to create an insecure position 
for the people. However, in the long term, this might jeopardise the security of the 
country in numerous ways that will ultimately place the people of Bangladesh in a 
vulnerable position in terms of environmental degradation,190 security,191 liberty and 
life. Thus, by applying the status-based and fact-based approaches of the fiduciary 
relationship, it can be said that there is a fiduciary relationship between the state and 
its citizens. 
 
The effects of this relationship are also noted in terms of protecting human rights and 
the state’s fiduciary obligation to protect the environment to ensure the health of 
citizens. Due to human actions at the connivance of the state, there is widespread 
degradation of the environment, which jeopardises the lives of citizens.192 
Consequently, according to the fiduciary theory of public authority, the state has the 
prime responsibility to avoid emitting large quantities of greenhouse gas that damage 
the environment, and to penalise polluters through taxation. Fox-Decent argues that, 
under the fiduciary theory of public authority, all states are obliged to guarantee a 
healthy environment for their citizens.193 States are joint trustees for the global 
atmosphere, and the people are the beneficiaries. Wood argues that government 
officials have trust duties related to handling the natural resources.194 This duty is more 
important than their general duty that must be performed in line with their oaths of 
office, and is different to normal bureaucratic jobs. This is the fiduciary duty of public 
trust that is owed to the people as beneficiaries. However, incorporating private 
fiduciary in the public domain is a recent development that is still in its embryonic 
                                                          
190 Ishak Mia, ‘India–Bangladesh Land Transit: An Environmental Perspective’, International Policy 
Digest (online), 11 August 2012 <http://www.internationalpolicydigest.org/2012/08/11/india-
bangladesh-land-transit-an-environmental-perspective/>. 
191 Piyali Dutta, ‘India Bangladesh Relations: Issues, Problems and Recent Developments’ (IPCS 
Special Report 97, September 2010) <http://www.ipcs.org/pdf_file/issue/SR97.pdf>. 
192 Amechi identifies poverty, lack of access to information, lack of public participation, lack of access 
to justice, lack of political will, and weak institutional capacity as the main factors contributing to 
environmental degradation in Sub-Saharan Africa. See Emeka Polycarp Amechi, ‘Poverty, Socio-
Political Factors and Degradation of the Environment in Sub-Saharan Africa: The Need for a Holistic 
Approach to the Protection of the Environment and Realisation of the Right to Environment’ (2009) 
5(2) Law, Environment and Development Journal 107. 
193 Fox-Decent, above n 21. 
194 Wood, above n 28. 
36 
stage—public fiduciary is a long way from being a recognised, separate branch of 
fiduciary law. 
 
2.3 State–Taxpayer Fiduciary Relationship 
 
The relationship between the state and taxpayers can be regarded a fiduciary one. This 
relationship exists independent of the knowledge of the citizens of this relationship. In 
other words, there exists a fiduciary relationship between the state and taxpayers even 
though the citizens may be unaware of the exact nature of this relationship—the 
relationship is subliminal. Taxpayers behave in a way that responds to the duty of 
paying tax, which causes the fiduciary obligation on behalf of the state—an obligation 
owed to taxpayers. Taxpayers trust the government not to dissipate or waste tax money 
in a way that would create resentment. For example, for years, taxpayers in the US and 
Australia have expressed dissatisfaction with the governments’ welfare programs 
created with the taxpayers’ money. This phenomenon had led to an issue that might 
undermine the state–taxpayer fiduciary relationship. 
 
The Australian welfare program is criticised based on the belief that the program 
causes dependence on welfare.195 It is argued that the welfare system removes 
incentives for people to work and become economically self-dependent.196 It is usual 
for taxpayers to want their government to be careful with welfare programs and ensure 
they are not a waste of taxpayers’ money. This situation creates a community interest 
conflict, which might jeopardise the state–taxpayer fiduciary relationship. Obviously, 
the welfare systems in Australia and similar countries ensure equity in society by 
promoting more equal distribution of wealth. Thus, considering the equity factor 
propounded by Adam Smith, it can be said that ensuring welfare for every citizen in 
the country—particularly those with less financial stability—falls within the scope of 
the fiduciary relationship between the state and taxpayers. 
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2.3.1 Entrustment: The Basis of the State–Taxpayer Fiduciary Relationship 
 
Some form of entrustment in the fiduciary can be regarded as the main feature of any 
fiduciary relationship. Frankel emphasises the entrustment placed on the entrusted by 
the entrustor.197 According to Frankel, ‘Entrustment is the most important aspect of 
fiduciary relationship. It greatly affects the existence, nature, and rules of fiduciary 
relationship’.198 Ribstein also considers entrustment the core issue in defining a 
fiduciary relationship.199 People place their interests, properties or authority in the 
hands of the fiduciary, and a special type of confidence is placed in the fiduciary. This 
confidence can be said to be utmost trust and good faith. Edelman contends: 
The argument is that we can only understand when fiduciary duties arise if 
we conceive of them as obligations based upon manifestations of a voluntary 
undertaking to another. By examining the corpus of cases involving fiduciary 
duties we can see that the scope of those obligations depends upon the scope 
of this express or implied undertaking. Fiduciary duties thus arise in the same 
manner as any other express or implied term: by construction of the scope of 
voluntary undertakings. They are not duties which are imposed by law nor 
are they necessarily referable to a relationship or status. It is time to move 
from thinking of fiduciary duties as a matter of status to understanding them 
as based upon consent.200 
Thus, it can be said that trusting others is an important feature of the fiduciary 
relationship and seems to be a common feature of all kinds of fiduciary obligations. 
 
The presence of entrustment is identified in the state–taxpayer relationship. Taxpayers 
pay tax with the trust and hope that the state will fulfil its expectations by using this 
tax to provide services such as quality education, health, agriculture, job creation, 
environmental protection and so forth. Taxpayers trust the government that the tax 
money will be spent for the wellbeing of the citizens of the country, and will not be 
dissipated or embezzled. The government comes into power through popular vote. 
According to Manin, through election, rulers gain unsurpassed superiority by virtue of 
which the rulers remain above than the others.201 Once a government is elected and 
takes power, it is in a superior position to exercise discretionary power over the citizens 
who pay tax to fuel the government machinery to work to fulfil popular expectations. 
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Thus, a situation of entrustment is created between the taxpayers and government 
because the government holds the state power in trust on behalf of the citizens, and 
uses this to achieve what is needful to further the interests of the people by providing 
expected and necessary services. 
 
However, there are arguments that entrustment is not the sole indicator of a fiduciary 
relationship. For example, Leary states: 
It is not simply the fact that public authorities, like many fiduciaries, are 
entrusted with discretionary powers to be exercised in the interests of public 
beneficiaries, that justifies treating public duty as fiduciary in nature. A 
central feature of fiduciary relations is not simply entrustment, but a vertical 
relationship of power, trust, and confidence between persons … The crucial 
point is that a duty is owed to the beneficiaries, whether or not this duty arises 
by delegation or by some other event or circumstance.202 
While there are divergences of opinions about the position of entrustment as the sole 
indicator of a fiduciary relationship, the current study argues that, without some form 
of entrustment, the fiduciary relationship becomes vulnerable and ill defined. The 
situation of entrustment leads to the state–taxpayer fiduciary relationship. Since 
entrustment remains pivotal to the creation of the fiduciary relationship, trusting the 
government with taxpayers’ money creates a situation of entrustment, which becomes 
a constituting factor of the state–taxpayer fiduciary relationship. 
 
2.3.2 Constitution as a Source of the State–Taxpayer Fiduciary Relationship 
 
The fiduciary relationship is generally regarded a legal relationship that has leverage 
in statutes and precedents.203 The courts recognise the fiduciary relationship as legal. 
For example, in the case of the trust–beneficiary relationship, the relationship is 
governed by specific rules that impose legal duty on the fiduciary.204 If there is any 
breach of these legal duties, courts of law are readily available to seek to redress 
against this wrongdoing. In the case of the state–taxpayer fiduciary relationship, it may 
appear unclear and perplexing when considering the legality of the relationship. More 
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importantly, if this relationship is breached, it may be unclear how to seek redress 
against such infringement. 
 
Most countries of the world have constitutions as the source of state power. The 
constitution is regarded the supreme law of the land, and any other law that appears 
inconsistent with the provisions of the constitution is regarded null and void.205 Thus, 
given that the constitution is the supreme law of the land and source of power for the 
government, it can also be regarded the source of the state–taxpayer fiduciary 
relationship. The constitution states that, in a country run on democratic principles, all 
power belongs to the people. The government cannot go beyond the ambit of the 
constitution—at least theoretically—while making any decisions or implementing any 
law. The constitution prescribes the system of electing the government through popular 
vote. The power a government exerts over its citizens emanates from the 
constitution.206 For example, Article 7 of the Constitution of the People’s Republic of 
Bangladesh says that state power belongs to the people, and the constitution is the 
expression of the people’s will and supreme law of the land. According to the 
constitutional provision, power belongs to the people and the constitution is the 
supreme law of the land as a solemn expression of the will of the people. The 
government must perform its duty according to the power delegated to it by the 
provisions of the constitution.207 
 
The citizens of a country do not exercise the power that belongs to them according to 
the constitution—they elect a government and authorise it to exercise power on their 
behalf for their best interests. The constitution guarantees various rights to the people, 
including the right to life, freedom of speech, religion, equal treatment before the law 
and others.208 If the government violates any provisions of the constitution and fails to 
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guarantee any right without any reasonable cause, there is provision in the constitution 
for filing a writ petition against the actions or failure of the government. These are all 
indications that the government stands in a fiduciary relationship to its citizens in 
general,209 and taxpayers more specifically. Section 5 of the Constitution of Australia 
provides that the Constitution Act: 
and all laws made by the Parliament of the Commonwealth under the 
Constitution, shall be binding on the courts, judges, and people of every State 
and of every part of the Commonwealth, notwithstanding anything in the 
laws of any State. 
According to Section 109 of the Constitution of Australia: ‘when a law of a State is 
inconsistent with a law of the Commonwealth, the latter shall prevail, and the former 
shall, to the extent of the inconsistency, be invalid’. The inconsistent state law is 
invalid because it is inconsistent with the laws enacted under the authority of the 
Commonwealth Constitution, which is the highest law of the land. In England, the 
Magna Carta of 1215210 is the document that upholds the rights of the people. 
Likewise, the constitutions of different US states assert the rights of the people.211 
Given that these constitutions do not specifically mention any term or topic specifically 
related to fiduciary, it can be presumed to be implied in the relevant provisions of these 
constitutions—the spirit of the constitution should imply such a relationship. 
 
As aforementioned, in Canada, the constitution and the courts guarantee the rights of 
the indigenous people of Canada regarding land title, and the Canadian government 
recognises the responsibility to ensure that the indigenous people live in equality with 
non-indigenous citizens.212 In Guerin v. R (1984),213 it was held inter alia that the 
fiduciary relationship is rooted in the concept of the indigenous title. The fiduciary 
obligation owed to the indigenous people by the crown is sui generis—one of a kind. 
This relationship was also affirmed in later cases. For example, in R v. Sparrow,214 it 
                                                          
209 The constitutions of the different states of the US employ the terms ‘trust’ and ‘public trusts’, 
where the term ‘trust’ is used and interpreted in the sense of the fiduciary duties of the elected 
government officials. Robert G Natelson, ‘The Constitution and the Public Trust’ (2004) 52 Buffalo 
Law Review 1077. 
210 The Magna Carta (‘The Great Charter’) was adopted in 1215 mainly to guarantee the rights of the 
feudal lords and English nobles. Later, it also guaranteed the rights of the citizens, and curtailed the 
immense tyrannical power of the monarchs of the time. Lord Irvine of Lairg, The Spirit of Magna 
Carta Continues to Resonate in Modern Law, 144 <http://australianfluorideaction.com/wp-
content/uploads/2010/11/AFA-LAW-Magna-carta-Lecture_Lord-Irvine_October2002.pdf>. 
211 For example, Article I of the 1776 Constitution of Maryland states, ‘That all government of right 
originates from the people, is founded in compact only, and instituted solely for the good of the 
whole’. <http://www.nhinet.org/ccs/docs/md-1776.htm>. 
212 Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act 1867 (Imp) s 35. 
213 [1984] 2 SCR 335. 
214 [1990] 1 SCR 1075. 
41 
was held that the Canadian government has the responsibility to act in a fiduciary 
capacity with respect to the indigenous people. The relationship is based on trust, 
rather than adversary. These cases were decided in the ambit of Section 35 of the India 
Act, which considers native title. 
 
In Wewaykum India Band v. Canada,215 a case not based on Section 35, the crown–
indigenous people fiduciary relationship was reiterated. In the Wewaykum case, the 
court inter alia held that the fiduciary duty does not exist in general—not all 
obligations between the parties to the fiduciary relationship were fiduciary in nature. 
According to the Report of the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples, the fiduciary 
relationship is the fundamental feature of the Constitution of Canada. The crown is not 
an ordinary fiduciary to the indigenous people, and the concept of fiduciary 
relationship and obligations arising from it are still being developed.216 It is clear that 
the Canadian Supreme Court labelled the crown–indigenous people relationship a 
fiduciary one, giving rise to fiduciary obligations in special circumstances. However, 
the courts regard the duties arising from the fiduciary relationship as not available 
under all circumstances. 
 
With respect to the state–citizen fiduciary relationship, Fox-Decent and Criddle 
reiterate that there is a fiduciary relationship between the state and its subjects, and 
that this relationship gives rise to fiduciary duties. Fox-Decent and Criddle argue that 
the state has the fiduciary duty to ensure its citizens have secure and equal liberty. The 
assumption of institutional power by the government gives rise to such fiduciary 
duties.217 The authors relate the fiduciary duty to the state’s authority regarding the 
treatment of human rights by the state. They contend that, to fulfil its fiduciary duties, 
the state must honour the equal dignity of all its citizens, and must not discriminate 
among subjects to maximise social welfare, which remains one of the principal 
purposes of the state. The government holds public power as a trustee of the people, 
and must use it for the people’s benefit. It cannot be used to deliberately treat subjects 
as a means to another end.218 
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2.3.3 Governments’ Law-making Power and Fiduciary Duty 
 
When the state makes any law, it makes it in the capacity of fiduciary. Matthew argues 
that the state operates as a fiduciary agent as a descriptive matter of history and positive 
law.219 While discussing the fiduciary position of the US government under the Patient 
Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010 (ACA), he emphasises the economic 
agency theory of the state to analyse the state’s fiduciary relationship.220 He bases his 
argument on the historical background of how the US states ceded their powers to the 
federal government as their agent. He states: 
The agency relationship is at the core of our democratic form of government. 
Organized originally to reflect the terms of corporate charters, each of the 
colonies evolved into sovereigns that ultimately ceded authority to the 
federal government to act on their behalf as an agent. I therefore extend the 
economic agency theory of the state, based on these historic facts, to explain 
that in passing the ACA, Congress acted within its fiduciary capacity as an 
agent to accomplish what the people of the United States could not 
accomplish independently, or could not accomplish well apart from their 
government … that the state operates as a fiduciary agent as a descriptive 
matter of history and positive law.221 
 
When the Australian states empowered the federal government under Section 51 of the 
Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act 1900, the federal government became a 
fiduciary to the states—and subsequently the people—in terms of performing specific 
duties, such as collecting taxes and ensuring the security of the state. When the 
Australian federal government makes any law, it passes that law in a fiduciary 
capacity. It is worth mentioning that the history of the Australian constitution and 
federation is a history of a process effectuated through conventions of the different 
colonies of Australia in phases. The Commonwealth of Australia was created on 1 
January 1901, when the Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act 1900 came into 
force. The Australian Federation is based partly on the parliamentary supremacy of 
England, and partly on the US system of federation. The main theme is the protection 
of the citizens against the power of the government by allocating the power through 
separation of powers.222 Thus, in line with the US constitution, it is logical to argue 
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that the Australian Commonwealth government remains accountable to the people of 
Australia and stands in a fiduciary relationship to them. 
 
2.3.4 The Principal–Agent Relationship and State–Taxpayer Fiduciary 
Relationship 
 
In explicating the nature of the fiduciary relationship and its corresponding obligations, 
the principal–agent theory of relationship plays a vital role. The fiduciary obligation 
concept has religious origins, with both the Christian and Muslim religions recognising 
humans as the agent of god in the world. Szto argues that fiduciary duties have both 
Christological and secular origins.223 In tracing the history of fiduciary duties, Szto 
states: 
The origin of fiduciary duties has religious and secular roots. These roots 
were wed by canon lawyers in the medieval era … Fiduciary duties in the 
biblical tradition begin in the Genesis creation account … God is the world’s 
eternal owner, and his agents are stewards. Fiduciary duties thus bond God, 
his creation, and his creatures. Adam and Eve failed in the enterprise, 
however, and the rest of biblical history is the story of redemption. It is a 
search for the faithful fiduciary and a permanent inheritance.224 
Atherton, Blodgett and Atherton contend that fiduciary law has religious origins.225 It 
developed as a result of the secularisation of a particular religious tradition, where a 
shepherd taking care of his or her flock could be compared to a fiduciary (steward or 
employer) or agent (servant or employee) tending the sheep for the owner of the 
flock.226 According to Young, after originating in religion, fiduciary was accepted and 
applied in the commercial domain.227 The religion of Islam also recognises the 
fiduciary obligation of humans who were sent to the world as vicegerents or agents of 
god. The relationship between humans, angels and Satan clarifies the status of humans 
among creatures, and highlights their special place as god’s vicegerents.228 
 
Thus, the fiduciary relationship theory has religious roots, and has been secularised by 
the state over time to reach the present condition. People are the agents of god in this 
world—they are ordered to obey the righteous rulers. Monarchs and rulers are held 
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responsible for the proper administration of justice, and are considered the holder and 
dispenser of justice among the citizens, according to religious prescriptions. Thus, 
monarchs can be regarded a model of godliness to the people by governing in a way 
that conforms to the requirements of the covenant between god and humans. The 
English law established stewardship through the Magna Carta of 1215. The king was 
to serve as a steward with fiduciary rights (ownership) in the management of his 
property, but was required to place the interests of his subjects (inferior rights) above 
his own—a fiduciary relationship.229 
 
The agent–principal relationship has been considered a fiduciary one by the English 
courts for a long time.230 In Armstrong v. Jackson,231 McCardie J states: 
The position of principal and agent gives rise to particular and onerous duties 
on the part of the agent, and the high standard of conduct required from him 
springs from the fiduciary relationship between his employer and himself. 
His position is confidential. It readily lends itself to abuse. A strict and 
salutary rule is required to meet the special situation. The rules of English 
law as they now exist spring from the strictness originally required by Courts 
of Equity in cases where the fiduciary relationship exists.232 
Thus, an essential characteristic of the principal–agent relationship is fiduciary 
obligation.233 According to DS Law, the principal–agent relationship remains vital for 
democracy.234 Law contends: 
In a system of constitutional government premised upon popular sovereignty, 
the government acts as the agent of the people and is supposed to exercise 
power consistent with the terms and conditions imposed by the people in the 
form of a constitution.235 
In a democratic state, people vote the government to power, thereby becoming 
principals, with the state as their agent.236 Chief Justice Holmes affirms that the state 
acts as an agent of the people.237 According to Iredell, ‘Those in power are their 
servants and agents; and the people, without their consent, may new-model their 
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government whenever they think proper’.238 The principal–agent relationship is 
termed by modern theorists as the doctrine of popular sovereignty.239 In the words of 
Gonzalez: 
Thus the essence of popular sovereignty is a principal–agent relationship 
between a principal/people and their constituted agent/government, under 
which a sovereign people grant governing power and authority to a 
government that acts as a trustee over the people's sovereignty.240 
 
The Declaration of Arbroath of 1320 is being put forward as the suggestion of popular 
sovereignty. According to the Declaration of Arbroath, Robert Bruce held the throne 
of Ireland solely to defend Ireland from English invasion. In the case of his failure, a 
new king would be chosen by the people to perform this duty on behalf of the people.241 
When governments are elected by the people as a result of the provisions of the 
national constitution, they become agents of the people. As agent of the people, their 
duty is to perform the designated jobs, using the sovereign powers entrusted to them 
by the principal. That is, people trust the agent in good faith to conform to the norms 
of behaviour as expected by the principal. Thus, when governments step into the 
principal–agent relationship, they are expected to honour the trust placed in them in 
good faith by the principal. This reliance on the government through placing trust and 
good faith can be regarded as giving rise to the state–citizen fiduciary relationship. 
People become the beneficiary and are entitled to good governance, according to the 
democratic norms and principles dictated by the national constitution. Through voting, 
people delegate their power to the government, whose duty is to act as the agent as a 
fiduciary for the people. If the government breaches this trust, the relationship is 
jeopardised and it becomes difficult for the people to respond to this situation. If the 
government becomes despotic, this poses a challenge for the people to exercise 
effective control on the government.242 In such situations, people must overthrow the 
government via popular uprising, which is very difficult for the ruler to withstand.243 
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The state–taxpayer fiduciary relationship can be related to the doctrine of popular 
sovereignty, which is also taken as a basis of the state–citizen fiduciary relationship. 
According to the doctrine of popular sovereignty, people own the sovereign authority, 
which they delegate to the government to exercise for the advancement and 
materialisation of policies regarding public welfare. Benjamin Franklin expresses the 
concept popular sovereignty: ‘In free governments, the rulers are the servants and the 
people their superiors and sovereigns’.244 In the US, the 1776 Pennsylvania 
Declaration of Rights says, ‘all power [is] … derived from the people; therefore all 
officers of government, whether legislative or executive, are their trustees and 
servants, and at all times accountable to them’.245 The main theme of this concept is 
that the legitimacy of the rule of law emanates from the consent of the people. Hobbes 
and Rousseau were the most influential people to advance the theory of popular 
sovereignty, stating that individuals choose to enter a social contract with one another, 
thereby voluntarily relinquishing some rights in return for protection from dangers. 
According to popular sovereignty, people give governments the power to govern them; 
thus, it is imperative that rulers hold that power as a trustee and stand in a fiduciary 
relationship to the governed, who are regarded beneficiaries. Thus, the doctrine of 
popular sovereignty is presented as the basis of the state–citizen fiduciary relationship. 
 
2.4 Limitations of the Governments to Act as Fiduciary 
 
An attempt to establish a fiduciary relationship between the state and taxpayers might 
cause practical problems that may make it difficult for the government to act as a 
fiduciary to the people. The concept of the state–taxpayer fiduciary relationship might 
generally face judicial resistance in the courts of Anglo-American jurisdictions. The 
courts have not reached consensus about the true nature and effect of fiduciary 
relationships, and the duties arising from them. There are divergences of opinion 
among judges about the application of fiduciary principles in cases before them, and 
they appear to be conservative when dealing with cases involving fiduciary duties. 
There is agreement among judges and commentators that the concept of fiduciary has 
not yet been successfully defined.246 The development of fiduciary law did not follow 
any principled way, and, in particular, common law jurisdictions have failed to define 
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the exact nature of the fiduciary relationship, justify fiduciary duties and explain the 
purpose of fiduciary duties.247 
 
However, while, under the common law, judges generally exhibit a cautious attitude 
in expanding the gyre of the fiduciary relationship, it is not uncommon to find cases 
where judges leant towards the view that governments have a fiduciary relationship 
with taxpayers. For example, in the case of Roberts v. Hopwood et al.,248 the House of 
Lords held inter alia that the Poplar Borough Council, while performing its duties, had 
responsibility as a trustee or manager of the property of others. Consequently, the city 
council was in breach of that duty if it dissipated taxpayers’ money in the name of 
charity or other reasons.249 In that case, the Poplar Borough Council paid wages to its 
employees at an increased rate, which was objected to by the district auditor. The 
district auditor disallowed the excess wages paid by the council on several grounds, 
one of which was that the council is a fiduciary body and cannot spend money in excess 
of the required amount to gain services.250 
 
Similarly, in Prescott v. Birmingham Corporation, the court held that local 
corporations owed a fiduciary duty to their ratepayers.251 Again, in 1981, the English 
court reiterated that city councils owe a fiduciary duty towards their taxpayers. In 
Bromley London Borough Council v. Greater London Council,252 Lord Wilberforce 
held inter alia that the Greater London City Council owed a duty of fiduciary character 
to its ratepayers, who must provide the money to be spent to provide services to the 
inhabitants of the council. Lord Diplock reinforced this by saying: 
A local authority owes a fiduciary duty to the ratepayers from whom it 
obtains moneys needed to carry out its statutory functions and this includes 
a duty not to expend those moneys thriftlessly but to deploy the full financial 
resources available to it to the best advantage … being … the rate fund … 
and the grants from central government respectively.253 
Courts in New Zealand also agree with the English courts that municipal councils owe 
a fiduciary duty to ratepayers. Some of the cases in which the courts held that local 
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councils have a fiduciary duty to ratepayers include Mackenzie District Council v. 
Electricity Corporation of New Zealand [1992] 3 NZLR 41 (CA), Barton v. Masterton 
District Council [1992] 1 NZLR 232 (HC), and Waitakere City Council v. Lovelock 
[1997] 2 NZLR 385 (CA).254 However, the theory of public fiduciary duty has never 
been welcomed in Australia.255 
 
The courts of the US, Canada and Australia have recognised the existence of a 
fiduciary relationship between the state and indigenous people. In the US, the court 
recognised the rights of the indigenous people and the fiduciary relationship between 
the state and the indigenous people long before Canada and Australia. In Canada, the 
courts have recognised the fiduciary obligation principle in some specific areas, except 
the native–crown fiduciary relationship aspect.256 For example, government decision 
makers, such as municipal councillors, have been held as fiduciaries in relation to those 
they serve.257 Fox-Decent describes: 
Courts have insisted that the claimant show a pre-existent right to the subject 
matter of the alleged fiduciary obligation. They have also clung fast to a 
formal private/public distinction according to which fiduciary duties belong 
almost exclusively to private law. The reasons that explain the dearth of 
fiduciary doctrine in public law, however, do not justify its absence.258 
Sossin contends that the emergence of new civil claims makes government 
administrators liable for breaches of fiduciary obligations, despite the fact that the 
requirements of trust have not been fulfilled.259 This happens when government 
officials have specific statutory obligations to act to protect the interest of a particular 
class of people. Sossin recounts: 
Canadian jurisprudence has been at the forefront of exploring the many 
incarnations of fiduciary obligations in private law, and so it is not surprising 
that Canadian courts have been instrumental in the recognition of public law 
fiduciary obligations as well.260 
 
It is evident that the courts in Canada are willing to expand the private fiduciary 
obligation law to the public domain, and hold the state as a fiduciary in relation to its 
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citizens. However, it is unclear to what extent the courts will recognise the state–
taxpayer fiduciary relationship. Dearth of judicial pronouncements fails to elaborate 
the issue. However, one case deals with the state–taxpayer fiduciary issue in Canada, 
which provides very poor fulcrum to support the state–taxpayer fiduciary relationship. 
The case is Harris v. Canada,261 in which it was argued by the plaintiff that, when 
imparting a decision regarding advance tax benefitting a particular family trust, the 
revenue minister used his discretionary powers illegally, improperly and with ulterior 
motive. This constituted a breach of the fiduciary duties that the minister owed to the 
taxpayers to act to further public interest. Harris’s argument was as follows: 
The circumstances of the rulings process suggest that all the elements of a 
fiduciary relationship exist between the Minister and Canadian taxpayers. 
First, the Minister has a discretion whether or not to issue an advance tax 
ruling in a given case. There are no statutory criteria guiding the Minister’s 
discretion … The exercise of that discretion will affect the practical interests 
of all income tax filers as a class, particularly when the matter involves a 
significant transaction which may have a large impact on the tax base. If 
under-collection or under-assessment of taxes occurs as a result of an 
advance tax ruling which erroneously interprets the law or permits an 
avoidance scheme to proceed, this will inevitably increase the load of tax on 
the shoulders of the rest of tax filers, as Lord Scarman noted in the Inland 
Revenue Commissioners case. This shortfall in public revenue must be 
corrected either through higher or newer taxes or through expenditure 
reductions. Either way, the very real and practical interests of Canadian 
citizens in general will be adversely affected. Due to the nature of the 
advance tax ruling process, Canadian taxpayers are peculiarly vulnerable to 
the Minister’s exercise of discretion. As noted, the process is secret and 
confidential, there is no right to appeal and taxpayers must place their trust 
in government officials to collect and assess tax in a fair and proper 
manner.262 
However, the court rejected the plaintiff’s argument of breaching the fiduciary 
obligation of the revenue minister, and held that that there was nothing within or 
outside the Income Tax Act to suggest that the minister was under a fiduciary obligation 
when exercising the discretion conferred on him by statute. As a result, fiduciary law 
is and should be restricted within the ambit where there is an identifiable beneficiary. 
While delivering judgement, Dawson J inter alia held that, in receiving and responding 
to the ruling request, the minister and his officials did not owe a fiduciary duty, or a 
duty akin to a fiduciary duty, to the plaintiff and those he represented. The Income Tax 
Act remains the only source of a minister’s actions and obligations, and there is nothing 
either in the statute or relevant ministerial guidelines to suggest that the minister owed 
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a duty in the nature of a private law fiduciary duty. Having discussed the position of 
tax fiduciary in Canada, the following will discuss the position in Australia regarding 
public fiduciary, particularly in terms of the judicial view. 
 
The Australian judiciary seems reluctant to expand the fiduciary law beyond the 
traditional private law domain. Langford states that the High Court of Australia has 
narrowed the scope of the fiduciary principle and expressed its reluctance to expand 
the fiduciary concept to new categories of fiduciary duties. In Australia, following the 
court’s pronouncements in Breen v. William263 and Pilmer v. The Duke Group Ltd (in 
liq),264 fiduciary duties have become proscriptive, rather than prescriptive, and the 
conflict and profit rules are currently the only recognised fiduciary duties.265 Langford 
argues that fiduciary duties in Australia are very limited in scope, given the court’s 
conservative constructions of fiduciary obligations; eagerness to limit fiduciary 
obligations to being proscriptive, rather than prescriptive; and wish to limit fiduciary 
to the conflict and profit rules.266 While in Bell Group Ltd (in liq) v. Westpac Banking 
Corporation (No 9),267 the court held that, depending on the particular fiduciary 
relationship, the fiduciary obligation can be imposed in other areas, it is highly unlikely 
that Australian courts will ascribe fiduciary status to fiduciary duties that have not 
formerly been viewed as fiduciary.268 Langford summarises the Australian fiduciary 
law as follows: 
First, the High Court appears to have rejected the existence of a prescriptive 
fiduciary duty to act in the interests of the principal, at least in the context of 
non-status based fiduciary relationships. 
 
Second, the preferable view is that the conflicts and profits rules are not the 
only remaining accepted fiduciary duties. Certain duties that have previously 
been recognised as fiduciary can continue to be so recognised. The High 
Court has, however, cautioned against the expansion of fiduciary duties to 
new categories. 
 
Third, it appears that fiduciary obligations are required to be proscriptive, 
although the application of this requirement has been shown to be unclear.269 
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Thus, considering the present scenario of fiduciary law in Australia, it is evident that 
it would be difficult to establish any fiduciary obligation of the government based on 
the state–taxpayer fiduciary relationship. 
 
In the US, the fiduciary relationship between the state and indigenous people has been 
recognised in several court cases, such as the Cherokee Nation case, where Justice 
Marshall recognised and reiterated the relationship between the state and indigenous 
people.270 More recently, the US Supreme Court reiterated the fiduciary relationship 
between the state and indigenous people in Cobell v. Norton,271 Confederated Tribes 
v. United States,272 White Mountain Apachee Tribe v. United States273 and Navajo 
Nations v. United States.274 In Canada, the crown is not generally held responsible for 
the management of indigenous bands (governing units of Indians in Canada instituted 
by the Indian Act, 1876). The relationship is viewed as one of political trust, rather 
than legally enforceable trust.275 In R v. Guerin,276 the Canadian court acknowledged 
that Canada (the federal government) has a trust-like relationship—or ‘fiduciary 
duty’—towards First Nations, specifically in regard to reserve lands. In other words, 
the federal government has the obligation to act in the best interest of the indigenous 
people.277 Chief Justices Wilson and Dickson interpret this fiduciary duty as stemming 
from an indigenous interest and title to the land, and the crown’s relationship to 
indigenous people. In Australia, although the courts do not directly recognise the 
existence of the fiduciary relationship between the indigenous people and state, they 
recognise the native title to land of the indigenous people, as in Canadian courts. 
Australian writer, however, recognised the fiduciary relationship between the state and 
the indigenous people.278 It is observed that, in all countries mentioned here, the courts 
directly or indirectly recognise the existence of a fiduciary obligation of the state only 
towards indigenous people. This is a special phenomenon where the court has 
identified the existence of a fiduciary relationship. However, it remains uncertain to 
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what extent the court will uphold the existence of the state–citizen fiduciary 
relationship. It is to be examined whether citizens have any power to bring an action 
against the state for the breach of a fiduciary obligation. Aside from judicial 
uncertainty, there are other factors relevant to mention here while discussing the state–
citizen fiduciary relationship. 
 
Certain factors can be identified that might impede the willingness of the government 
to act as a fiduciary in relation to its citizens. The government may be failing to 
undertake its fiduciary duties to the people as a result of certain factors, which tend to 
be more particularly applicable to developing countries. First, corruption among the 
governments of developing and transition countries remains a major impediment to 
the development of these countries. Taxes largely enter the pockets of corrupt 
politicians and bureaucrats, which reduces the capacity of the government to spend 
generously and appropriately for development and other work aimed at bettering the 
lives of citizens and eradicating poverty. According to a report by the United Nations 
Secretariat, governments have a responsibility to provide services of vital importance 
for development, including education services, health services, water and sewerage 
facilities, roads, public transport and essential housing.279 
 
It could be argued that the citizens of developing countries pay little or no tax, and that 
governments subsequently lack the necessary finances to complete their work as 
expected. However, it can also be argued that these governments receive annual 
donations from donor countries and loans on soft terms from the IMF and other 
international financial organisations. This money should be spent for the development 
of the country and welfare of the people; however, in most cases, it disappears due to 
rampant political and bureaucratic corruption. Specific examples exist in developing 
countries such as Bangladesh and India. In Bangladesh in 2012, the World Bank 
ceased disbursing a large loan for the construction of a bridge (the Padma Bridge) 
because of a corruption charge against one of the government’s ministers.280 Political 
parties in developing countries appear to have lost public credibility and the mandate 
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to function as a result of their own mismanagement of the political system.281 For 
example, in Pakistan, political parties have lost credibility to such an extent that the 
military’s overthrow of the established political order was accepted, if not welcomed, 
by the general public.282 
 
Political parties in developing countries no longer enjoy people’s trust. A survey of 
the people of Latin America, Europe and Africa showed that political parties ranked 
sixth in terms of enjoying popular support and trust.283 Due to constitutional 
provisions, governments are in a position to own, hold and manage public properties, 
such as the environment, hospitals, public transport and others. While holding and 
managing those public properties as a fiduciary of the public trust, the government 
employs substantial powers and discretion. This power can be used undeterred if laws 
do not establish any limitations on their use. However, Professor Torres argues that 
this type of power to control and manage public property is not limitless, and that a 
danger is that government officials can convert public property to private use through 
corruption.284 It can be concluded from the above that political parties in developing 
countries have failed to undertake the fiduciary duties that they owe to the citizenry in 
general, and taxpayers in particular. 
 
The government might compromise its fiduciary obligations owed to taxpayers by 
supporting the party’s interest over the welfare of the citizens. In developing countries 
such as Bangladesh, when undertaking infrastructure development—such as 
constructing roads, highways, bridges, hospitals and power stations—the government 
allocates the work to contractors that belong to the political party. These contractors 
focus on profit, rather than on ensuring the quality of the work. At times, these 
contractors take money from the government without actually completing any work. 
In such situations, the government breaches its fiduciary duties by compromising the 
quality of work, and by dissipating taxpayers’ money without any outcomes being 
achieved. 
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2.5 Remedies for the Breach of Relationship 
 
The fiduciary relationship calls for the use of discretionary power by the fiduciary. At 
the same time, there is a risk of this power being abused by the fiduciary to the 
detriment of the beneficiaries. According to Young, in every aspect of the fiduciary 
relationship, there remains danger of power abuse by the fiduciary, which can range 
from simple negligence or misunderstanding to intentional fraud and theft.285 Young 
clarifies this in terms of the agent–principal relationship, and identifies this risk as a 
cost associated with the agency relationship. In the case of the state–taxpayer fiduciary 
relationship, the risk of abuse of power can be identified, where the government might 
ignore its duties to the people by not doing a proper job or supplying necessary quality 
services to citizens. In that case, the government might be in breach of the fiduciary 
relationship. Thus, the question arises of how to remedy this breach. 
 
In financial and corporate or trust law, if the person in the capacity of fiduciary 
breaches the fiduciary duty, the person affected can seek a remedy of that breach by 
filing suits to enforce his or her rights in an ordinary court of law. However, the 
situation is not as clear when a government is in breach of a fiduciary duty. One 
solution to this is that people can file writ petition against the government for not 
performing its duties, thereby leading to breach of fiduciary duties. This then raises 
questions regarding applying the law of standing. According to the law of standing, 
before an individual can bring any action in a court of law, he or she must have some 
standing to bring that proceeding.286 Justice Brian J Preston suggests that the three 
prerogative writs—writ of prohibition, certiorari and mandamus—can be used in 
environmental cases.287 In the case of breach of fiduciary duties by the government, it 
seems logical to suggest that the prerogative writs can be employed by any taxpayer, 
and a public interest litigation proceeding can be brought before the court. Applying 
the traditional common law of standing in the state–taxpayer fiduciary relationship 
case might create some inevitable and established issues—the most important being 
that, as per common law traditions, to have standing to bring a proceeding before a 
court, an individual must prove that some harm or damage has been suffered as a result 
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of the violation of constitutional provisions.288 For standing, the individual must show 
that he or she has a special interest in the subject of the litigation. 
 
In environmental law cases, it is difficult for individuals to prove special interest, and 
courts have not always accepted that the people bringing the proceeding do have 
standing. For example, in Australia Conservation Foundation v. Commonwealth,289 
the court held that the Australian Conservation Foundation had no standing to bring 
action against the decision of the Australian government to allow a company to 
establish and operate a resort and tourist area in Central Queensland, to the detriment 
of the environment. Thus, this can be one of the most frustrating impediments to the 
taxpayer having any standing to prove special interest, and successfully bring any 
proceeding before the courts. However, the filing of suits against governments in 
developing countries by the people is becoming more frequent. For example, recently 
in the Philippines, some citizens of the Llocos Pangasiana coast filed a writ—called 
‘writ kalikasana’—against a large-scale mining operation along the coast. The writ 
was granted to effectively control the environmental degradation.290 In addition, 
recently in Bangladesh, a writ petition was filed against the government’s attempt to 
establish a power plant in Sundarban, based on its environmental degradation.291 
 
Ultimately, if a government fails to perform its expected duties, it can be ousted by the 
people in a general election. In a democracy, election remains the most effective and 
vital tool to reward or punish elected representatives for their acts.292 However, it is 
difficult to identify the state–taxpayer fiduciary relationship based on strong and 
distinct legal foundations as fiduciary obligations under private laws are. The 
constitutional basis of the state–taxpayer fiduciary relationship is sufficiently broad 
and general to render it incapable of being monitored by any individual citizen, as is 
possible in the established fields of fiduciary obligations, such as trust, torts and 
contracts. 
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2.6 Autocratic Governments as Fiduciary 
 
The state–citizen fiduciary relationship exists in democratic societies where the 
government is accountable to the people for its acts. However, in autocratic societies 
where people do not have voting rights, or when a constitution is suspended, the state–
citizen fiduciary relationship may not be visible. In such regimes, the rulers do not 
consider themselves accountable to the people because they are not voted to power. 
However, Fox-Decent suggests that the fiduciary doctrines can still be applicable in 
dictatorships,293 and that fiduciary doctrines apply to both democratic and autocratic 
or authoritarian situations. However, in authoritarian countries, the ruler may not be 
willing to abide by the fiduciary obligations. Consequently, in such states, the activities 
of rulers cannot be scrutinised through a fiduciary lens. For example, allegations of 
human rights violations in China are common,294 with China being a country under 
one-party authoritarian rule, where the government appears to care little about the rule 
of law or human rights. Thus, the indices of fiduciary obligations may not be as visible 
as in a multi-party democratic society. 
 
In a democracy, governments are elected through popular vote, and become the 
representatives and agents of the people. They are expected to work for the best 
interests of the voters who place trust in them, depending on their commitments of 
accountability and election manifesto. However, for such an accountable government, 
elections must be free and fair, citizens’ participation must be widespread and citizens 
must have political freedom.295 In many countries—particularly in developing 
countries of Asia and Africa—people have voting rights and countries are known as 
democratic states. However, many elections are not free and fair, and votes are 
purchased from voters. In such circumstances, it is difficult to uphold a true democracy 
that will ensure the accountability of the government to the people. Due to a lack of 
accountability and commitment to the people, the governments of such countries with 
apparent democracy might lack the traits of a fiduciary relationship. 
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Taxpayers contribute tax to the government to finance the necessary work that cannot 
be executed through individual effort. It is the duty of the government to complete this 
work on behalf of the people. People trust that the government will govern well and 
undertake work with tax money in terms of providing goods and services that cannot 
be achieved by individual efforts. Researchers tend to consider fiduciary obligation 
and good faith as separate domains; however, the relationship between good faith and 
fiduciary obligation remains largely unexplored.296 In case of contract good faith and 
fiduciary duties work as a complement to each other.297 Good faith appears to be an 
important element of the state–taxpayer fiduciary relationship. People pay tax to the 
government in good faith in anticipation of the government’s honesty298 in providing 
goods and services, based on the people’s social exchange relationship with the 
government. When the government rules well, it can be considered in compliance with 
the fiduciary obligations. When there is good governance, the quality of the services 
supplied to the people is ensured.299 When the government provides the expected 
benefits to the people, taxpayers become compliant. In support of this, Alm and Gomez 
find a positive relationship between the supply of goods and services to the people, 
and the rate of tax compliance.300 
 
2.7 Contractual Aspect of the State–Taxpayer Relationship 
 
According to Levy, there is a vertical contractual relationship between the taxpayer 
and state, and this contract shapes taxpayers’ compliance behaviour.301 The essence of 
a contractual relationship is quid pro quo—something is received in exchange for 
giving something else. From this perspective, paying taxes can be regarded a 
consideration for the government, and the government completing the expected work 
can be regarded as quid pro quo for the citizens. Levy argues that the vertical contract 
between the taxpayer and government is the quid pro quo of taxation and, under this 
vertical contract, taxpayers expect to receive public goods in exchange for taxes 
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paid.302 When taxpayers believe that the government has failed in its promise under 
the contract, they will not comply. 
 
Lassen contends that, if the government fails to provide benefit to taxpayers as 
expected, if benefits have been provided to a group of people with whom taxpayers do 
not identify, or if the flow of service is slow because of corruption, the quid pro quo 
on behalf of the taxpayers gradually disappears.303 Lassen suggests the concept of a 
horizontal contract between the taxpayer and government, although he does not define 
the term ‘horizontal contract’. However, according to this horizontal contract, when 
people trust others in their society to pay the correct amount of tax, they are encouraged 
to comply. Conversely, if people do not trust others to comply, they also choose not to 
comply and evade tax. To support his argument, Lassen refers to Laurin,304 who finds 
through a survey with Swedish taxpayers that, when people find that other people 
underreport their income, they also try to do the same.305 
 
It has been suggested that there is a social contract between the state and taxpayers.306 
This social contract presupposes the effective supply of political goods—that is, the 
expected public services from the government to taxpayers.307 According to Scholz, 
there is a contract between taxpayers and the state.308 Taxpayers contribute to the 
government treasury, and the government provides benefits and services to the people. 
This is the tax contractarian theory of tax compliance, where citizens’ compliance with 
paying taxes is contingent on the government’s performance of its obligations. Feld 
and Frey extend the contractual obligation to what they called the ‘psychological 
contract’.309 They argue that there is an implied psychological contract between 
taxpayers and the government to which taxes are paid. This contract shows that tax 
morale tends to expound the complicated tax compliance behaviours of taxpayers 
towards governments, and tax morale is endogenous and not residual while explaining 
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tax compliance behaviour. Given that the psychological contract—like an ordinary 
contract—connotes the rights and duties to which taxpayers and the tax-collecting state 
must adhere, each side is expected to perform duties under the contract in order to 
morally assert their right, and expect the other side to comply. Failure to perform the 
expected duties or noncompliance with the taxpaying obligation will trigger 
noncompliance with the contractual provisions from one of the parties—particularly 
from taxpayers. According to Feld and Frey: 
A contractual relationship implies duties and rights for each contract party. 
This is looked at from an exchange perspective according to which the 
government should provide public services to citizens in exchange for their 
tax payments. If the benefit principle of taxation, which implies a fiscal 
equivalence between public goods and tax prices, is violated by setting those 
prices too high, citizens think they have a justification for evading taxes.310 
 
It transpires from the above discussion that there is a contractual relationship between 
taxpayers and the state. However, this contract may not have the characteristics of a 
private contract executed by private citizens among themselves. Yet, if there does exist 
a contract in the relationship between taxpayers and the state, it can be argued that this 
type of contractual relationship is based on trust and good faith, which leads to a 
fiduciary relationship between taxpayers and the state. Ribstein argues that necessity 
fiduciaries are contractual because they arise from contractual relationships that entail 
default fiduciary duties.311 Thus, the contractarian theory of the state–taxpayer 
relationship clearly indicates that the relationship between the state and taxpayer is a 
fiduciary one that moulds the tax compliance behaviour of citizens. 
 
2.8 Conclusion 
 
Many factors shape the compliance behaviour of taxpayers, which may vary across 
countries and cultures. This chapter has sought to contribute to the compliance 
literature by arguing that governments stand in a fiduciary relationship with taxpayers. 
If governments fail or show incapacity to provide the necessary services to taxpayers 
as per their commitment, taxpayers may feel discouraged to comply with their tax 
liability. This theory can be regarded an ambitious extension of the state–citizen 
fiduciary duties into the tax compliance literature. This chapter has argued that the 
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state has a fiduciary relationship with its citizens in terms of maintaining the rule of 
law, applying laws to citizens, and protecting the environment for future generations. 
Likewise, states stand in a fiduciary relationship to taxpayers. If they fail to undertake 
their fiduciary duties, this might negatively affect the tax compliance behaviour of 
taxpayers. This chapter also observed that the relationship between the state and 
citizens is based on agency and a contractual relationship. It further revealed that the 
state–citizen fiduciary has religious origin, which speaks for the state–citizen and 
god’s fiduciary relationship. All these established theories countenance the present 
state–taxpayer fiduciary relationship aspect. This may not be as important in developed 
countries as in developing countries, where governments continuously breach the trust 
of the people. 
 
This is a novel idea and attempt to add to the existing tax compliance theories. The 
researcher is aware of the risk involved in propounding a new theory such as this, 
particularly in a legal system where fiduciary law has limited application; is 
proscriptive, rather than prescriptive; and has improbable extension. Such a theory can 
be lampooned and face scathing criticism from legal scholars. The main arguments 
against this theory are that it is unrealistic, idealistic and optimistic, and may fail to 
generate positive discussion. However, today’s theory can become tomorrow’s reality, 
as shown throughout history. Thus, it is argued that research should embrace the reality 
and accept the extension of the fiduciary law into the field of tax compliance, as it has 
been in the state–citizen relationship. While this proposition is ambitious, apparently 
unrealistic and marked with the aforementioned problems, these issues are not 
insurmountable, although they may appear difficult to resolve. Further research in this 
field will enable greater development in analysing tax compliance behaviour based on 
the proposed state–taxpayer fiduciary relationship theory. 
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Chapter 3: Background to the Tax System and 
Administration in Bangladesh 
 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter examines the history, background and development of the taxation system 
in Bangladesh—particularly income tax. The focus is on Bangladesh’s tax structure 
and reforms in direct taxation in order to present a picture of the direct taxation system 
in this country. Given that this research concentrates on tax compliance issues in 
Bangladesh, it is important to provide background information about income tax 
administration in Bangladesh. 
 
3.2 History and Development of the Income Tax System in 
Bangladesh 
 
The history of taxation in Bangladesh can be traced back to the early Hindu period, 
which was characterised by a complete system of taxation,312 where kings had the 
authority to impose taxes on citizens’ income.313 Taxes during ancient times can be 
classified as tax on land produce, tax on personal wealth of various kinds, poll tax314 
and succession duties. Sarkar states that ancient India had a very comprehensive and 
sophisticated taxation system.315 Among the principal sources of revenue were land 
tax, irrigation cess,316 octroi,317 customs duty, excise duty, salt tax, sales tax, excess 
profit tax, professional tax, trade tax, income tax, labour tax, poll tax, gambling tax, 
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Bali,318 Kara and others.319 Income tax was imposed on people of different 
professions.320 The citizens of the state would give tax to the king, and the king would 
give protection to the citizens.321 What is now defined as tax was considered a fee due 
to the king in return for service rendered by the king to the people.322 
 
This older system of taxation was further developed during the Mughal rule.323 This 
system continued up to 1860, when the term ‘income tax’ was coined and used by the 
then English ruler.324 In the Indian subcontinent, income tax was introduced in the 
context of war, as in England, the US, Australia and other countries.325 Before the 
introduction of income tax in 1860, British colonial rulers raised revenue through ‘tax 
farming’ by the ‘zamindars’.326 In 1860,327 income tax was introduced to the Indian 
subcontinent for the first time via the Income Tax Act. This was designed to make up 
the deficit caused by the Sepoy Mutiny of 1857.328 
 
In 1922, the Income Tax Act was enacted, which resulted from recommendations of 
the All India Income Tax Committee formed in 1921.329 This Act was a milestone in 
the evolution of direct tax laws in British India—the foundation of a comprehensive 
system of income tax administration was laid for the first time.330 The Act stayed in 
force until 1984, when, based on recommendations of the Final Report of the Taxation 
Enquiry Commission, submitted in April 1979, the Income Tax Ordinance 1984 was 
promulgated.331 
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3.3 Income Tax Administration in Bangladesh 
 
The Income Tax Department of Bangladesh (ITDB) is a continuation of the British 
colonial legacy.332 The contemporary organisational structure of the ITDB arose from 
the Income Tax Act of 1922. In 1924, the Central Board of Revenue Act constituted 
the board as a statutory body with functional responsibilities for the administration of 
the Income Tax Act. The central board of revenue later became the NBR, which is the 
apex revenue body and administers income tax administration. Some of the most 
important functions of the NBR remain collecting direct and indirect tax revenue for 
the government of Bangladesh;333 each year, preparing finance bills and issuing 
different statutory rules and orders, as well as other orders regarding direct and indirect 
tax; drafting and signing double taxation agreements regarding avoidance of double 
taxation;334 and reforming the direct and indirect tax system. 
 
3.4 Characteristics of the Income Tax Administration of Bangladesh 
 
The ITDB shares common characteristics with other tax administrations in developing 
countries.335 The tax base is narrow, with fewer than one million income tax filers, and 
tax evasion is rampant. The ITDB collects the amount of tax that taxpayers pay 
voluntarily, not the amount that taxpayers are supposed to pay as per the income tax 
law.336 Withholding tax gyre and information reporting are not wide enough to 
determine the true income of taxpayers. As a result, compliance remains very low. 
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3.4.1 Tax Evasion in the ITDB 
 
Tax evasion involves the violation of tax law, where taxpayers do not report their exact 
taxable income or tax to be paid on that income, as per the law.337 It is a premeditated 
and deliberate failure by taxpayers to comply with their tax obligations.338 Every tax 
system faces the problem of tax evasion and avoidance.339 Minimising tax evasion 
creates a challenge for the tax administrations340 of both developed and developing 
countries.341 In the US, 17 per cent of income taxes are unpaid each year.342 In Europe, 
$1.3 trillion is lost every year due to tax evasion.343 In Australia, there is tax evasion.344 
Schneider finds that the average value of the underground economy in Australia, 
Canada, Japan, New Zealand and the US in 2010 was 9.7 per cent, and, in 2013, was 
8.6 per cent.345 
 
While all countries experience tax evasion, the problem is more serious in developing 
countries, such as Bangladesh. Systematic large-scale tax evasion is omnipresent in 
many developing countries.346 Buehn and Schneider estimate that the average size of 
the shadow economy in developing countries in 2007 comprised 37.4 per cent of the 
GDP.347 Government estimation in Bangladesh reveals that the black economy 
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comprised 80 per cent of the GDP—some $110 billion.348 Hasan finds the size of the 
shadow economy in Bangladesh to be 38.1 per cent. Thus, in Bangladesh, the famous 
saying that ‘there is nothing certain in the world except death and taxes’349 appears to 
be a myth, given that tax can be evaded with ease.350 
 
3.4.1.1 Causes of Tax Evasion in Bangladesh 
 
The causes of tax evasion in Bangladesh are multiple, with evasion motivated by many 
factors.351 These factors have been found by various researchers as being related to 
peer effect, age, gender, level of income, status, economic position, education, source 
of income, the probability of being caught and punished, the marginal tax rate, the 
complexities of the tax system, high compliance costs, inefficiencies in tax collection, 
weak enforcement of the law, low tax morale and many others.352 No single factor is 
solely responsible for tax evasion in a given society. Against this backdrop, the main 
reasons for tax evasion in Bangladesh are discussed below. 
 
3.4.1.1.1 High Tax Rate 
 
A high tax rate is generally thought to be one of the main causes of tax evasion. 
Alingham and Sandmo,353 Clotfelter,354 Wallschutzkt355 and Bayer 356 find a positive 
relationship between tax evasion and tax rate. Fisman and Wei found that any increase 
in tax rate is likely to produce a reduction, rather than an increase, in tax revenue.357 
Likewise, the high rate of tax in Bangladesh is thought to be one of the main reasons 
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for tax evasion,358 and survey evidence supports this claim.359 Waresi argues that the 
corporate tax rate is high compared to the rates in other countries,360 while the average 
tax rate in Bangladesh is 35 per cent, which is considered high.361 Thus, the tax rate 
should be adjusted as a measure to reduce tax evasion in the country. 
 
3.4.1.1.2 Corruption in the Income Tax Department 
 
It is argued that corruption encourages tax evasion.362 Corruption is generally 
perceived as the misuse of public power for private gain.363 Schneider observes that 
high levels of corruption among bureaucrats and government officials create a larger 
informal economy.364 Corruption reduces the size of the GDP, increases the size of the 
informal economy, distorts the tax structure, and destroys the morality of taxpayers, 
thereby eventually attenuating the revenue collection capacity of the economy.365 
Tanzi and Davoodi find a statistically significant negative correlation between 
corruption and personal income taxes, where a one per cent increase in corruption 
causes a 0.63 per cent reduction in income tax.366 
 
The situation is more alarming in developing countries such as Bangladesh,367 where 
corruption in the ITDB is another cause of tax evasion. Average taxpayers believe that 
tax officials are corrupt, and taxpayers must pay bribes to tax officials in order to 
complete their tax assessments. Survey evidence supports this claim—previous 
research has found that more than 50 per cent of the taxpayers surveyed stated that 
they had been asked by tax officers to pay bribes, while 58.5 per cent of the survey 
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respondents thought that corruption in the tax department was a cause of tax  
evasion.368 
 
3.4.1.1.3 Political Intentions 
 
Kim argues that tax evasion is positively related to the political intentions of the 
government.369 In developing countries, politicians try to control the tax administration 
for political gain. In Bangladesh, governments often influence tax policies to gain 
political support from the influential and wealthy members of society. For example, 
during the 1980s, the government pressured the income tax administration to pass a 
law so that politicians could receive gifts from relatives, without paying tax. As such, 
these politicians received millions of dollars of ‘gifts’ from fictitious relatives, with no 
questions asked. These provisions of the law allowed black money holders to launder 
their black money and evade a huge amount of tax.370 
 
3.4.1.1.4 Lack of Information 
 
Information is vital to detect tax evasion371 and improve voluntary compliance. 
According to Lederman, the main problem encountered by tax administrations is 
information asymmetry.372 In most cases, the authority must depend on the taxpayer 
to provide information about the taxpayer’s income. Likewise, the ITDB faces the 
problem of asymmetric information on taxpayers’ financial transactions. Due to the 
lack of an effective information reporting regime, the ITDB is in no position to gather 
information about taxpayers. Therefore, taxpayers are able to misrepresent or conceal 
the true state of their affairs in order to reduce their tax liability. 
 
3.4.1.1.5 Inefficient Tax Administration 
 
The effectiveness of a tax system not only depends on proper tax legislation, but also 
on the efficiency of the tax administration.373 Kaldor observes that the tax 
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administrations of developing countries are generally inefficient and ineffective,374 
although some have been more successful in recent years.375 As a developing country, 
Bangladesh shares this common feature. Thus, inefficiency of the tax administration 
remains another cause of tax evasion in Bangladesh. This is evident from the poor level 
of enforcement, which encourages tax evasion.376 Complex regulations and the 
inefficiencies of tax officers are identified as causes of the large shadow economy in 
Bangladesh.377 
 
3.4.1.1.6 Inadequacies and Complexities of the Tax Law 
 
Tax law complexities and inadequacies provide opportunities for tax evasion by 
discouraging honest taxpayers to be noncompliant, and encouraging dishonest 
taxpayers to create ways to evade tax378 by passing laws with the help of tax advisers 
and big law firms.379 The present tax statute of Bangladesh is complex and full of 
rebates and exemptions.380 A tax statute is complex if, under the law, compliance 
becomes difficult, requires a significant amount of money, and is not easy to 
comprehend by taxpayers.381 
 
Hussain382 and Akhand383 state that the income tax law of Bangladesh is complex. This 
is demonstrated by the Income Tax Manual, which is divided into two parts, with Part 
I alone containing 184 sections and eight schedules. These sections are again divided 
into numerous subsections, while the schedules are divided into several parts. In 
addition, every year, the parliament passes finance acts that cause various changes in 
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the income tax law. To apply these finance acts, the NBR issues circulars, statutory 
rules and orders, and various clarifications. This frequent change to the law is another 
major cause of complexity. The income tax law also depends on various other laws of 
the land for proper implementation; thus, the income tax laws of Bangladesh are 
complex and exacerbate the problem of noncompliance. 
 
3.4.1.1.7 Lack of Knowledge 
 
Eriksen and Fallan highlight that tax knowledge has a relationship with tax 
compliance,384 and taxpayers’ lack of knowledge is another cause of noncompliance 
in Bangladesh. This lack of knowledge may be caused by taxpayers’ inability to 
understand the law,385 or by the lack of tax information available from the tax 
department. In a survey, 23.9 per cent of the taxpayers stated that lack of knowledge 
is a cause of tax evasion in Bangladesh. 
 
3.4.1.2 Effect of Tax Evasion 
3.4.1.2.1 The Informal Economy 
 
In developing countries, tax evasion and avoidance cause a loss of revenue of 
approximately $385 billion a year.386 Kim finds that, when tax evasion increases, the 
size of the informal economy also increases, while Hug and Spörri observe that tax 
evasion seriously diminishes the state’s capacity to provide basic public goods. In 
Bangladesh, tax evasion erodes a huge amount of government revenue every year. It 
is estimated by the NBR that approximately Tk 40,000 crore is lost each year because 
of tax evasion and avoidance.387 
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3.4.1.2.2 Distortion of the Tax Law 
 
Tax evasion causes the tax law to become distorted. It is activity undertaken by 
wealthy individuals and large corporations that frustrates the tax law by engineering 
new avenues to evade tax. Ingenious tax advisers develop products to evade and avoid 
tax. To counter the efforts, tax authorities amend tax laws. The tax law is compared 
with a ship to which wholes are made constantly by the taxpayers and tax advisers and 
the tax authorities constantly repair the ship resulting in numerous patches that has the 
effect of distorting the tax law.388 The same process holds good in case of developing 
countries like Bangladesh.Tanzi and Shome comment that tax evasions are numerous 
and that taxpayers continuously engineer new ways to reduce their tax burden.389 This 
is an accurate representation of the situation in Bangladesh. 
 
3.4.1.2.3 Erosion of the Tax Base 
 
It is well recognised that illegal tax evasion erodes the tax base in developing countries. 
As a result of such erosion, revenue is reduced, administrative costs increase, tax 
policy goals are not achieved and social equity is affected.390 In Bangladesh, 
widespread tax evasion is gradually eroding the tax base. For example, in terms of 
revenue loss due to transfer mispricing from 1990 to 2008, Bangladesh lost $34.08 
billion, placing Bangladesh at the top of the list.391 
 
3.4.1.2.4 Credibility of the Tax Administration 
 
As a result of tax evasion, the burden of taxes falls disproportionately on low-income 
earners. This makes people dubious about the efficiency and fairness of the tax 
administration. The reduction of state capacity due to tax evasion also affects the tax 
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morale of the populace.392 The tax administration loses credibility if it is not fair and, 
if there is tax evasion, the tax administration is perceived to be unfair.393 
 
3.4.1.3 Remedial Measures to Curb Tax Evasion 
 
Bangladesh must urgently address the tax evasion problem by taking appropriate 
measures. During a taxpayer’s survey conducted by the Reforms in Revenue 
Administration (RIRA) in 2003, taxpayers were asked about measures to curb tax 
evasion. According to 88.5 per cent of the respondents, publicity, media reporting and 
better coverage of tax evasion cases would have a positive effect on preventing tax 
evasion. Eighty-nine per cent of the respondents said that the NBR needs to improve 
the quantity of publicity, publicise how to file a tax return properly and make tax 
payments, and adequately describe the penalties involved in evasion. Eighty per cent 
of the respondents stated that awareness about the responsibilities of paying tax must 
be improved through publicity, public seminars, and school and university 
participation in awareness campaigns. Around 40 per cent of the taxpayers said that 
the existing penal provisions in the tax statute regarding tax evasion are insufficient, 
and that stricter penalties and punishment provisions should be incorporated in the tax 
law. However, the NBR has undertaken some commendable measures, some of which 
are discussed below. 
 
3.4.1.3.1 Tax Amnesty Scheme 
 
Tax amnesty is a type of temporary incentive provided to taxpayers to let them pay tax 
at a reduced rate, so they can be within the tax net. This is known as a ‘black money 
whitening’ scheme and is highly controversial.394 During the past 40 years, such tax 
amnesties have been allowed on many occasions; however, the NBR has failed to 
access the underground economy.395 Rather, this scheme has encouraged honest 
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taxpayers to pay tax incorrectly, or resort to evading practices.396 This thesis has a 
separate chapter about the tax amnesty programs in Bangladesh. 
 
3.4.1.3.2 Reward Incentives for Income Tax Officials 
 
The ITDB has provisions to reward income tax officers who unearth income tax 
evasion—Section 184B of the Income Tax Ordinance 1984 deals with this. This 
reward is aimed at encouraging tax officials to more seriously seek to detect tax 
evasion. The reward system in the civil servant is part of the New Public Management 
theories which is in fact not widely used in Bangladeshi.397 The NBR has only recently 
begun using this tool to curb tax evasion. In addition, the extent to which this tool will 
prove effective has not yet been studied empirically. 
 
3.4.1.3.3 Income Tax Fair 
 
To encourage taxpayers’ voluntary compliance, from 2010, the ITDB has held an 
annual income tax fair. At this fair, taxpayers can submit their return and pay their tax 
easily and without harassment. The income tax fair is considered successful to improve 
compliance,398 and taxpayers’ reactions have been very positive. 
 
3.4.1.3.4 Central Intelligence Cell in the NBR 
 
In 2004, a Central Intelligence Cell (CIC) was established in the NBR as a part of the 
NBR modernisation project.399 According to the IMF, the establishment of the CIC 
was a bold step to improve the weaknesses of the tax administration in Bangladesh.400 
The CIC is an integrated unit comprising officials from both the direct and indirect tax 
wings of the NBR. The CIC performs a tax intelligence function and investigates tax 
evasion and fraud cases in the areas of income tax, customs and value-added tax. The 
CIC, headed by a director general, is working hard to improve taxpayer compliance, 
for both direct and indirect taxes. Information and data are held confidentially by the 
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CIC and are not readily accessible; however, the CIC works under strong monitoring 
from the NBR to negotiate with potential tax evaders to pay the correct amount of tax. 
Thus far, the CIC has been able to create a positive effect on taxpayer compliance.401 
Since its establishment, the CIC has undertaken 1,750 investigations related to tax 
evasion for income tax, value-added tax and customs. Substantial tax evasion cases 
have been detected, and, in the majority of cases, the evaders paid their taxes.402 
 
3.4.2 Low Tax–GDP Ratio 
 
The tax–GDP ratio in developing countries is typically much lower than that in 
developed countries because of the weakness of direct taxation in developing 
nations.403 As a developing country, Bangladesh has a poor tax–GDP ratio. In the 1999 
to 2000 financial year, the tax–GDP ratio was 8.47 per cent, which gradually rose to 
10.79 per cent in 2005 to 2006. In the 2007 to 2008 financial year, the tax–GDP further 
rose to 11.17 per cent, and further enhanced to 11.24 per cent in 2008 to 2009. 
Although the tax–GDP ratio has risen from five per cent in the early 1980s, it is still 
very low compared to even the neighbouring country of India, where the tax–GDP 
ratio is 10 per cent.404 The OECD average is around 36 per cent, with true welfare 
states such as Norway and Sweden having tax–GDP ratios as high as 43.6 and 49 per 
cent, respectively.405 
 
3.4.3 Narrow Tax Base 
 
The income tax base of Bangladesh is narrow.406 McCarten finds that, in direct taxes, 
agricultural land is not a buoyant source of revenue. Begum shows that a significant 
number of tax expenditure measures exist for both direct and indirect taxes, which 
adversely affects overall revenue. It is also argued that the large number of tax 
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exemptions, incentives and special provisions erode the tax base, thereby causing the 
existing tax base to narrow.407 Thus, Bangladesh needs to explore how the tax base 
can be broadened, and how people in the informal sector can be brought into the tax 
base. 
 
3.4.4 Dependency on Indirect Tax 
 
Developing countries’ tax administrations depend heavily on indirect taxes, such as 
customs duty and value-added tax.408 In the 1970s, the percentage of collection of 
income tax in developed countries was 35.5 per cent, while, in 2000, this rose to 53.8 
per cent. In contrast, in developing countries, the ratio was 29.6 per cent and 28.3 per 
cent. In the 1970s, the ratio of indirect tax in developing countries was 25.2 per cent 
and, in 2000, it was 40.1 per cent.409 Likewise, in Bangladesh, the contribution of direct 
taxes is not very robust. Up to the 1990s, the share of direct taxes (income tax) was 
below 15 per cent of the total tax revenues. It began to increase and surpassed 20 per 
cent during the 2006 to 2008 financial years. However, it remains the lowest in the 
south Asian region, with a ratio of approximately 34 per cent of the tax collected and 
three per cent of the GDP in the 2009 to 2010 financial year.410 
 
3.4.5 Lack of Taxpayer Education 
 
Better tax knowledge is vital for sustained compliance behaviour.411 Without this, any 
effort to enforce compliance will have limited success and render enforcement efforts 
futile.412 Song and Yarbrough find that taxpayers with a high level of education and 
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knowledge have high tax ethics.413 Thus, taxpayers must be provided with sufficient 
knowledge to have a clear understanding of the fairness of the system, tax ethics and 
tax evasion.414 Taxpayers must be properly educated so they can understand the 
complicated tax laws. For example, in Australia, the ATO provides education and 
advice to taxpayers.415 In contrast, in Bangladesh, poor taxpayer education is 
considered an impediment to improving the tax administration.416 To educate 
taxpayers, there must be sufficient publications, advertisements on the radio and 
television, leaflets and service centres. In addition, tax-related education should be 
included in the curriculums of educational institutions at different levels. 
 
3.4.6 Poor Automation System 
 
Bangladesh ranked at 123 in the e-services adoption index.417 E-governance is not 
considered a priority in the national development agenda, lack of incentives, 
organisational belongingness, capacity to implement e-governance projects and 
financial resources.418 However, the income tax department is gradually undergoing 
an automation process. An income tax calculator is now available on the internet, as 
are laws, regulations and income tax returns. The government is committed to 
undertaking the necessary steps to provide e-governance, including providing online 
submission of tax returns across the country within the next three years.419 
 
3.4.7 Lack of Long-term Planning 
 
There is no research division in the ITDB, yet tax compliance research is an integral 
part of any contemporary tax administration. The IRS has a strong research, analysis 
and statistical division.420 According to the IRS, common research strategies can 
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include taxpayer surveys, behavioural research, analyses of taxpayer characteristics, 
research with data to identify trends and so forth.421 The ATO422 and CRA undertake 
different types of tax research.423 
 
3.4.8 Poor Enforcement Initiatives 
 
In Bangladesh, enforcement initiatives to collect tax and ensure compliance are very 
poor. The ITDB is characterised by the traditional system of subjective selection and 
intuitive enforcement, with no measurement criteria for success.424 The causes of this 
poor state of enforcement include corruption, lack of departmental shelters and 
political interference. For example, there is a recent trend to politicise the ITDB. 
Officers that support the political ideologies of the government receive good positions 
and are rewarded, while the opposite occurs for those with opposing political 
ideologies. As a result, officers who are politically suppressed are not encouraged to 
work properly for the government, which hampers the operation of a smooth and 
efficient tax administration. Politicisation of the administration is not a new 
phenomenon internationally, but is having severe effects in Bangladesh.425 
 
The enforcement measures followed by the NBR for income tax include imposing 
penalties by tax officers under the tax law, freezing bank accounts, seizing bank 
transactions, criminal prosecution and raising risk points.426 However, as 
aforementioned, to improve enforcement activities, the NBR established the CIC in 
2004. Since its establishment, the CIC has dealt with 1,750 evasion cases and 
prosecuted 100 taxpayers for tax-related offences.427 
 
3.4.9 Corruption Decreasing Revenue Collection 
 
It is alleged that corruption reigns in the ITDB. According to a survey conducted in 
2011 by Transparency International in South Asia, 66 per cent of clients pay bribes to 
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civil bureaucrats to gain services.428 Corruption in the ITDB reduces revenue by 
encouraging tax evasion and generating black money. In 2007, black money in 
Bangladesh was estimated to be at Tk 50,000 to 60,000 crore—or one-fifth of the 
GDP.429 In 2011, the amount of black economy stood at Tk 400,000.430 There are 
several reasons for corruption in the ITDB, including a poor salary structure, numerous 
available avenues for corruption, a lack of e-governance, and a lack of morality among 
tax officers. 
 
3.4.10 Nonprofessional Chairperson of the NBR 
 
The chairperson of the NBR works in the administrative service without having any 
professional and technical knowledge, such as in Australia, New Zealand and IRS. For 
example, the commissioner of the ATO is a professional taxation officer with a strong 
economic and law background,431 and also the New Zealand Inland Revenue 
Commissioner Bob Russell.432 The IRS has tax attorney, William Wilkins, as the IRS 
Chief.433 This is not the case in the NBR. To mitigate this problem, the officers of the 
ITDB recommend that the chairperson of the NBR be a professional with a background 
in taxation.434 
 
 
3.5 Income Tax Collection and Recovery System 
 
The Income Tax Ordinance (ITO) 1984 contains provisions for the collection of taxes 
before and after assessment from taxpayers. There is provision to withhold tax, which 
remains a major avenue for revenue collection.435 In the 2008 to 2009 financial year, 
income tax collection comprised approximately 60 per cent of the total collection.436 
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The ITO also has a quarterly advance tax payment system.437 In addition, another 
method of tax collection is the provision of payment of tax, as per the admitted liability 
of tax in the return.438 This is called the ‘admitted tax liability’ of the taxpayer, which 
he or she must dispose of before filing the return of income. If there is any default, the 
assesse will be treated as an assessee by default.439 Finally, tax is also collected through 
tax officials making assessments and tax demands,440 and there are provisions of the 
law to collect the tax due by taxpayers. 
 
3.6 Tax Expenditures 
 
Tax expenditures are fiscal incentives for taxpayers.441 Tax incentives promote 
investment, particularly in developing countries, although the effectiveness of these 
incentives is frequently debated and questioned442 because of the lack of empirical 
evidence to support them.443 Giving industrialisation the top priority in the age of 
globalisation and trade liberalisation, the government of Bangladesh has made 
provisions of different types of incentives in the tax law, as discussed below. 
 
3.6.1 Tax Holiday 
 
A tax holiday is a form of tax incentive in the form of tax exemptions for a certain 
period. It is offered by the tax authority to certain types of industrial undertakings.444 
However, there is debate that tax holidays lead to erosion of the tax base and motivate 
firms to find imaginative ways to qualify for the incentive, thereby undermining 
policies designed to offer it only when the benefits outweigh the costs. This 
subsequently leads to shrinking tax revenue even further445 and creates an avenue for 
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tax corruption.446 Shahabuddin, Chowdhury and Azam argue that the tax holiday 
scheme paves the way for tax avoidance because it offers an opportunity for the exempt 
entities to enter financial transactions and avoid tax through a transfer pricing 
mechanism.447 In contrast, other evidence shows that tax holidays have a positive 
effect on tax policy formulation.448 
 
Bangladesh began its tax holiday scheme in 1974, and continues to allow this incentive 
to specified corporate taxpayers under specific legal requirements. However, over 
time, the effectiveness of the scheme has been questioned when taxpayers began to 
misuse the scheme.449 Research has shown that many of the units established in 
economically backward sectors show profits during the tax holiday period, and become 
markedly less profitable after the holiday expires.450 The owners of the tax holiday 
concern closes down the unit and establish new unit to get more tax holiday. Thus, the 
scheme remains prone to abuse to the prejudice of revenue451 and creates a tax haven 
for tax evaders.452 
 
In addition to the tax holiday, Bangladesh offers other tax incentives, as detailed in 
Schedule 5 of the 1984 ITO. Considering the misuse of tax incentives and its harmful 
effect on national revenue, it is proposed that the government remove some of these 
incentives—particularly the tax holiday. The tax holiday concept should be rethought 
by considering the competitiveness of the market and effective revenue collection. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
446 Easson and Zolt, above n 444, 12. 
447 AM Shahabuddin, Mustafa Manir Chowdhury and Md Kazi Golam Azam, ‘An Analysis of Tax 
Incentives to Attract FDI in Bangladesh: An Empirical Study’ 12(8) China-USA Business Review 756, 
757. 
448 Adianto P Simamora, ‘Tax Holiday Needed to Attract Investment: BKPM’, The Jakarta Post 
(online), 16 April 2002 <http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2002/04/16/tax-holiday-needed-attract-
investment-bkpm.html>. 
449 ‘Bangladesh Govt. to Abolish Tax Holiday System’, Unified Communications Industry News 
(online), 12 June 2009<http://wireless-backhaul.tmcnet.com/news/2009/06/12/4222650.htm>. 
450 Mary Swire, ‘Bangladesh Tax Holiday Has Failed In Its Objectives’, Global Tax News (online), 6 
August 2001<http://www.tax-
news.com/news/Bangladesh_Tax_Holiday_Has_Failed_In_Its_Objectives____4782.html>. 
451 Shahabuddin, Chowdhury and Azam, above n 447, 758. 
452 Swire, above n 450. 
80 
3.7 Reform in the ITDB 
3.7.1 Initiatives to Increase Voluntary Compliance 
 
Since the ITDB is beset with the problem of tax noncompliance, the NBR, as an apex 
authority, is consistently seeking to find new avenues to increase voluntary compliance 
in the field of income tax. The NBR is currently pursuing the following compliance 
framework to ensure voluntary compliance.453 
 
 
Figure 3.1: The NBR’s Tax Compliance Framework 
 
The NBR compliance framework indicates that, to seek to ensure voluntary 
compliance, the NBR emphasises tax policy, tax enforcement, taxpayer service and 
taxpayer education. With that goal, the NBR has recently undertaken certain 
initiatives, which are discussed below. 
 
3.7.2 Establishment of a Large Taxpayer Unit 
 
From the early 1980s, the IMF has made recommendations to developing countries to 
establish large taxpayer units (LTUs) to collect maximum revenue from the highest 
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taxpayers.454 The LTU has proved to be a success in different countries.455 
Accordingly, the LTU (Income Tax) was established in Bangladesh in November 
2003.456 The LTU has been assigned to manage the income tax matters of the largest 
companies in Bangladesh, and their shareholder directors. The LTU works under an 
automated system, which has operated successfully to contribute more than one-third 
of the total revenue collection from these large taxpayers. For example, in the 2010 to 
2011 financial year, the LTU (Income Tax) collected Tk 7,525.98 crore, while the total 
collection from income tax was Tk 23,007.53 crore.457 The challenges faced by LTU 
include an insufficient workforce and lack of logistical support. In addition, the LTU 
has no data bank or research cell.458 
 
3.7.3 Establishment of the CIC 
 
To curb tax evasion, the NBR established the CIC in 2003. The CIC can complete 
investigations to indicate tax evasion, tax concealment or any other tax irregularities. 
It can collect evidence to demonstrate tax offences or tax fraud in order to recover tax, 
issue penalties and suggest prosecutions. Since its establishment, the CIC has 
unearthed significant cases of tax evasion. In 2012, a separate cell—the transfer pricing 
cell—was established in the CIC to monitor cases of tax fraud among multinational 
corporations. The CIC is persistently working to improve tax compliance. 
 
3.7.4 Taxpayers’ Service Centre 
 
To reduce tax-related hassle and subsequently encourage compliance, each tax zone 
has established a one-stop service centre for taxpayers. In addition, two new central 
taxpayer service centres were established in Dhaka and Chittagong in 2011. These 
service centres were created with financial support from the United Kingdom (UK)–
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based Department for International Development under the Tax Administration 
Capacity and Taxpayers Services Project.459 
 
3.7.5 New Simplified Tax Code 
 
As aforementioned, the income tax law of Bangladesh is old, complicated and not user-
friendly. Taxpayers find it difficult to understand the intricate provisions of the law, 
which creates problems and impediments to voluntary compliance. To remove the 
complexity of the tax statute, the NBR has drafted a new direct tax code that has been 
posted on the NBR website for comments and suggestions. It is hoped that, if the new 
tax code is passed by the parliament and becomes law, it will remove the complexities 
and subsequently encourage voluntary compliance. 
 
3.7.6 New Transfer Pricing Law 
 
Until 2012, Bangladesh had no separate transfer pricing regime—transfer pricing cases 
were dealt with under the anti-avoidance rules.460 In 2012, the NBR presented a 
separate transfer pricing law to manage the transfer pricing issues of the multinational 
corporations working in Bangladesh.461 This new law was implemented on 1 July 
2015.462 The NBR is undertaking a three-year implementation phase and has 
established a separate transfer pricing cell. It will implement the new transfer pricing 
law with assistance from the IMF and International Finance Corporation.463 
 
3.7.7 Alternative Dispute Resolution Provisions 
 
The NBR introduced an alternative dispute resolution (ADR) system to the department 
through the Finance Act 2011.464 The ADR mechanism is used by other laws of the 
                                                          
459 Doulot Akter Mala, ‘Service Centres Get Good Response from Taxpayers’, Bangladesh Economic 
News (online), 7 December 2011 <http://bangladesheconomy.wordpress.com/2011/12/07/service-
centres-get-good-response-from-taxpayers/>. 
460 Income Tax Ordinance 1984, ch XI. 
461 ‘Bangladesh Transfer Pricing Regulations—Finance Act, 2014’, Global Tax Alert (online), 30 
October 2014 <www.ey.com/.../Bangladesh_Transfer_Pricing_Regulations.../2014G_C>. 
462 Doulot Akter Mala, ‘NBR to Launch TP Law from July 1, 2015’, The Daily Financial Express 
(online), 21 January 2013 <http://www.thefinancialexpress-
bd.com/index.php?ref=MjBfMDFfMjFfMTNfMV8xXzE1NzYyMQ==>. 
463 Ibid. 
464 Finance Act 2011–2012, ch 4, article 46, 23 <http://www.nbr-bd.org/budget_2011-
12/finance_ordinance/Amendments_of_Income_Tax_Ordinance_1984.pdf>. 
83 
land.465 According to the ADR law, taxpayers can settle disputes through the ADR 
process while disputes are pending in the traditional settlement mechanism.466 The 
ADR is becoming increasingly popular as a tax dispute settlement mechanism.467 The 
ADR has been working in the ITDB with remarkable success since July 2012. 
 
3.7.8 New Information Reporting Regime 
 
Third-party tax information reporting is a primary tax enforcement tool, with the 
information reporting system being one of the most effective tools to increase 
voluntary compliance. Taxpayers tend to cheat if they have the opportunity; thus, a 
successful tax system must seek to deny this opportunity.468 Tax information reporting 
is a tool that achieves this. Until 2011, there was no standalone law regarding a TIRS 
in the income tax laws of Bangladesh. Considering the importance of an information 
reporting system for improving voluntary compliance, the NBR implemented a new 
section in the 1984 ITO—Section 75B. Chapter 6 of this thesis further discusses the 
third-party tax information reporting regime. 
 
3.8 Conclusion 
 
This chapter has observed that, like other developing countries, the ITDB has many 
problems of varying magnitude. Although gradually increasing, the share of revenue 
collected by the ITDB is still low compared to the country’s collected indirect tax. 
Numerous factors influence the taxation system in Bangladesh, including the lack of a 
taxpaying culture, corruption, dependency on indirect tax, tax evasion, a strong 
informal economy, a narrow tax base, the lack of taxpayer awareness, and legal 
complexities. Against this backdrop, the government of Bangladesh is seeking to 
determine and implement effective reform initiatives to modernise the income tax 
department and improve voluntary compliance by taxpayers. 
 
 
                                                          
465 Md Habib Alam, ‘Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR): A New Key for Implementing Civil 
Justice in Bangladesh’ (2014) 19 (1) IOSR Journal Of Humanities And Social Science 88. 
466 Income Tax Ordinance 1984, s 152F. 
467 Doulot Akter Mala, ‘ADR Gaining Popularity with Corporate Taxpayers’, The Financial Express 
(online), 31 October 2013 <http://www.thefinancialexpress-
bd.com/old/index.php?ref=MjBfMTBfMzFfMTNfMV8xXzE4ODQ1Mg==>. 
468 Brooks, above n 133, 22. 
84 
Chapter 4: Tax Compliance Theories 
 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
Previous research has presented numerous theories and models to explain the causes 
of and remedies for the issue of tax noncompliance. Since this study seeks to identify 
the best possible ways to address the problem of tax noncompliance in Bangladesh, it 
is necessary to discuss some of these tax compliance theories and models. However, 
before doing so, it is important to examine the inherent issue of why people obey the 
law. After attaining a satisfactory answer, it will be possible to comprehend how, why 
and to what extent tax compliance theories have been developed in an attempt to 
explain the tax compliance issue. 
 
Why do people obey the law? This is a puzzling question and it is a challenge to 
determine an appropriate answer. Compliance behaviour remains a mysterious trait of 
human character, particularly given that defiance and disobedience appear to be innate 
in humans. The truth of this is revealed by the expulsion of Adam and Eve from the 
Garden of Eden because they disobeyed the order of god.469 Religious scriptures 
present what god says about obeying the law. A reading of the verses of the Holy 
Quran or Bible reveal that it is god’s order that people obey the state authority and the 
laws of sovereigns.470 However, do people feel it necessary to obey the law? This 
question is posed because of the popular belief that individuals have no obligation to 
obey the law471—some say there is not even a prima facie obligation to obey the law472 
at least to obey all the laws of the state.473 In contrast, some argue that people obey the 
law because they have consented to do so.474 Others argue that people are obliged to 
obey the law because they benefit from the legal system.475 Raz states that people have 
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moral and prudential reasons for obeying the law.476 Philosophically, it is argued that 
the obligation to obey the law is based on the proposition that the government is 
essential to safeguard society from evils.477 A plethora of research has developed on 
this topic, particularly during the last two decades.478 Tyler offers two explanations for 
why people obey the law—one from an instrumental perspective (forced compliance) 
and the other from a normative perspective (procedural justice).479 According to Tyler, 
the deterrence theory forms the basis of the instrumental perspective. Deterrence 
theory states that people mould their conduct to be responsive to incentives and 
punishments in order to obey the law.480 The normative perspective considers 
compliance a response to internal factors, such as norms and the internalised values of 
people.481 Thus, Tyler identifies the main reasons for obeying the law as being fear of 
being caught and punished for wrongdoing, personal morality, and a perceived 
obligation to obey the law.482 
 
Ross argues that people have a political obligation to obey the law, and should obey 
the law as a form of gratitude to their government, in exchange for the benefits received 
from the state.483 Advocates of this theory of gratitude are Ross, Plamentaz and 
Simmons.484 However, Klosko argues that gratitude cannot be the basis of political 
obligations to obey the law for several reasons.485 According to Klein and Klosko, 
people believe that they have a political obligation to obey the law.486 People have a 
significant moral requirement to comply with the law, even when doing so is costly. 
Klosko argues that citizens have a moral obligation to obey the law.487 Klosko further 
argues that people’s consent lays the foundation of a strong moral obligation to obey 
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the law.488 In contrast, regarding consent, Knowles refers to express and tacit 
consent.489 Consent remains one of the bases of obedience to the law. Hobbes’s social 
contract theory is also based on consent between contractors.490 However, it appears 
that each of these theories offers only a partial explanation of why people obey the 
law. 
 
As with research on compliance behaviour regarding general law tax, compliance has 
also been studied elaborately.491 The schools of thought researching tax compliance 
are divided into two groups. The first emphasises the theory of crime and punishment, 
which posits that taxpayers decide to comply or not comply based on the probability 
of being caught and the benefit achieved through noncompliance. This is popularly 
known as the ‘economic deterrence theory’ of tax compliance. The second school is 
based on theories of psychology and sociology that explain the varying levels of 
taxpayer compliance. This section of the thesis critically discusses the different 
theories of compliance. Considering the peculiar nature of the tax compliance 
environment in Bangladesh, this section identifies that that there is no single solution 
to the compliance problem. Rather, this study suggests that the income tax 
administration should incorporate a pragmatic approach to apply an appropriate theory 
to each particular case, or use a combination of theories, depending on the context and 
nature of the involved party’s behaviour and psychology. 
 
4.2 Economic Deterrence Theory 
 
The economic deterrence theory is one of the most important and pioneering theories 
in the field of tax compliance research. This model presents the taxpayer as an 
economically rational being who will evade taxation as long as the reward from 
evading is greater than the expected cost of being caught.492 Tax evasion is considered 
a gamble in which taxpayers either pay lower tax by cheating, or subject themselves 
to punishment through detection by the tax authority.493 The model suggests that the 
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apprehension of being detected and punished by the tax authority through legal 
enforcement will reduce illegal or noncompliant behaviour for the betterment of 
society.494 This theory was first propounded by Nobel laureate economist and 
sociologist, Gary S Becker, in his seminal work on the economics of crime.495 The 
main element of this neoclassical theory of crime and punishment is a person’s 
expected utility if he or she complies, compared to the expected utility in the case of 
noncompliance, weighed against the probability of detection. During the last 50 years, 
the theory has been expanded and developed by Alligham and Sandmo,496 as well as 
many other scholars, such as Srinivasan,497 Kolm,498 Yitzhaki,499 Spicer and Becker,500 
Clotfelter,501 Beck and Jung,502 Klepper and Nagin503 and Beck and Davis.504 
 
According to Murphy, the economic theory regards taxpayers’ behaviour to be 
moulded by profit-seeking decisions.505 Hasseldine and Bebbington highlight that the 
deterrence model involves two factors.506 First, taxpayers’ tax evasion behaviour 
depends on the level of risk aversion of the taxpayer. If the taxpayer is more risk 
averse, there is less chance of tax evasion. Second, taxpayers’ knowledge of the tax 
administration—in terms of the chance of detection, and penalties imposed for tax 
evasion—motivates compliance behaviour. This last aspect throws the taxpayer in 
state of uncertainty.507 Beck and Jung508 demonstrate that uncertainty created by a 
knowledge gap makes taxpayers more conservative and averse to tax evasion. 
According to Devos, the economic deterrence model asserts that taxpayers make 
compliance decisions in a social vacuum.509 The model examines the effect of both the 
economic and structural factors involved in moulding compliance behaviour. 
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4.2.1 Does Deterrence Really Deter Taxpayers from Noncompliance? 
 
There is theoretical and empirical evidence that deterrence works;510 however, there is 
also evidence indicating that it does not always work.511 Posner argues that, if 
taxpayers only considered the probability of being detected, there would not be as 
many taxpayers voluntarily complying every year.512 Webley et al. find that fear of 
punishment serves as one of the determinants of tax compliance behaviour.513 
Berenson reaches the same conclusion, based on survey evidence.514 In addition, 
Klepper and Nagin515 and Park and Hyun516 find the same. However, their research 
finds penalty rates to be a more effective deterrent.517 
 
Despite its positive effects,518 the economic deterrent theory has limitations. Sheffrin 
and Triest argue that it fails to provide strong predictions of the socioeconomic 
determinants of tax evasion.519 Weigel et al. identify the absence of a motivational 
concept as one of the weaknesses of the model.520 The theory is beset with difficulties 
that need to be solved.521 Lederman states that the economic model cannot encompass 
all tax compliance issues.522 This is because only a fraction of all taxpayers can be 
audited, and penalties are not imposed on all detected tax evaders. Klosko argues that 
deterrence has been proven to be a primary determinant of compliance behaviour, but 
not the sole determinant.523 Despite its limitations, this theory is important in the field 
of legal enforcement as a whole, and particularly for expounding taxpayers’ 
compliance behaviour. 
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4.3 Social Norm Theory 
 
Although the social norm theory has not attracted the attention of law and economics 
scholars,524 it has contributed immensely to explaining compliance behaviour. 
According to this theory, taxpayers respond to a compliance norm outside the ambit 
of legal enforcement or the command-and-control regime of tax authorities. Posner,525 
Lederman526 and Wenzel527 emphasise social norms to explain tax compliance 
behaviour. Norms are social regularities that individuals feel obliged to follow because 
of an inner sense of duty, a fear of legal sanctions, or both.528 According to Becker, 
‘Norms are those common values of a group which influence an individual's behaviour 
through being internalized as preferences’.529 
 
Norms can control individual behaviour to the exclusion of law, or sometimes law and 
norms together. For example, when an individual’s friends and colleagues pay tax, he 
or she feels obliged to pay as well. In contrast, if fellow taxpayers cheat, the individual 
also tends to not comply.530 Thus, taxpayers’ compliance is influenced by their 
estimates of other taxpayers’ noncompliance.531 This obligation is internalised and 
normative outside the ambit of law. Thus, a compliance norm is important to ensure a 
robust culture of taxpayer compliance. Research by the Australian Centre for Tax 
System Integrity finds that a norm-based appeal has a positive effect on tax 
compliance. The same result is found in research by the Minnesota Department of 
Revenue. In this research, psychologists identified three tiers of decision making 
related to complying or not complying with taxes.532 The report finds that the social 
norm approach had the most significant effect on taxpayers’ compliance decisions.533 
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4.4 Psychological Contract Theory 
 
The psychological contract theory of tax compliance views the relationship between 
taxpayers and the government as a contract.534 Taxpayers contribute to the government 
treasury, and the government provides benefits and services to the people—this is the 
tax contractarian theory of tax compliance. Citizens’ payment of tax is thought to be 
contingent on the government’s performance of its obligations towards them. Feld and 
Frey extend the contractual obligation to what they call the ‘psychological contract’.535 
Like an ordinary contract, the psychological contract incorporates the existence of 
rights and duties with which taxpayers and the state must comply. Failure to perform 
the expected duties or noncompliance with the taxpaying obligation will trigger 
noncompliance with the contractual provisions from one of the parties, particularly 
from taxpayers.536 
 
Feld and Frey develop the notion of a psychological tax contract that goes beyond the 
traditional economic model to explain tax morale as a complicated element that exists 
between taxpayers and the government to establish fair and reciprocal obligations 
between the parties. This leads to giving one thing to a contractual partner, and taking 
something from the same partner—it is a quid pro quo scenario that incorporates duties 
and rights from both contractual parties (the government on one side, and citizens or 
taxpayers on the other). Thus, a government is expected to provide public services to 
all citizens in exchange for the taxes collected from them.537 
 
4.5 Shame and Guilt Theory 
 
The shame and guilt theory is an offshoot of the psychological theory of tax 
compliance that posits that taxpayers’ psychological attitudes can be manipulated to 
create more negative consequences for noncompliance.538 The use of shaming as a 
deterrent to tax noncompliance has attracted significant attention from researchers.539 
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Shaming is a deterrent because it deters the propensity to commit an offence.540 
Effective communication of shame about crime lowers the crime rate in a society.541 
Likewise, researchers have found that shame and guilt have a significant effect on tax 
compliance behaviour. Soled and Ventry recommend using the shaming approach by 
the IRS,542 and US states such as California, Delaware and Wisconsin have 
successfully employed this approach to improve compliance.543 Other advocates of 
this theory are Grasmick and Bursick,544 Williams and Hawkins,545 Erard and 
Feinstein546 and Aitken and Bonneville.547 However, Andreoni, Erard and Feinstein 
express some reservations about the explanatory scope of shame and guilt theories on 
the basis that the inclusion of shame and guilt into the utility function of economics is 
arbitrary and not of economic or psychological value. In addition, because it is difficult 
to identify shame and guilt, their existence is based on mere presumption.548 
 
4.6 Procedural Fairness Model 
 
Another influential model explaining compliance behaviour is the procedural fairness 
model. Tyler finds that people respond to perceptions of fairness and unfairness, rather 
than considering the outcome of an action as favourable or unfavourable.549 Procedural 
justice and trust are vital for the voluntary acceptance of decisions by authorities, and 
can be substituted for deterrence-based compliance, which can be kept for recalcitrant 
law breakers.550 Andreoni, Erard and Feinstein contend that taxpayers’ perceptions of 
the fairness of the tax burden imposed on them are very important in explicating tax 
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compliance behaviour.551 Hartner et al.552 and Dijke and Verboon553 also find evidence 
to support this theory. However, according to Murphy, deterrence measures employed 
directly by the tax administration to ensure tax compliance may jeopardise the 
legitimacy of the administration if it is seen as procedurally unfair by taxpayers.554 
Tyler states that procedural fairness indicates the perceived fairness of the procedures 
used to make allocation decisions.555 Laventhal states that there are six rules that must 
be maintained for a procedure to be perceived as fair: consistency, lack of bias, lack of 
suppression, accuracy, lack of corruptibility, representativeness and ethicality.556 
Murphy finds support for the theory,557 and suggests it to solve the problem of the 
aggressive tax planning faced by the ATO.558 
 
4.7 Motivational Posture Model 
 
The motivational posture model suggests that taxpayers maintain a social distance 
between themselves and the tax authority, signalling the nature of that distance through 
different postures that protect themselves from negative appraisal by the authority.559 
According to Hartner et al., in the context of taxation, motivational postures are said 
to account for the self-positioning of taxpayers in relation to the tax authority. The five 
motivational postures are commitment, capitulation, resistance, disengagement and 
game playing. 
 
Commitment and capitulation describe favourable attitudes towards tax authorities, 
while resistance, disengagement and game playing reflect a negative orientation 
towards tax authorities. Capitulation describes the acceptance of the tax office as a 
legitimate power whose decisions must be followed in order to get along with them. 
In contrast to the two deference-oriented motivational postures, resistance reflects a 
sense of distrust of the intentions of the tax authority, and an oppositional stance. 
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However, taxpayers with the motivational posture of resistance still remain in the 
system, and stay available to persuasive messages from the tax office. The greatest 
social distance to the tax authority is reflected in the motivational posture of 
disengagement, where taxpayers consider themselves outside the system. The final 
posture, game playing, can be described as an attitude towards legal rules—that is, the 
perception of laws as something to be interpreted in ways suitable for one’s own 
purpose.560 
 
4.8 Organisational Culture Model 
 
The organisational culture model of tax compliance emphasises the organisational 
structure and behaviour of tax administrators, rather than focusing on the behaviour of 
taxpayers. According to Brown, organisational culture may be generally described as 
a set of norms, beliefs, principles and behaviours that together give each organisation 
a distinctive character.561 Organisational culture is thought to be important in crafting 
an effective and responsive taxation system.562 Job, Stout and Smith use organisational 
culture to examine changes in the administration of the tax laws and policies of 
Australia, New Zealand and East Timor.563 In East Timor, tax administration was also 
perceived as corrupt and disoriented, with the people ‘demanding accountability, 
transparency, and culturally appropriate treatment’.564 However, the organisational 
culture model has some challenges, including resistance to change, meeting the legal 
principles of consistency and equity, and so forth.565 In addition, the model explains 
tax compliance only from the perspective of the tax authority.566 
 
4.9 Religious Theory 
 
Religion remains an important determinant of tax compliance behaviour.567 According 
to Afield,568 religious values are a vital component of norm changing behaviour. Thus, 
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Afield emphasises the importance of religiosity in shaping tax compliance behaviour. 
He suggests that partnerships between religious organisations and the government may 
be crucial to ensuring compliance with tax laws.569 
Torgler finds that religious faith has a strong effect on shaping the tax morale of 
taxpayers, which subsequently influences tax compliance behaviour.570 Mutascu finds 
that, among the major religions of the world, the Protestant and Muslim religions have 
a positive effect on tax revenue collection, while other religions do not.571 Thus, tax 
authorities can use these religious dogmas to enhance tax compliance.572 Studies about 
the influence of religion on deviant behaviour are profuse; however, only a few have 
been able to determine some form of influence of religion on criminal acts.573 In 
Bangladesh, the major religion is Islam; thus, the government could take the 
opportunity to use religious dogma to influence taxpayers’ compliance. 
 
4.10 Needs Preference Theory 
 
The needs preference theory posits that, when governments fail to respond to the needs 
of citizens—such as health, education and quality of life—the citizens themselves have 
to provide for those needs. Under such circumstances, people prefer not to pay tax. 
Thus, it is imperative that governments retain people’s confidence in their credibility 
and capacity to deliver promised returns for taxes. In addition, they ‘must convince 
taxpayers that taxpayer contributions make a difference in producing the desired 
goods’.574 The government of Bangladesh is distanced from the people, and the people 
do not trust it.575 The government seems to fail to provide the required services to the 
people; thus, the people may prioritise meeting their own needs, rather than paying 
taxes. As a result, this paper argues that a culture of noncompliance prevails in the 
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country. People prioritise their needs according to a needs hierarchy, and tax payment 
is in a less prioritised position in that hierarchy. 
The concept of the needs preference theory has been borrowed from the famous 
psychologist, Abraham Maslow.576 Maslow suggests that human needs can be 
classified into five categories, and that these categories can be arranged in a hierarchy 
according to their importance.577 These include physiological, security, belonging, 
esteem and self-actualisation needs. The hierarchy of needs is presented in the pyramid 
in Figure 4.1. 
 
 
Figure 4.1: Maslow’s Needs Hierarchy Pyramid 
Source: http://www.citehr.com/24353-maslows-hierarchy-theory.htmln at 28 May 
2012. 
 
According to Maslow, a person is primarily motivated to satisfy physiological needs, 
such as food, air, water, heat and the basic necessities to survive.578 As long as these 
needs remain unsatisfied, people will continuously seek only to fulfil them. When 
these physiological needs are satisfied, the individual will move ‘up’ the hierarchy to 
seek to satisfy security needs. This process continues until self-actualisation needs are 
satisfied.579 
 
This study applies the first and second tiers of the hierarchy pyramid in an attempt to 
use the needs preference hierarchy to explain tax compliance behaviour. According to 
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the first tier, people will first try to fulfil their basic physiological needs, such as food 
and water. No tax payment occurs at this level because it is not a basic element of 
survival. The second tier of the pyramid considers safety—Maslow argues that, once 
physiological needs are fulfilled, attention turns to safety and security.580 Such needs 
might be fulfilled by living in a safe area, having medical insurance, ensuring job 
security, having financial savings, having physical safety, being free from attacks, and 
so forth. It is the duty of the state to maintain social order, ensure justice and proper 
application of the rule of law, and ultimately create a safe environment for its citizens. 
However, if the government fails to provide safety and security to the people, the 
people will rely on themselves for these provisions. In such a situation, people will be 
reluctant to pay tax to the government—they will prioritise fulfilling their more basic 
needs. Accordingly it can be hypothesised that people’s tax complying behaviour is 
characterised by needs preference, according to the needs hierarchy presented by 
Maslow. 
 
4.11 Responsive Regulation Model 
 
The responsive regulation model of tax compliance presents a framework of tax 
compliance in the tax administration. This model is also known as the ‘ATO model’ 
because the ATO adopted this framework in 1998 to ensure voluntary compliance in 
Australia. This model is also used by tax jurisdictions in the UK, New Zealand, East 
Timor, Indonesia and Pennsylvania.581 Before switching to the responsive regulation 
model of tax compliance, the ATO followed a long-established, traditional style of 
command-and-control administration and tax enforcement.582 As a result, the ATO 
was considered unfair, lacking in integrity and out of touch with commercial reality.583 
A lack of community tolerance had developed for the blanket approach to enforcement 
that was harsh, inflexible and bullying. Thus, change was inevitable under this critical 
juncture.584 Against this backdrop, the ATO began to explore responsive regulation as 
a possible alternative to the old approach to tax compliance. 
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The concept of responsive regulation was first presented by Ayers and Braithwaite in 
1992. Responsive regulation is an interdisciplinary approach that originated from the 
discipline of psychology.585 Compliance is generally a problem for tax administration 
around the world.586 According to Braithwaite, responsive regulation is effective when 
compliance is not easy, automatic or straightforward.587 The responsive regulation 
model was based on the idea that the government should choose when to intervene and 
when not to intervene by adopting a philosophy of responsiveness to ‘industry 
structure’, ‘the differing motivations of regulated actors’ and ‘industry conduct’.588 
Before escalating punishment, dialogue is employed by regulators.589 Typically, 
responsive regulation seeks to maintain a balance between persuasion, friendliness and 
providing assistance to taxpayers, with an interventionist approach that emphasises 
punishment or a command-and-control approach. The responsive regulation model 
seeks to build a moral commitment to comply with the law.590 
 
This model posits that if taxpayers make mistakes through ignorance or poor financial 
planning and are prepared to come forward and acknowledge their mistakes, they 
should be helped. If they are prepared to be cooperative when anomalies are identified, 
they should be assisted to correct the issues and move on. Persistent and consistent 
attention should focus on the difficult cases and the ‘big fish’, not the ‘low hanging 
fruit’. The initial goals of the compliance model were to: 
1. understand taxpayer behaviour 
2. build a cooperative relationship with the community 
3. encourage and support compliance 
4. introduce a range of sanctions that escalate in severity and are known to 
taxpayers so that difficulties can be settled before the costs became too great 
for both parties 
5. reduce the time-consuming handling of complaints about procedural injustice 
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6. implement the Taxpayers’ Charter.591 
This model is graphically represented in the form of a regulatory triangle and 
accompanying circle of influencing factors. The pictorial representation of this model 
is shown in Figure 4.2. 
 
 
Figure 4.2: Responsive Regulation Model 
Source: ATO website <http://www.ato.gov.au/corporate/ content.aspx?doc=/ 
content/5704.htm> 
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Figure 4.3: The Australian Compliance Pyramid 
 
At the very base of the enforcement pyramid are the willing and compliant taxpayers 
who need support from the authority to comply. These taxpayers form the majority.592 
The second group up needs more help or persuasion to comply. The third group up are 
the resistant people, who tend to avoid complying and need to be detected. The 
taxpayers at the top of the pyramid are those engaged in tax evasion, who show 
disrespect to the tax authority. They cannot be persuaded or coaxed to comply, and the 
ATO compliance model suggests that the full force of the law should be used against 
them to make them compliant. 
 
The model considers the basic economic model, while also recognising other factors, 
such as the way that society, morality and ethics affect taxpayer behaviour, and 
particularly the manner in which the taxpayer–tax administration relationship affects 
compliance.593 The most important contribution of the responsive regulation theory is 
that it enhances understandings of regulatory enforcement and its effect on 
compliance, recognising that different people have different motivations for 
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complying or not complying with the law, and that the same person or firm can have 
multiple, potentially conflicting motivations for compliance.594 By following this 
model, the ATO attempts to establish a cooperative and friendly relationship with 
taxpayers, while also using deterrence when necessary.595 
 
4.11.1 Comments on the ATO Model of Compliance 
 
The ATO model is being replicated by other tax jurisdictions, such as the UK, Canada, 
New Zealand, East Timor and others.596 However, it faces several criticisms. Haines 
contends that enhancing sanctions in response to serial noncompliance might help 
regulatory authorities shape enforcement policy, but also shapes the behaviour of 
regulated firms.597 The escalation of enforcement measures and serious action against 
a firm might aggravate the relationship between the regulator and regulated, and create 
distrust of regulators. Gunningham, Grabosky and Sinclair argue that responsive 
regulation is too focused on the state.598 According to Freigang, responsive regulation 
is not compatible with the rule of law, and has inherent constitutional problems that 
create judicial and doctrinal challenges.599 It is difficult to apply to corporate taxpayers, 
encourages tax corruption and creates disequilibrium in treatments.600 Due to the 
constitutional and political sensitivity of tax collection and the complexity and relative 
indeterminacy of tax legislation, it is difficult to apply the responsive regulation model 
to tax.601 Baldwin and Black present criticisms that mounting up through the 
enforcement pyramid might not always appear appropriate because of serious fractions 
of regulations and the adversarial relationship between the regulator and the regulated 
make it difficult to glide through the pyramid.602 
 
The success of responsive regulation depends on a number of factors, including the 
agency’s resources, size of the regulated population and types of standard imposed.603 
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In a developing country such as Bangladesh, the bureaucracy is not free from political 
interference.604 Actions may not be taken or less action may be taken against one 
person, while stern action may be taken against others due to media and political 
pressure.605 In addition, the model is thought to cause regulatory capture,606 which 
leads to situations of exploitation by the authority for private gains.607 Evidence of 
such capture has already been found by the progenitors of the model.608 
 
The model is also criticised because it was crafted for a developed country609 to address 
the regulatory debate in such countries, rather than in developing countries.610 To solve 
this problem, third-party participation and qui tam provision are suggested.611 Another 
major weakness of the model is that it encourages corruption612 due to the frequent 
interaction between the regulators and regulated,613 where tax officials might develop 
a desire to please those who they are supposed to be regulating, as Grbich notes.614 
This can be dangerous for developing countries such as Bangladesh. Heimer argues 
that corrupted regulatory systems can sometimes masquerade as being responsive 
systems.615 
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Ayres and Braithwaite suggest republican tripartism to solve the problem of 
corruption;616 however, Scholz,617 Khademian,618 Mandeloff619 and Burton620 criticise 
republican tripartism on various grounds. Besides, the confidential nature of tax 
matters always indicates bipartite negotiation.621 Since the responsive regulatory 
model considers law as determinate, the indeterminacy of taxation law remains the 
‘Achilles’ heel’ of the model.622 Picciotto623 and Freedman624 agree that income tax 
law is indeterminate. Thus, the model suffers from a constitutional shortcoming 
because it ignores the constitutional values of proportionality and consistency, which 
are ingrained in the right to equal and fair treatment.625 Yeung states that the model 
prefers administrative settlements to judicial settlements,626 and this might stop the 
regulatory pyramid halfway because it is less coercive and persuasive.627 It is argued 
that the responsive regulation theory has a narrow strait of operation decreasing 
compliance.628 
 
4.11.2 Replicating the ATO Model by the ITDB 
 
Since the model has a developed country approach,629 it is pertinent to consider 
whether it would work in a developing country, such as Bangladesh. The major 
obstacles to implementing the model in Bangladesh include organisational barriers and 
resistance, lack of political commitment, and corruption in the tax administration. 
However, despite its shortcomings, this model offers the best solution to the problem 
of tax noncompliance—the successful use of this model in different countries 
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highlights its effectiveness. Thus, Bangladesh should implement this model in its 
income tax administration. 
 
4.12 The Slippery Slope Framework of Tax Compliance 
 
The slippery slope model630 is a blend of the economic and psychological aspects of 
tax compliance.631 This theory proposes that the success of the economic and 
psychological factors of tax compliance is very much dependent on the relationship 
between the taxpayer and tax authority. It is argued that compliance increases when 
this relationship is friendly and not antagonistic.632 Thus, a relationship of trust must 
be built to create a congenial atmosphere to increase compliance. Increased power and 
trust can increase compliance.633 The following is a pictorial presentation of the 
slippery slope framework. 
 
 
Figure 4.4: The Slippery Slope Framework of Tax Compliance 
Source: Erich Kirchler et al. (2008). 
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The left side of the framework shows that, when trust is low, an increase in power 
through auditing and detection of tax evasion increases compliance. An increase in 
compliance is highly anticipated with an increase in the power of the authorities. The 
right side shows the trust dimension, where power is low, yet trust is high. An increase 
in trust is likely to increase compliance. Thus, both high power and high trust are likely 
to yield high compliance. Previous studies have found empirical support for the 
slippery slope compliance framework, including research by Muehlbacher, Kirchler 
and Schwarzenberger;634 Koglar, Muelbacher and Kirchler;635 Wahl, Kastlunger and 
Kirchler;636 Lisi;637 and Prinz, Muelbacher and Kirchler.638 
 
4.13 OECD Compliance Risk Management Model 
 
The OECD compliance risk management model seeks to provide its member states 
with guidelines on how to identify and manage tax compliance, and harvest maximum 
tax compliance by using minimal and scant resources. To answer its members’ 
questions regarding tax compliance issues and their need to determine the most rational 
allocation of limited resources, the OECD identified three focusing questions to guide 
decisions on how to allocate resources: 
x What are the major compliance risks to be addressed? 
x To which taxpayers do these risks relate? 
x How should these risks be treated to achieve the best possible outcome? 
 
To address the above issues successfully, the OECD developed its compliance model. 
According to the OECD, this model is ‘a structured process for the systematic 
identification, assessment, ranking, and treatment of tax compliance risks (e.g., failure 
to register, failure to properly report tax liabilities etc.)’.639 The model aims to help 
                                                          
634 Stephan Muehlbacher, Erich Kirchler and Herbert Schwarzenberger, ‘Voluntary Versus Enforced 
Tax Compliance: Empirical Evidence for the “Slippery Slope” Framework’ (2011) 32 European 
Journal of Law and Economics 89. 
635 Christoph Kogler, Stephan Muehlbacher and Erich Kirchler, ‘Trust, Power, and Tax Compliance: 
Testing the “Slippery Slope Framework” among Self-employed Taxpayers’ (WU International 
Taxation Research Paper Series No 2013–05, 17 July 2013). 
636 Ingrid Wahl, Barbara Kastlunger and Erich Kirchler, ‘Trust in Authorities and Power to Enforce 
Tax Compliance: An Empirical Analysis of the “Slippery Slope” Model’ (2010) 32(4) Law & Policy 
383. 
637 Gaetano Lisi, ‘Testing the Slippery Slope Framework’ (2012) 32(2) Economics Bulletin 1369. 
638 A Prinz, S Muelbacher and E Kirchler, ‘The Slippery Slope Framework on Tax Compliance: An 
Attempt to Formalization’ (2014) 40 Journal of Economic Psychology 20. 
639 OECD, Compliance Risk Management: Managing and Improving Tax Compliance (2004) 8 
<http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/21/55/37212610.pdf>. 
105 
revenue departments respond quickly to changing circumstances, ensure that treatment 
strategies are applied to activities of the highest priority, have a high probability of 
success with interventions, and meet their business intents—to optimise collections 
under the law, while maintaining community confidence in the system.640 The 
compliance risk management model is presented in Figure 4.5. 
 
 
Figure 4.5: The Compliance Risk Management Process 
Source: OECD 2004, page 9. 
 
As the model reveals, it offers its members specific and strategic guidelines to deal 
with compliance risks via a micro approach and in a diversified manner. It concentrates 
on the drivers of noncompliance, and is flexible in nature. While managing the 
identified risk through a specific treatment strategy, the model recommends 
considering issues such as the nature of the risk to be addressed, what the treatment 
strategy seeks to achieve, and which measurement methodologies should be used 
(including timeframes and external factors that could affect the measures and how they 
may be interpreted). It also suggests the identification and measurement of 
compliance-related risks to address the issue of noncompliance by employing a narrow 
approach.641 
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4.14 Future Compliance Strategy for Bangladesh 
 
No single theory has been able to explicate tax compliance behaviour in its totality. 
Yet, it is necessary to determine an optimal model to effectively manage the tax 
compliance problem in Bangladesh. Thus, it is suggested that Bangladesh employ a 
model that embraces a comprehensive approach to the problem. This comprehensive 
approach should consider the contribution and importance of different theories and 
models of tax compliance.642 A holistic understanding of taxpaying behaviour is 
necessary to improve compliance.643 This comprehensive approach should recognise 
that the tax compliance problem is endogenous with the evolution of the taxation 
system in a human society. 
 
The comprehensive approach suggests that the ATO compliance model based on the 
responsive regulatory theory should be accepted in Bangladesh, upon fulfilment of 
certain conditions. This is because, despite its drawbacks, this model remains the 
optimal option in the regulatory arena.644 The ATO compliance pyramid offers a 
comprehensive strategy because it does not discard the traditional deterrence type of 
enforcement. At the same time, it also takes into account the psychological factors that 
affect compliance.645 However, to successfully use this model in Bangladesh, 
corruption in the income tax department must be reduced. Achieving this will require 
policy and political goodwill on behalf of the government to curb tax corruption. There 
is evidence that appropriate strategies can control corruption. For example, in the 
Nigerian revenue department, the government has been able to reduce corruption 
through introducing anticorruption instruments.646 Any successful reform in the 
income tax department necessitates institutional integrity in its performance,647 and the 
institutional mechanism remains the main avenue through which the government can 
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increase the integrity of the income tax department. In addition to a separate 
institutional establishment, strong departmental control is necessary to improve 
institutional integrity.648 
 
Apart from corruption, to successfully replicate the ATO compliance model for 
Bangladesh, information asymmetry must be addressed. Once taxpayers’ information 
is gathered, it will be easier to facilitate dialogue using the ATO model.649 Imbalance 
of information between the tax official and taxpayer creates an avenue for tax 
evasion.650 To address this, Bangladesh requires a strong information reporting regime 
with the tax department to help gather the necessary information about taxpayers’ true 
incomes. 
 
4.15 Conclusion 
 
This chapter has critically discussed all the existing tax compliance theories. It has 
observed that no one theory or model is sufficient to provide a comprehensive solution 
to the problem of tax noncompliance in its totality. However, it is argued that the 
responsive regulatory theory adopted by the ATO is currently the best option to 
manage this problem. Therefore, the ATO compliance model is suggested for 
Bangladesh as a pragmatic and future tax compliance model. 
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Chapter 5: Tax Amnesties and Tax Compliance in 
Bangladesh 
 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
Tax amnesty constitutes a major aspect of political agendas around the world.651 It is 
allowed as a part of the government’s tax reform process. Tax administrations in a 
variety of countries are facing the formidable challenge of curbing tax evasion. The 
problem of tax evasion is a transnational issue652—every country, whether developed 
or developing, faces this problem to a greater or lesser extent.653 To tackle this 
problem, tax administrations employ different enforcement measures, such as 
auditing, prosecution and so forth. Tax amnesty is one such measure relating to policy 
issues,654 which complements other tools655 to ensure compliance. This strategy can 
also be adopted by governments to improve their budget by raising quick revenue. 
Although tax amnesty has only been frequently practised in recent times, the history 
of tax amnesty is as old as the history of taxation. The Rosetta Stone of King Pharaoh 
from Ancient Egypt evidences the first occurrence of tax amnesty granted to 
taxpayers.656 Under that amnesty scheme, the king granted amnesty to tax rebels, and 
arrear taxes were written off. Traces of tax amnesty are also found in the Ancient 
Roman Empire.657 
 
Tax amnesty allows individuals or firms to pay evaded taxes without being subject to 
all or some of the financial and criminal penalties that are usually imposed on tax 
evaders.658 For revenue raising, tax amnesty is a controversial tool.659 However, 
champions of tax amnesty emphasise the short-term success of revenue augmentation, 
since individual taxpayers take the opportunity to eliminate tax delinquency without 
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penalty. They argue that, if tax amnesty is offered, taxpayers who are not in the tax net 
might feel encouraged to do so.660 Boise argues that amnesty helps generate revenue, 
paves the way for future tax compliance by the individuals taking part in the program, 
and leads to more harsh future enforcement regimes.661 
 
In Bangladesh, tax amnesties are conducted frequently to attempt to curb the problem 
of the underground economy in the country. However, the purpose of this chapter is to 
argue that tax amnesty in Bangladesh is used as a means of ‘whitening black money’ 
by politicians, businesspeople and other corrupt sectors of society. As a result, the 
overall effect of the tax amnesty scheme is not as great as expected. The scheme is 
perceived to be exploited by corrupt politicians and businesspeople over the years to 
the prejudice of the interest of the national revenue. It is also contended that tax 
amnesty does not have a positive effect on improving voluntary compliance. This 
chapter argues that, in Bangladesh, tax amnesty is conducted with political motives, 
rather than as an effective revenue raising tool or part of the tax reform process. Tax 
amnesty is offered on direct tax, such as income tax, and indirect tax, such as customs 
duty and value-added tax. Since this thesis focuses on income tax compliance in 
Bangladesh, this section will detail tax amnesty in the field of income tax in 
Bangladesh. 
 
There has been considerable research on the effect of tax amnesty programs on revenue 
collection and improving tax compliance. Alm, Martinez-Vazquez and Wallace’s 
study on Russian tax amnesty finds that tax amnesties produce little short- or long-
term effect on revenue, and are not helpful as a policy instrument in Russia.662 Torgler, 
Schaltegger and Schaffner’s cross-cultural comparative study with data from European 
and Latin American countries reveals that tax compliance increases significantly when 
people have the opportunity to vote for or against a tax amnesty, independently of 
whether a tax amnesty is rejected or not.663 In addition, the expectation of further tax 
amnesties has a negative effect on tax compliance. 
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Alm and Beck find tax amnesty has a positive effect on revenue collection when 
combined with increased enforcement measures.664 Through a study of Michigan tax 
amnesty programs, Fisher, Goddeeris and Young find that amnesty programs could 
not substantially increase the number of tax payers; rather, only existing taxpayers took 
advantage of the programs by paying their tax debts.665 Joulfaian notices the same 
trend in Massachusetts tax amnesty programs.666 Christian, Gupta and Young’s study 
uses data from Michigan state to ascertain the effect of tax amnesty on subsequent 
return filing.667 They find that two-thirds of new and nine-tenths of previous taxpayers 
who filed amended tax returns under the amnesty program filed a state income tax 
return after the amnesty period was over. Uchitelle finds tax amnesties to have mixed 
success. Some programs failed to broaden the tax base, while some succeeded, and 
some could raise revenue, while others could not. He argues that it is not beneficial for 
developing countries to conduct tax amnesty programs if they do not also improve 
their overall tax collection mechanism—a tax amnesty program should be 
accompanied by structural and tax reforms.668 
 
Martinez notes that states without tax amnesty programs also experience rises in 
revenue and compliance rate like the states having same with amnesty programs by 
implementing enforcement measures.669 In an experiment with US data, Alm, McKee 
and Beck find that compliance decreased after the tax amnesty period because of the 
expectation of further amnesty, and that post-amnesty revenue increased if strong 
enforcement measures were implemented.670 Alm argues that tax amnesty produces 
limited revenue, and there is exaggeration when presenting the revenue data collected 
through amnesty programs.671 Repeated amnesties are even less effective; thus, tax 
amnesty should not be regarded an efficient revenue raising tool. 
 
Through an experiment in India, Gupta and Mookherjee find an insignificant effect of 
amnesty on revenue collection, except for one sudden boost in revenue collection.672 
Luitel and Sobel find that repeated amnesty programs reduced the state revenue 
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collection.673 Using a Bayesian modelling approach, Fox and Murray’s empirical 
research finds that the tax amnesty programs conducted by US states over a long period 
depended largely on economic, fiscal and political factors.674 They also find that initial 
tax amnesty increases revenue collection and subsequent amnesties, although later 
amnesties produce less revenue. They find the same result in the case of tax return 
filing. This implies that, when tax amnesties are offered repeatedly, revenue 
performance diminishes gradually. Mikesell finds tax amnesty programs to be the 
norm among US state tax collection systems.675 
 
Tax amnesty programs have been found to be an effective revenue raising mechanism 
based on the positive experience of tax administrations undertaking repeated tax 
amnesties. Parle and Hirlinger observe that amnesty programs are revenue yielding, 
though in low volume, and appear to be low-cost and low-risk political undertakings 
that increase compliance and are helpful in minimising budget shortfall.676 In an 
empirical study, Rakhmindyarto identifies the factors of a successful tax amnesty 
program in Indonesia.677 Rechberger et al. study the influence of the perceived justice 
of tax amnesty on future tax compliance.678 They find that post-amnesty tax 
compliance was positively influenced by the perceived justice of tax amnesty. The 
fairer the tax amnesty was perceived, the more honestly people reported their income 
in post-tax amnesty periods. 
 
From the above elaboration it is observed that scholars have come to different 
conclusions regarding the effectiveness of the tax amnesty programme as a revenue 
raising tool. Debate is ongoing about the issue. The following section addresses the 
tax amnesty debate. 
 
5.2 Tax Amnesty Debate 
 
As a fiscal policy, the tax amnesty scheme attracts debate among scholars in the field 
of research. There are champions of tax amnesty, who support the scheme as a policy 
instrument to mobilise internal revenue and improve compliance. In contrast, there are 
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those who argue that tax amnesty has little effect on revenue collection and compliance 
behaviour. This section first gives an overview of the arguments in favour and against 
tax amnesty, and then critically details each argument in the following subsections. 
 
5.2.1 Arguments for and against Tax Amnesty 
 
As a revenue raising tool, tax amnesty attracts both positive and negative debate. The 
arguments in favour of tax amnesty are identified and categorised by Luitel in his PhD 
thesis. The arguments in favour of tax amnesty state that it: 
x augments government revenues and ensures income distribution in society 
x offers an opportunity to mend the mistakes of delinquent taxpayers to allow 
them to undertake honest tax compliance 
x helps remove the slur of guilt from citizens 
x is an effective and appropriate tool that can be employed before increasing 
penalties and enforcement activities 
x paves the way for a transition to a new tax regime 
x indicates the government’s strong will and capability to curb tax evasion in the 
country 
x broadens the tax base by including more citizens in the tax net 
x mobilises internal revenue in both the short and long term 
x helps revenue departments minimise administrative costs 
x increases tax compliance through continuously monitoring tax evaders and 
bringing them into the tax net. 
The arguments against tax amnesty state that it: 
x erodes tax morale among honest and complying taxpayers by decreasing the 
moral costs for dishonest behaviour 
x is regarded as too lenient action against tax evaders 
x encourages honest taxpayers to evade taxes because it removes the guilt of tax 
evasion by allowing amnesty for previous evasion 
x highlights the strong presence of an underground economy and widespread 
noncompliance in the tax system of the country 
x reveals the weakness of the tax administration in enforcing the tax law and 
ensuring compliance 
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x decreases present compliance when employed repeatedly because taxpayers 
wait for future schemes in order to avoid penalties, thereby negatively affecting 
present revenue collection.679 
 
Overall, the tax amnesty is still regarded as a reasonably efficient tool to generate 
internal revenue in both the short and long term. It is true that, in the short term, the 
tax amnesty frequently fails to generate the anticipated level of revenue. Yet it is 
considered useful, particularly in times of financial crisis and economic recession, 
when government spending increases unexpectedly.680 The positive effect of tax 
amnesty is usually measured by policymakers in terms of gross short-term revenue 
collection. Evidence suggests that tax amnesty generally gathers a small amount of 
revenue, while recurring amnesties generate even less.681 The advantages of tax 
amnesty are that it increases government revenue, expands the tax base, encourages 
dishonest taxpayers to be honest, does not penalise unintended mistakes by sincere 
taxpayers, helps improve the tax structure, highlights sincere efforts by governments 
that are committed to curbing tax evasion in the country, and lowers the cost of tax 
collection. Conversely, tax amnesty lowers tax morale in the community, highlights 
the weak enforcement capacity of the state machinery, reduces compliance by making 
taxpayers believe that it will recur, generates a belief among tax evaders that tax 
evasion is a minor or negligible offence, generates less revenue than expected, signals 
the presence of noncompliance, and encourages taxpayers to be dishonest by not 
complying regularly.682 Different researchers have found different results of tax 
amnesty; however, there is lack of studies in the field of tax amnesty, and the available 
evidence fails to offer a clear picture of the effect of tax amnesty on tax compliance 
practice.683 
 
In the US, there are two factors compelling taxpayers to comply voluntarily. First, 
taxpayers believe it is their duty as citizens to pay tax according to the law. Second, 
strict enforcement of the tax law causes taxpayer honesty.684 These complying 
taxpayers are honest, law abiding and patriotic. If these voluntarily complying 
taxpayers thought that the system of tax concession (in the name of tax amnesty) was 
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absolving tax criminals of their crimes, these patriotic feelings might disappear, and 
they might be discouraged from paying tax at the specified rate. Malherbe et al. 
contend that, as a result of tax amnesty, honest taxpayers may be encouraged to reduce 
their compliance due to perceiving tax amnesty as an unfair tax relent for delinquent 
taxpayers. Consequently, they might find tax evasion to be a profitable business.685 
The resultant revenue loss from tax amnesty programs has the potential to undermine 
its benefits. Malherbe et al. cite an example from the US in which, in 1985, a one per 
cent point loss caused around US$5 billion.686 The amnesty in Michigan in 2002 
decreased the revenue of the 2003 financial year by $18.4 million.687 Martinez argues 
that, in this situation, tax amnesty might decrease tax compliance, rather than 
increasing it.688 It might also create anger and dissatisfaction among honest taxpayers 
who see their fellow citizens evade tax by thwarting the tax laws.689 
 
5.2.2 Tax Amnesty and Black Money Whitening 
 
Tax amnesty programs can work as a legalised means of money laundering by black 
money holders. Pasha argues that allowing tax amnesty is like inviting tax evaders to 
whiten their black money.690 It teaches people how to whiten black money illegally 
earned and legally earned but tax not paid.691 A black money whitening scheme offered 
through a tax amnesty program ultimately encourages tax evasion.692 Tax amnesty 
legitimises money laundering, thereby rewarding those who do not pay their taxes and 
penalising honest taxpayers who pay tax at higher rates.693 When amnesty programs 
are conducted regularly, tax evaders take full advantage of such anticipated 
amnesties.694 The way that tax amnesty leads to money laundering through paying tax 
at a lower rate is indicated by the example of amnesty provisions contained in the 1984 
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ITO. Section 19A695 of the ITO gives the opportunity to whiten black money by 
investing this money in newly established industrial undertakings. The income tax 
authority cannot ask any questions about the source of money invested under this 
section if, prior to the investment, the taxpayer has paid tax at the rate of 10 per cent. 
This is a clear example of amnesty offered to tax evaders to legalise dirty money. The 
researcher also has anecdotal evidence of the ways people take advantage of the 
amnesty to whiten their black money in Bangladesh. 
 
5.2.3 Tax Amnesty and Tax Base 
 
It is believed that tax amnesty expands the tax base,696 and there is some evidence to 
support this.697 However, specific country experience shows that, in the long term, tax 
amnesty does not expand the tax net. For example, in the US, the state tax amnesty 
programs have failed to broaden the tax net as expected.698 In Pakistan, during the last 
two decades, repeated tax amnesty programs have failed to increase the tax net.699 In 
Bangladesh, the NBR has been conducting regular amnesty programs since 
independence, yet they have not contributed much to the tax roll. For example, there 
are currently 2.6 million taxpayers in Bangladesh and, of these taxpayers, only half 
submit income tax returns. Interestingly, of the taxpayers submitting returns, salaried 
people and contractors are the main constituents. The lack of people paying tax is a 
significant problem for the ITDB.700 The number of taxpayers in Bangladesh remains 
much the same, except for a slight increase in volume. Thus, it appears that tax amnesty 
programs have failed to increase the tax net. In this respect, Martinez argues that 
‘adding to the tax rolls through a … tax amnesty is an unrealistic objective because 
much of the income that goes unreported is derived from illegal activities’701—as is 
the income from bribery and other forms of corruption. 
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Another problem for Bangladesh is that the tax statute can offer immunity from penalty 
and punishment under the tax statute only—it cannot guarantee protection from 
prosecution under any other law in the country. For example, if a person declares 
income from bribery, the income tax law might ignore this, but the law regarding 
anticorruption should not exonerate the person due to the tax amnesty. Thus, 
considering the legality question of income earning, the chance of tax amnesty to 
contribute to the tax net appears bleak.702 
 
5.2.4 Rule of Law, Social Justice and Tax Amnesty 
 
The rule of law postulates that there will be proper and just application of the law for 
all citizens, and that everybody will be treated equally, without preference or prejudice. 
The rule of law remains a precondition for successful governance;703 however, tax 
amnesty seems to tarnish the essence of the rule of law by treating taxpayers unequally. 
Thus, tax amnesty schemes are intrinsically reprehensible. The fairness of the tax 
system becomes questionable because of preferential treatment in the payment of tax. 
Tax amnesty might cause honest taxpayers to believe that the tax system is unfair 
because of treating tax evaders in a privileged manner by granting amnesty.704 In tax 
systems operated with a voluntary compliance system, taxpayers’ positive perceptions 
about the system are vital to ensure voluntary compliance. If taxpayers perceive that 
the system is unfair, they might be discouraged to comply voluntarily. According to 
Vihanto, the decision of taxpayers whether to evade tax depends on their perception 
of the fairness of the system, and tax amnesty makes the system seem unfair to honest 
taxpayers.705 
 
Tax amnesty may negatively affect the horizontal equity of taxation. A horizontally 
equitable tax system renders equal treatment to all taxpayers in similar economic 
situations.706 A horizontal system postulates that there is ‘equal treatment of equals’. 
That is, individuals who have the same wealth, or are in the same income bracket, 
should receive the same tax rate. Horizontal equity is considered vital because it affects 
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taxpayers’ perceptions of the fairness of the system.707 Tax amnesty undermines 
horizontal equity because it creates discrimination among tax rates by giving tax 
evaders opportunities to pay tax at lower rates. Thus, uniform application of the tax 
statute is impeded because tax amnesty has the effect of sabotaging the principle of 
equality.708 If tax amnesty is unaccompanied by provisions of punishment for tax 
crime, the purpose of the traditional view of punishment under the criminal law is 
thwarted.709 The retributive justice theory does not support tax amnesty because 
retributive justice emphasises the apportionment of appropriate punishment for 
violation of laws. Tax amnesty compromises that by not punishing individuals who 
violate the tax laws, and gain immunity under the tax amnesty program. 
 
5.2.5 Tax Amnesty and Tax Compliance 
 
The voluntary compliance rate may decrease following the amnesty period.710 
Hasseldine argues that tax amnesty reduces tax evasion guilt among delinquent 
taxpayers.711 However, Saracoglu and Kasakurlu contend that, in the short term, tax 
amnesty increases tax compliance by enabling detection of taxpayers in the informal 
economy.712 A successful tax amnesty program highlights the rampant noncompliance 
in the country. Consequently, tax evaders become aware of the fact that they are not 
the only ones who cheat.713 This is particularly true in developing countries, such as 
Bangladesh. When there are repeated tax amnesties, tax evaders might be encouraged 
not to comply in anticipation of future tax amnesty. Thus, amnesty can reduce taxpayer 
compliance.714 However, there is evidence that amnesties supported by strict 
enforcement and taxpayer education generally increase compliance, or at least do not 
decrease it. 
 
Torgler, Schaltegger and Schaffner find that an initial tax amnesty increases tax 
compliance, while recurring amnesties have a negative effect on the compliance 
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rate.715 Alm and Martinez-Vazquez observe that, if post-amnesty enforcement 
activities are increased and organisational capacities are improved, tax amnesty might 
be an effective tool for improving voluntary compliance.716 To improve compliance 
through tax amnesty, the revenue authority must create an impression that amnesty 
will be followed by tougher enforcement. Baer and Le Borgne argue that tax amnesty 
alone plays a very limited role in increasing compliance.717 Thus, if tax amnesty is 
employed alone, it may not succeed, but if it is accompanied by other penal provisions, 
it may work well. Leonard and Jackhuser refer to the Massachusetts state revenue 
department’s estimate regarding the effect of tax amnesty, and argue that when a tax 
amnesty program is coupled with wide publicity and stricter future enforcement, it can 
substantially increase future compliance with tax statutes.718 
 
Moran suggests that tax amnesty can be an effective mechanism for the government 
to combat the burgeoning tax noncompliance problem in the IRS. However, he stresses 
the need for a thorough examination of the present and future implications of the 
amnesty program, including its moral aspects.719 Martinez argues that, although 
apparently effective, the short-term success of the state amnesty program is 
dangerously misleading, and the amnesty cannot be regarded the most important factor 
to increase compliance.720 He suggested publicity and enforcement as an alternative to 
tax amnesty.721 Mikesel contends that limited tax amnesty programs targeted as a one-
off tool to raise revenue might not affect future tax compliance.722 As a logically 
tailored tax amnesty that seeks to balance complying and noncomplying tax payers, 
the amnesty might increase both revenue and equity.723 However, Mikesel 
concentrates on the effect of tax amnesty in US states—he does not consider the 
background and culture of developing countries, such as Bangladesh. In addition, he 
argues that tax amnesty will strike a balance between honest and dishonest taxpayers 
if accompanied by high penalties and strict enforcements, yet this does not occur in 
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developing countries. Usually, tax amnesties are not coupled with punishment or strict 
enforcement measures. In most cases, people who take advantage of the amnesty go 
unpunished or pay a minimum penalty, to the utter chagrin of the honest taxpayer. 
 
The case of Bangladesh can be used as an example to support this argument. There is 
a tax amnesty provision in the 1984 ITO in Section 19BBB that states that: 
no question shall be raised as to the source of any sum invested by an 
assessee, being an individual, firm, association of persons or a private limited 
company between the first day of July 2009 and the thirtieth day of June, 
2010 in the purchase of stocks and shares of a company listed with any stock 
exchange in Bangladesh if the assessee pays, before the filing of return of 
income, tax at the rate of ten per cent on such sum invested. 
The implication of this is that, while honest taxpayers go for corporate investment 
giving proper tax, tax evaders whiten their black money by paying only 10 per cent 
tax, which is far below the maximum rate for the individual. Unlike in developed 
countries, developing countries such as Bangladesh have significant resource 
constraints. Referring to the success of US states’ tax amnesty programs, Stella argues 
that the enforcement capacities of the different US states have made these programs 
successful, while developing countries lack unique enforcement capabilities.724 In 
addition to a lack of resources, developing countries’ tax administrations do not have 
the appropriate will to implement post-amnesty strict enforcement measures.725 
 
5.2.6 Tax Amnesty and Revenue Authorities’ Audit Power 
 
Tax amnesty impedes revenue authorities’ audit power. The tax audit is a very 
important tool because it detects noncompliance at the individual taxpayer level; 
gathers information on the health of the tax system, including patterns of taxpayers’ 
compliance behaviour; gathers intelligence; educates taxpayers; and identifies areas of 
the law that require clarification.726 However, tax amnesty affects the tax audit in 
several ways. Certain tax amnesty schemes provide that a return will not be audited 
for a certain period if a taxpayer commits to increasing his or her present or future (or 
both) tax payment. Another type of amnesty provides exemption from audit for returns 
submitted in the future. Yet another type provides that, if the return submitted in the 
present is correct and accurate, earlier returns with problems or evasions will be 
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ignored and no audit will be conducted. In developing countries, where there is low 
tax morale and a weak tax culture, accompanied by corruption and other 
phenomena,727 audits are an effective tool for enforcing tax compliance; however, due 
to tax amnesty, the audit activities of revenue authorities are compromised. 
 
5.2.7 Tax Amnesty and Enforcement 
 
Tax enforcement is costly and time consuming; thus, the tax authority is frequently in 
a weak and sensitive position. Tax evaders take time to respond because they are aware 
that the government has time and resource constraints to go for quick enforcement. 
Baer and Le Borgne observe that high penalties for tax evasion are not frequently 
applied because they might not be commensurate with the offence, they might be 
impractical and there might be corruption among the tax officials.728 Tax amnesty 
worsens this issue by revealing the tax authority’s constraints and incapability to 
enforce tax laws in order to prosecute and punish tax evaders.729 If the tax authority 
allows tax amnesty regularly, habitual tax evaders find it easy and profitable to flout 
the law and evade tax. 
 
5.2.8 Tax Amnesty Programs and Future Enforcement 
 
Boise states that tax amnesty can ease the transition to a new tax enforcement regime 
that features more stringent enforcement activities.730 Under tax amnesty, delinquent 
taxpayers are given the opportunity to erase their illegal behaviour by paying tax at 
lower rates. In addition, usually, no civil or criminal actions are initiated against people 
under the amnesty program. Certain percent monetary penalty is imposed in addition 
to the rate of tax. At the same time, governments publicise that, after the amnesty 
period, strict measures will be taken against individuals identified as cheating. Thus, 
amnesty programs can ease the transition to a more strict enforcement regime.731 
Commenting on this transition, Lederman contends that increased enforcement 
necessitates change in norms, and that amnesty works as a transition relief. These 
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norms include attitudinal change, and Lederman argues that an immediate change of 
attitude is not possible.732 
 
5.2.9 Effect of Repeated Tax Amnesty 
 
For a tax amnesty program to be effective, it should be conducted once only. Repeated 
amnesty has the effect of diminishing revenue collection and the rate of compliance. 
US state tax amnesty and other international amnesty experiences indicate that 
repeated amnesties yield gradually smaller amounts of revenue.733 Boise argues, ‘a 
proliferation of amnesties generally is associated with an overall reduction in tax 
compliance’.734 When compliance falls, revenue collection is bound to fall. When tax 
amnesty is conducted for the first time in a country, it is widely held to generate 
substantial short-term revenue. The one-off amnesty conducted in Indonesia—under 
the title of the ‘Sunset Policy’—generated significant revenue. However, when 
amnesty programs are repeated, revenue collection decreases.735 Luitel and Sobel draw 
this conclusion after a thorough study on the effect of repeated tax amnesty on US 
states’ revenue collection. They consequently recommend that the states do not make 
repeated use of tax amnesty programs.736 
 
5.2.10 Tax Amnesty and State–Taxpayer Fiduciary Relationship 
 
It is suggested that tax amnesty affects the psychological tax contract between the state 
and taxpayers.737 According to psychological contract theory, governments and 
taxpayers are considered two actors with an implicit or relational psychological 
contract with each other. Feld and Frey propound the psychological contract theory.738 
They argue that strong political participation makes the contract more explicit and 
generates high tax morale. Revenue authorities must admit the existence of such a tax 
contract and support this by treating taxpayers equally and respectfully. Since tax 
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amnesty absolves tax evaders by granting amnesty from tax crime, amnesty disrupts 
the psychological tax contract relationship between the government and taxpayers.739 
 
In addition, this study argues that tax amnesty affects the fiduciary relationship 
between the state and taxpayer. The state–taxpayer fiduciary relationship postulates 
that taxpayers trust the government and subsequently pay tax as per the law. In return, 
it is the duty of the state to provide the needed public services that cannot be obtained 
by individual taxpayers. When applying the law, the government must not discriminate 
among taxpayers. If the government does not follow these principles, it is in violation 
of the fiduciary duties it owes to taxpayers in general. By allowing tax amnesty, the 
government moves out of the ambit of the state–taxpayer fiduciary relationship. As a 
result, honest taxpayers might feel frustrated and perceive the tax system as unfair, and 
subsequently become reluctant to comply voluntarily. 
 
5.2.11 Why Countries Choose Tax Amnesty Schemes 
 
Despite the debate about the negative effect of tax amnesty on revenue, countries still 
undertake tax amnesty. For example, US states repeatedly conduct amnesty programs. 
However, the US Treasury Department has expressed disapproval for these programs. 
According to the Treasury Department, tax amnesty: 
would further undermine taxpayer morale by sending a clear signal to the 
American public concerning noncompliance and tax fraud … Amnesties can 
only reinforce the growing impression that the tax system is unfair and 
encourage taxpayer noncompliance.740 
However, if ignoring the question of whether amnesty is moral, amnesty has proven 
an important and popular program in tax administrations.741 Baer and Le Borgne state 
that, ‘[t]he ease in quantifying the short-term benefits of tax amnesty programs 
combined with the difficulty in quantifying their costs, especially in terms of 
compliance, could partly explain amnesties’ popularity’.742 
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Developing countries employ tax amnesty schemes because of the weakness of their 
legal framework, and management and operation of the tax administration.743 Tax 
amnesty indicates the presence of tax evasion.744 When a tax administration is aware 
of tax evasion, it employs enforcement actions, such as audits and imposition of 
penalties. However, audits are a complex and costly task, particularly for the tax 
administrations of developing countries, which face resource constraints and 
complexities when undertaking audits. Thus, before employing expensive 
enforcement measures, an increased penalty rate can be a solution.745 However, there 
is danger in enhancing and applying penalties under tax statutes, as Stella states: 
The choice of penalty structures may be constrained by equity considerations 
… Harsh penalties that are viewed as incommensurate with the offense 
would not be applied in practice and thereby would call into question the tax 
authority’s credibility.746 
In this situation, it is likely that tax administrations will prefer tax amnesty, which is 
cheaper and rapidly brings easy money to the treasury. However, although the inability 
to pursue a long-term enforcement policy might justify the short-term success of 
amnesty programs, it is expected that tax administrations would commit to a given 
enforcement policy eschewing amnesties.747 However, the popularity of amnesty 
around the world has made it an integral part of the tax policy of most tax 
administrations. 
 
5.2.12 Remoteness of Damage and Tax Amnesty 
 
Tax amnesty creates resentment among honest taxpayers, with civil society very 
critical of this. However, governments employ amnesty, and the people ultimately 
accept it. Parle and Hirlinger observe that the US states’ tax amnesty programs do not 
face much resistance from citizens. They find that some citizens favour the programs, 
while others are neutral. They find no example of uprising or organised protest from 
the people against the amnesty.748 Rather, states increasingly resort to tax amnesty on 
a regular basis. As aforementioned, this might be a sign of the weakness of the tax 
administration in enforcing tax laws, yet it is unclear why people accept it. One 
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plausible explanation might be the ‘remoteness of damage’ theory. The idea of 
‘remoteness of damage’ is found in the law of contract. According to the remoteness 
of damage theory, a person claiming damages for any damage caused to him or her by 
breach of the terms of a contract must be foreseeable by the party, and must be directly 
related to the breach of the contract. If the damage is indirect or remote, the court will 
not consider the case fit for damages due to the remoteness of the damage.749 Tax 
amnesty does not cause any direct harm to fellow taxpayers or the state. Thus, this 
study argues that this might explain people’s acceptance of amnesty, given that the 
damage caused by the loss of revenue due to amnesty is not clearly visible, and cannot 
be identified as having a direct negative effect on revenue collection. 
 
Interestingly, anecdotal evidence reveals that some business leaders in Bangladesh 
speak against the tax amnesty policy of the government. However, these leaders are 
sometimes identified as tax evaders, who use the tax amnesty scheme to whiten black 
money. It is alleged that one former finance minister of Bangladesh whitened black 
money by taking advantage of the tax amnesty that he himself had declared while 
working as the finance minister.750 Even some of the organisations that campaign 
against tax amnesty and tax evasion in Bangladesh do not have a satisfactory record 
regarding payment of tax. 
 
5.3 Selected Country Snapshots on Tax Amnesty 
 
This section of the chapter presents snapshots of the overall scenarios of tax amnesty 
programs conducted in selected countries, namely Australia; USA; Italy; Indonesia. 
These countries were selected because of evidence being available on implementation 
and comparative success. Between them they exemplify a range of developed countries 
with differing cultural, political and legal characteristics, as well as Indonesia, a 
rapidly developing country with a very large population. 
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5.3.1 Tax Amnesty in Australia 
 
It has been observed that tax amnesty programs are popular as a revenue raising tool. 
The popularity of domestic and international tax amnesty programs in different 
countries highlights the problem of tax evasion around the world. Schneider, Buehn 
and Montenegro find that the average size of the informal economy around the world 
reached a noticeable size until 2007.751 Australia is not free from an informal economy 
or tax evasion. The size of the Australian informal economy was found to be 14 per 
cent of the GDP, on average, from 1999 to 2007.752 In Australia, tax evasion is not 
regarded a serious offence, compared to other offences.753 However, tax evasion 
targeting is a high priority of the ATO.754 Tax evasion in Australia occurs due to the 
failure of taxpayers to report all income, failure to report cash wages, failure to forward 
tax withheld from employees’ wages to the ATO, withholding tax from workers’ 
wages (for example, paying in cash), not paying employee superannuation 
entitlements, lodging tax returns in an attempt to avoid payment, and lodging tax 
returns in order to avoid childcare or other obligations.755 Tax evasion also occurs due 
to claims of non-deducted taxes.756 To minimise tax evasion, the Australian 
government launched ‘Project Wickenby’ in 2006. This project has proven successful 
in detecting cases of tax evasion and bringing tax evaders into the tax net.757 
 
Despite the wave of tax amnesty programs around the world, Australia has conducted 
very few amnesty programs. There are very limited studies on amnesties conducted in 
Australasia. According to Sawyer, this the dearth of studies indicates that there has 
been very minimal use of tax amnesty in Australia.758 In 1988, the ATO conducted a 
domestic tax amnesty program that it considered successful.759 However, no details 
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are available about that amnesty. Hasseldine760 briefly reviews the 1988 Australian 
and New Zealand tax amnesty.761 Besides this short study, no major documents are 
available about Australian domestic tax amnesty programs. 
 
The 1988 Australian tax amnesty was a limited amnesty that gave the opportunity to 
submit unlodged tax returns.762 The ATO decided to conduct the amnesty when it 
found that nearly 360,000 Australian taxpayers had failed to submit their tax returns.763 
The ATO encountered this problem of non-lodgement because of the shift from the 
traditional assessment system to the self-assessment system in the 1980s.764 Thus, the 
ATO offered lodgement amnesty, where taxpayers with outstanding returns were able 
to lodge their returns.765 This was a time-locked amnesty from 30 May to 31 October 
1988, and there was no penalty provision accompanying the program.766 It should be 
noted that, while the ATO was happy with the results of the program, the returns 
lodged under the program showed that only 28 per cent of the taxpayers submitting 
returns owed tax to the ATO, while 57 per cent claimed refunds.767 
 
After the first domestic amnesty program in 1988, in 2007, the ATO offered tax 
amnesty for taxpayers who made mistakes between the financial years of 2001 to 2002 
and 2006 to 2007 regarding payments and loans from their private companies, and 
allowed taxpayers to avoid penalties under Division 7A of the Income Tax Assessment 
Act 1936. This amnesty was offered through the issuance of practice statement, PSLA 
2007/20.768 This stated that if taxpayers took corrective action by 30 June 2008, they 
would not have to pay interest or penalties. However, taxpayers would have to pay the 
correct amount of tax, provided the time limits under the law allowed it.769 Changes in 
the tax statute gave the commissioner the discretion to disregard penalties when an 
honest mistake or inadvertent omission had been made. It should be noted that the 
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above tax amnesty was only granted to honest taxpayers who had made inadvertent 
mistakes, and not to deliberate tax evaders. 
 
Australian taxpayers have a positive attitude about the performance, integrity and other 
aspects of the taxpayers’ service rendered by the ATO. In a community perception 
survey, 85 per cent of the taxpayers surveyed expressed confidence in the ATO’s 
administration of the Australian tax system.770 Eighty-four per cent were happy that 
the ATO was doing a good job,771 while 87 per cent believed that the ATO acted with 
integrity.772 Seventy-nine per cent stated that the ATO was fair and professional in 
administering the tax system,773 while 95 per cent believed that the ATO was effective 
in dealing with tax evasion.774 Since repeated tax amnesty programs are regarded as 
proof of the weakness of a tax administration, the ATO may be deterred from 
conducting domestic amnesty programs. In addition, given the current tax compliance 
rate, the ATO would not feel the need to conduct amnesty programs. 
 
5.3.1.1 The ATO and Overseas Voluntary Disclosure Programs 
 
Although Australia has a reputation for not offering major tax amnesty, it has joined a 
group of countries to implement offshore tax amnesty programs. These offshore tax 
amnesty programs are conducted by different countries as overseas voluntary 
compliance programs. The main purpose of these programs is to curb tax evasion by 
eliminating international tax havens and bringing undisclosed overseas money into the 
tax network. The growing budget deficits and financial crisis around the world have 
necessitated such programs. These voluntary compliance programs are conducted by 
enabling tax information exchange agreements and tax treaties among countries. In 
2011, 600 such tax information exchange agreements and treaties had been signed by 
different countries, following the OECD standard on information exchange for tax 
purposes.775 
 
                                                          
770 ATO, Community Perceptions Survey Report (2011) 18 
<http://www.ato.gov.au/content/downloads/cor00330040_CPSAnnualReport2011.pdf>. 
771 Ibid, 19. 
772 Ibid. 
773 Ibid, 20. 
774 Ibid, 35. 
775 OECD, Taxation of Multinational Enterprises (2011) 25 <http://www.bfsb-
bahamas.com/international/047596100.pdf>. 
128 
Like other OECD countries, Australia felt it is time to identify overseas money, and 
bring this back into the country. To make this possible, the ATO started an offshore 
tax amnesty program under Project Wickenby, launched in 2006. According to the 
ATO, voluntary disclosure by individuals under Project Wickenby generated an 
additional A$301.7 million in revenue by June 2010.776 However on 30 November 
2009, the ATO declared an Offshore Voluntary Disclosure Initiative (OVDI), under 
which Australian taxpayers who had offshore income that they had not declared or 
paid tax on would be able to show that income voluntarily until 30 June 2010. The 
program was open to those who were holding or had held an offshore account or 
investment (either directly or indirectly), or had participated in an offshore tax 
arrangement. However, under the law, voluntary disclosure concessions were reduced 
once the ATO began audit. 
 
The ATO’s OVDI expired on Wednesday 30 June 2010. In 2012 to 2013, the ATO 
started its follow-up actions on people who did not come forward after receiving an 
OVDI letter—notwithstanding that over 8,000 people did respond. However, the ATO 
voluntary disclosure initiative program is regarded a success in achieving its targets.777 
Numerous people who were identified by the project submitted their tax returns778 and, 
as of 30 June 2012, Project Wickenby had collected more than A$660 million of 
outstanding revenue. This exceeded the targeted collection of A$503 million set for 
this date, and included more than A$351 million in cash collections and nearly A$308 
million made from increased voluntary compliance following interventions by the 
Project Wickenby taskforce.779 
 
The latest and perhaps the last tax amnesty offered by the ATO is ‘Project DO IT’ 
(Disclose Offshore Income Today). This was declared on 27 March 2014 to allow 
eligible taxpayers with previously unreported offshore financial activities to 
voluntarily disclose any income and assets.780 The deadline for coming forward under 
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Project DO IT was 19 December 2014. The ATO received information of 
approximately A$550 million worth of assets stored in offshore havens in Europe, 
Israel and Asia.781 Serious penal measures are planned for the people who did not come 
forward to take advantage of the amnesty.782 
 
5.3.2 Tax Amnesty in the US 
 
Tax amnesty is a common feature of the state tax system in the US. Mikesell and Ross 
argue that tax amnesties have evolved as a standard component of the US tax system. 
During the last 30 years, the states have conducted tax amnesty programs 117 times. 
The state tax amnesty began in 1983 and continues to be conducted at regular 
intervals.783 Tax amnesties are generally conducted by the states, with more than half 
of the states conducting tax amnesty regularly. At the federal level, tax amnesty had 
never been conducted until 2009, when the IRS for the first time declared tax amnesty 
for US citizens and green-card holders who had failed to report foreign income on their 
US income tax returns and/or failed to report foreign bank and investment accounts on 
a Foreign Bank Account Report (FBAR). As a result, in 2009 and 2011, the IRS 
implemented two amnesty programs that encouraged people to declare their 
undisclosed foreign income and assets. More than 30,000 people have voluntarily 
complied since 2009, with at least 30 people criminally indicted, and the IRS netting 
a total of US$4.4 billion in unpaid taxes, interest and penalties.784 Although tax 
amnesty programs at federal level began in 2009 and in case of offshore income of US 
citizens and permanent residents, there were demands for federal tax amnesty 
programs in the 1990s.785 
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The IRS began a voluntary disclosure program that aimed to capture the untaxed 
billions of dollars held by US citizens in foreign accounts. This voluntary disclosure 
tax amnesty program was conducted at federal level in 2009, followed by a second one 
in 2011. During that time, more than 30,000 people have voluntarily complied, at least 
30 people have been criminally indicted, and the IRS has netted a total of US$4.4 
billion in unpaid taxes, interest and penalties. It is thought, that despite these two 
amnesties, a large amount of money remains untapped. The state department estimates 
that more than six million citizens live overseas, excluding those in the military, yet 
the IRS receives only 1.6 million tax returns each year with foreign addresses. In 
addition, just over 500,000 FBARs were filed in 2009. Thus, to bring that money into 
the US, on 9 January 2012, the IRS announced a third amnesty—formally known as 
the Offshore Voluntary Disclosure Program. This was substantially the same as the 
2011 amnesty, with some exceptions.786 
 
Amnesty programs at the state level are very popular and repeatedly conducted. States 
favour amnesty programs because they generate much-needed cash for the tax 
administration. However, regular amnesty can have negative effects because it raises 
questions about the justness of the system.787 The US state tax amnesty programs 
operate like sales in departmental stores—similar to the way consumers wait for a sale 
to buy goods, US taxpayers wait for tax sales in the form of tax amnesties.788 
 
5.3.2.1 Success of US Offshore Tax Amnesty Program 
 
The tax amnesty programs conducted at federal level are regarded a boon for the 
IRS.789 The first disclosure program, which ended in October 2009, proved so 
successful that the IRS initiated a 2011 follow-up program. The 2009 program led to 
approximately 15,000 voluntary disclosures and another 3,000 applicants who came 
in after the deadline, but were allowed to participate in the initiative. The agency has 
closed around 80 per cent of these cases, and collected US$2.2 billion in taxes, interest 
and penalties. These cases represented bank accounts in 140 countries. Overall, it can 
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be said that the US offshore tax amnesty is a success, considering the volume of 
revenue it has gathered. Until 2012, the IRS offshore programs produced US$4.4 
billion for the nation’s taxpayers. Lawmakers and tax enforcement agencies see the 
success of the tax amnesty programs as confirmation that many taxpayers are using 
offshore jurisdictions to avoid compliance with tax laws. Whether this is justified or 
not, lawmakers seem to agree that greater transparency is needed to combat offshore 
abuses.790 As a result, the US Congress enacted the Foreign Account Tax Compliance 
Act (FATCA) in 2010. FATCA seeks to increase transparency by imposing an 
additional disclosure requirement on individuals and certain domestic entities. 
Although the US offshore disclosure programs have been successful and the IRS is 
happy with their success, it is argued that repeated use of voluntary disclosure 
initiatives might cause diminishing results in terms of collection of revenue.791 The 
2012 disclosure program launched by the IRS has no deadline, which might encourage 
taxpayers to avoid compliance in the early years of the program.792 According to 
Lederman, the reason for not setting any deadline for the current disclosure programs 
might be the maximum use of penalties by the IRS.793 However, this might cause a 
lack of enforcement actions by the IRS relating to the offshore voluntary programs. As 
a solution to this, Lederman suggests that the IRS should collect the names of evaders 
and seek criminal prosecution.794 
 
5.3.3 Tax Amnesty in Italy 
 
Italy has a successful record of offshore tax amnesty programs. The Italian tax 
amnesty—the ‘Scudo Fiscale’ (‘tax shield’)—was adopted in 2001 and offered to 
taxpayers who voluntarily disclosed or repatriated undeclared foreign assets. The 
amnesty program was a strategy adopted by the Italian government to improve 
voluntary compliance among those who placed money in foreign bank accounts 
without paying tax. The amnesty program captured 56 billion euros of exiled money. 
The returning money attained a 2.5 per cent tax so that the Italian government 
produced 1.4 billion euros of additional tax revenue (about 0.4 per cent of the total tax 
                                                          
790 Jenny C Lin, Another Offshore Assets Reporting Requirement (2012) 
<http://cclawyer.cccba.org/2012/05/another-offshore-assets-reporting-requirement/>. 
791 Lederman, above n 121, 32. 
792 Ibid. 
793 Ibid. 
794 Ibid, 33. 
132 
revenues). Additional tax revenue of 1,480 million euros in 2002 and 617 million euros 
in 2003 was raised through the Scudo Fiscale program. 
 
For example, in 2009, Italy’s amnesty for tax evaders got the benefit of more than 80 
billion euros.795 The key to this success is thought to be the generous terms and 
anonymity of people stashing money in Swiss banks.796 However, although initially 
successful, a 2012 report states that the amnesty strategy is no longer an effective 
method in Italy to improve voluntary compliance.797 Thus, Italy is now preparing to 
sign a deal modelled on the agreement that Switzerland has already signed with 
Germany and the UK. It is believed that signing this agreement will mean that anything 
between 10 billion and 25 billion euros could be brought back from Switzerland to the 
Italian treasury.798 
 
5.3.4 Tax Amnesty in Indonesia 
 
In July 2008, Indonesia declared a tax amnesty program known as the ‘Sunset Policy’. 
Under this program, people who had never registered as taxpayers had the opportunity 
to register in the tax ledger without penalty, up to 28 February 2008. Existing taxpayers 
would also have the opportunity to amend their past mistakes and omissions without 
receiving any administrative penalties. The Sunset Policy was backed by Kadin799 (the 
Indonesian Chamber of Commerce) and proved a huge success for the Indonesian 
government’s fiscal policy.800 The program collected revenue of 7.46 trillion rupiahs 
in total. Tjen and Abbas argue that the revenue generated from the Sunset Program is 
significantly lower than the revenue target set by the tax service office. However, 
5,635,128 people entered the tax net as a result of the program,801 and a study found 
that the increased number of registered taxpayers might bring enhanced revenue in the 
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future.802 The Sunset Policy was part of the Indonesian government’s comprehensive 
reform program, which made the program successful.803 In addition, publicity played 
a significant role in the program’s success.804 
 
5.4 Tax Amnesty in Bangladesh 
5.4.1 Informal Economy and Tax Evasion in Bangladesh 
 
Developing countries such as Bangladesh face critical constraints to their development 
due to low overall revenue because of tax evasion and avoidance.805 As a result of tax 
evasion and avoidance, developing countries face a loss of revenue of approximately 
$385 billion a year.806 By losing this revenue, tax evasion seriously hinders the state’s 
capacity to spend on basic public goods.807 In addition, rampant tax evasion produces 
a feeling of exploitation among honest taxpayers, and encourages them to join the tax 
evaders.808 In Bangladesh, it is estimated by the NBR that approximately Tk 40,000 
crore is lost each year because of tax evasion and avoidance, and as a result, the size 
of the informal economy has increased to an alarming 38.1 per cent.809 From 21.4 per 
cent in 1989, the informal economy reached to the present state in 2011.810 
 
The government of Bangladesh has undertaken a variety of measures to eradicate the 
underground economy. Tax amnesty is one such measure to curb the rampant tax 
evasion in the country. In Bangladesh, tax amnesty is generally known as a ‘black 
money whitening’ scheme and is highly controversial.811 It is argued that the amnesty 
projects of the NBR have failed to access the underground economy—rather than 
improving compliance, they have deteriorated it, and encouraged honest taxpayers to 
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indulge in evading practices.812 Although the repeated tax amnesty conducted by the 
government at different times during different regimes has failed to curb the 
underground economy to the expected level, the government of Bangladesh is always 
eager to conduct tax amnesty programs again. The statistics of tax collected through 
tax amnesty are not very encouraging—during the last 40 years, Tk 12,996 crore was 
whitened, and the government received tax of Tk 1,368 crore. 
 
5.4.2 Repeated Tax Amnesty Programs 
 
As observed throughout this chapter, tax amnesty is allowed as a part of tax reform to 
raise government revenue and broaden the tax net. However, it does not seem to work 
properly in Bangladesh. In Bangladesh from 1971 to 2013, tax amnesty has been 
allowed 18 times. However, the experience of tax amnesty programs does not support 
the aims of the program. Although the amount of black money is appalling, less money 
has entered the government treasury through the amnesty program.813 During the last 
40 years, Tk 1,805.01 crore has been whitened, while tax of Tk 230.41 crore has been 
collected under several tax amnesty programs.814 This is only a fragment of the 
estimated amount of black money in the country. 
 
The taxpayers of Bangladesh do not like the idea of repeated tax amnesty programs by 
the government, with tax amnesty considered an awful system,815 and economists and 
members of civil society continuously opposing the amnesty.816 The trend of allowing 
tax amnesty programs is more frequent just before a national election. It is argued that 
only a handful of people have benefited from the tax amnesty program, and that it 
violates the law and is disrespectful to the people, which is unacceptable.817 The 
program has failed to serve any national interest—rather, tax amnesty in Bangladesh 
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highlights the inability of the government to tackle the black economy, and presents 
an opportunity to whiten black money.818 
 
The first tax amnesty program was announced in 1975. The Martial Law Order No. 6 
allowed people to declare any undeclared income until 30 June 1976. However, this 
period was extended into the 1977 to 1978 financial year. The amnesty was again 
offered during the 1981 to 1982 fiscal year; however, no positive responses were 
received by the government. During the 1988 to 1989 fiscal year, Tk 250 crore was 
whitened and tax was collected at Tk 25 crore. In the following fiscal year, Tk 400 
crore was whitened and the government received tax of Tk 40 crore. After the fall of 
General Ershad’s regime, the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) gained power 
through popular vote. The then finance minister, Saifur Rahman, said that he would 
not allow any tax amnesty. Thus, no amnesty occurred during the five-year period of 
the BNP government. In 1996, the Awami League government came to power and 
began allowing tax amnesty at different times. During the fiscal year of 1996 to 1997, 
the government passed a law that if money is invested in new industries. The amnesty 
continued until the 2000 to 2001 fiscal years, but few people took advantage of it. 
During the 2000 to 2001 fiscal year, provision was made to whiten money by paying 
10 per cent tax on undeclared income. Tk 1,000 crore was whitened at that time, and 
revenue of Tk 100 crore was collected under the scheme. 
 
After political turmoil at the end of the BNP government, the military-backed caretaker 
government came to power in 2007, declared a war against corruption and vowed to 
punish all corrupt people and tax evaders. A state of emergency was declared. This 
caretaker government adopted a new way to offer tax amnesty. It stated that undeclared 
income could be shown on income tax returns, and this would be accepted without 
question if a tax of seven per cent was paid. At that time, 32,558 people declared 
income in their returns who had not previously declared. As a result, Tk 3,775 crore 
was declared, and the government received revenue of Tk 678.43 crore. 
 
After the caretaker government, the Awami League party again came to power and, 
despite widespread criticism, allowed tax amnesty in its first year, during which 1,923 
people whitened black money for a total of Tk 922.98 crore. This government remains 
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in power and continues allowing tax amnesty. In the fiscal year of 2012 to 2013, the 
government again made provisions for tax amnesty. This created resentment among 
civil society and honest taxpayers. However, the finance minister defended provisions 
for legalising undisclosed money in the proposed budget by stating that it generates 
investment and prevents cash leaving the country.819 Muhith stated that the amount of 
undisclosed money in the economy is huge—between 42 and 82 per cent of the 
country’s GDP. He stated about the proposed tax amnesty:  
We have given scope to bring the undisclosed money to the market because 
we want the undisclosed money invested in the economy. We want to utilise 
the money. We kept provision for penalty for this scope.820 
 
According to the amnesty scheme, individuals can legalise their undisclosed money 
with a 10 per cent fine, and then must pay regular tax. Transparency International 
Bangladesh (TIB) has termed the proposed tax amnesty scheme to ‘whiten black 
money’ as unconstitutional, immoral and a violation of Article 20(2) of the 
constitution. As such, it has demanded its immediate withdrawal.821 Article 20(2) of 
the constitution states that: 
the State shall endeavour to create conditions in which, as a general principle, 
persons shall not be able to enjoy unearned incomes, and in which human 
labour in every form, intellectual and physical, shall become a fuller 
expression of creative endeavour and of the human personality. 
 
Tax amnesty creates a condition where tax evaders can enjoy the benefit of reduced 
tax, thereby making this saved tax equivalent to unearned income. Clearly, this issue 
raises questions regarding the constitutional validity of the tax amnesty schemes.822 
The following table presents an overview of black money whitening under the tax 
amnesty schemes conducted at different times by the Bangladesh NBR.823 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
819 ‘Black Money for Investment’, The Daily Star (online), 9 June 2012 
<http://www.thedailystar.net/newDesign/news-details.php?nid=237502>. 
820 Ibid. 
821 ‘TIB Urges Govt to Drop Black Money Whitening Option’, The Financial Express (online), 9 June 
2012 <http://www.thefinancialexpress-bd.com/more.php?news_id=132367&date=2012-06-09>. 
822 ‘Money Whitening Scope to Legitimise Corruption’, The Daily Star (online), 11 September 2011 
<http://www.thedailystar.net/newDesign/news-details.php?nid=233944>. 
823 Shaukat Hossain Masud, Shada Kalor Orthoniti (Dibbya Prokash, 2011). 
137 
Table 5.1: Black Money Whitening under Tax Amnesty Schemes over the Years 
Financial Year Disclosed Amount (in 
Bangladesh Tk Crore) 
Amount of Revenue Collected 
( in Bangladesh Tk Crore) 
1976–1977 70 10 
1987–1988 200 40 
1988–1989 250 25 
1989–1990 400 40 
2000–2001 1,000 100 
2002–2005 1,757 No tax 
2005–2006 4,603 345 
2006–2007 3,775 687.43 
2007–2008 800.03 80.03 
2008–2009 70.87 10.08 
2009–2010 923 121 
Source: NBR Bangladesh 
 
The above table reveals that revenue generation through amnesty programs is not 
particularly high, which give can put forward enough reason to go for amnesty 
programs in Bangladesh. The percentage of income tax collected as a result of tax 
amnesty compared to the overall collection in the concerned financial years is not 
satisfactory—to some extent, it can be said to have had no effect. The following table 
demonstrates the low effect of tax amnesty on overall revenue collection. 
 
Table 5.2: Collection through Tax Amnesty Program versus Total Collection 
Financial 
Year 
Total Income Tax 
Collection 
(in Tk Crore) 
Collection of Tax through 
Tax Amnesty Program (in 
Tk Crore) 
Percentage of Amnesty 
Tax of Total Income 
Tax Collection 
1976–1977 114.64 10 8.72 
1987–1988 664.29 40 6.02 
1988–1989 705.93 25 3.54 
1989–1990 782.24 40 5.11 
2000–2001 3,500.82 100 2.85 
2002–2005 14,520.00 No tax 0.00 
2005–2006 7,162.01 345 4.81 
2006–2007 8,721.24 687.43 7.88 
2007–2008 11,744.66 800.03 6.81 
2008–2009 13,857.74 100.08 0.72 
2009–2010 17,042.28 121 0.70 
Source: NBR Bangladesh 
 
It is observed that the tax on undeclared income declared under the tax amnesty 
programs of the NBR is negligible when compared to the overall collection of income 
tax. It is to be noted that data regarding black money whitening in Bangladesh are not 
readily available, and there are no significant studies in this respect. However, 
considering the volume of collected income tax in different years and the percentage 
of amnesty tax, it can be deduced that the revenue effect of tax amnesty in Bangladesh 
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is very limited—amnesty seems to have failed to generate revenue to the expected 
level. In addition, compared to the size of the black economy in Bangladesh, the total 
amount of amnesty tax of Tk 1,368 crore is negligible. According to Alim, conducting 
tax amnesty and asking people to declare black money appears to be a futile exercise824 
that offers little revenue.825 Rampant corruption, worsening law and order, the use of 
money and muscle in elections, and the rise of criminality in society are all related to 
black money.826 Alim argues: 
The governments in Bangladesh have so far generally failed to put the ‘black 
money whitening’ effort to any good use. The government should not any 
more run after this chimera. It should instead show zero tolerance to 
undisclosed money and apply the law more strictly on sources of black 
money.827 
It is also argued that amnesty fosters the black economy and criminalises politics.828 
 
Although data regarding the participants in amnesty programs are not available, it can 
be seen that the tax net expansion effect is not very positive or significant. This study 
was able to collect partial data on the effect of an amnesty program in a particular tax 
zone in Dhaka—Zone 4. In that tax zone in the 2005 to 2006 financial year, 818 
taxpayers participated in the amnesty program. In 2006 to 2007, 2,461 participated, 
and in 2008 to 2009, only 138 participated. Nationally, in 2007 to 2008, 16,664 
taxpayers participated, while in 2008 to 2009, 14,254 taxpayers participated.829 These 
statistics, while incomplete, present a picture of the limited effect of tax amnesty on 
expanding the tax net. 
 
5.4.3 Political Dimension of Tax Amnesty in Bangladesh 
 
It is acknowledged that tax amnesty is unethical, yet it yields to political motives to 
whiten the black money of politicians.830 Tax amnesty is conducted in Bangladesh on 
political grounds to enable corrupt politicians and businesspeople with black money. 
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The government admits that tax amnesty in Bangladesh is a compromise or surrender 
to politics. Dewan states, ‘Successive governments dared not to enforce the existing 
laws and regulations because it would hurt their own “black people”’.831 These people 
may try to undermine the government, while crippling the economy. Thus, every 
government has flirted with whitening black money at a nominal tax rate that is well 
below the statutory rate applicable to honest taxpaying citizens, thereby perpetuating 
the breeding of black money and a parallel economy driven by corrupt people.832 If 
black money holders were to whiten the money on their own, they could be charged 
with money laundering.833 The TIB states that this is an example of political 
bankruptcy, and the helpless surrender of the government to the immoral pressure of 
black money holders. The government justified the tax amnesty scheme allowed in the 
2012 to 2013 budget on the grounds that the country held around 42 to 82 per cent of 
black money (US$110 billion), and that this huge amount must be brought into the 
investment and tax network. With that goal, the government decided to allow tax 
amnesty to taxpayers to whiten black money with 10 per cent tax on the money 
declared.834 
 
Different interest groups—especially political leaders and businesspeople—pressure 
the government for amnesty to whiten black money.835 They may do so for a number 
of reasons. For example, they may have a significant amount of black money that they 
attained via corruption, and now wish to declare the money to invest it in business. 
The present Awami League government approved six commercial banks that were 
owned by either politicians or close allies of the ruling parties. This decision was not 
unanimously welcomed by economists and commentators across the country. While 
politicians owning large shares of banks are not a new phenomenon in this country, 
this time, the political involvement was so conspicuous that it created repercussions. 
The media and general public who are critical of the decision state that the authorities 
gave in to political pressure and compromised their principles.836 In addition to 
                                                          
831 Abdullah A Dewan, ‘Bangladesh: Black Money, Corrupt People and a Parallel Economy’, South 
Asia Monitor (online), 18 June 2012 <http://southasiamonitor.org/detail.php?type=n&nid=3035>. 
832 Ibid. 
833 Syed Tashfin Chowdhury, ‘Bangladesh’s “Black” Money Wins Reprieve’, Asia Times (online), 7 
July 2011 <http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/MG07Df02.html>. 
834 ‘Black Money Amnesty “to Lure Investment”’, BD News 24.Com (online), 8 June 2012 
<http://bdnews24.com/details.php?id=226090&cid=4>. 
835 Zahid, above n 816. 
836 Akram Hosen Mamun, ‘The Bank Job’ (2012) 11(16), The Daily Star Magazine (online) 
<http://www.thedailystar.net/magazine/2012/04/03/economy.htm>. 
140 
approving these six private commercial banks, the government is planning to issue 
licenses for around 10 new non-bank financial institutions to operate in the country. 
This decision is also criticised by financial experts and economists, who state that these 
licenses were given for political reasons, and that there is no need for new banks, given 
the size of the country’s economy.837 Amnesty seems to be an art of compromise by 
the democratic government of Bangladesh, which is acknowledged by the finance 
minister himself.838 The government compromises with black money and allows 
amnesty based on political motivations. 
 
Given that tax amnesty remains a popular revenue gathering tool by countries around 
the world, there is nothing inherently wrong with Bangladesh offering amnesty; 
however, there are some preconditions of a successful amnesty program. Primarily, 
tax amnesty should not be frequent. In addition, a survey of OECD countries divulged 
that most compliance strategies involve tax amnesty programs with varied conditions 
and tax rates.839 Their cause of success was identified to be broad advertising via the 
media and revenue department’s website, and the involvement of financial institutions 
in the process.840 This is discussed in greater detail in the following section. 
 
5.4.4 Preconditions of Successful Tax Amnesty Programs 
 
For a successful tax amnesty program in Bangladesh, the following conditions should 
be considered by the revenue administration: 
1. Tax amnesty, whether domestic or offshore, should not be a repeated event. 
2. When an amnesty program is conducted, it must be widely advertised in the 
media and on the website of the revenue department. Financial institutions 
should be involved in the process because these institutions, such as private 
banks, are an important actor in the process of money laundering. 
3. The government must show its political commitment to the notion that, once 
the amnesty period is over, harsh enforcement measures will be taken against 
detected tax evaders who failed to take advantage of the tax amnesty. 
                                                          
837 Asif Showkat, ‘BB May Issue Ten NBFI Licenses Final Decision by Dec; Expert Opposes the 
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838 ‘Black Money “too Tough to Control” in Bangladesh’, Asia News Network (online), 23 April 2012 
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839 OECD, Improving Access to Bank Information for Tax Purposes, 28 
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4. The government should undertake structural change to remove fundamental 
economic problems that contribute to tax evasion. 
5. The tax rate should be reduced to encourage taxpayers to voluntarily comply. 
6. Special investment bonds can be issued, and investment in these bonds should 
be accepted without question by the revenue department. 
7. The corruption problem in the tax department must be addressed. Taxpayers 
evade tax in collusion with tax officials by giving bribes in cash or in kind. If 
they can remain untapped and undetected without paying tax at all, they will 
not participate in the amnesty program. 
8. Publishing Black Money White Paper. 
 
5.4.5 Tax Amnesty on Offshore Assets 
 
The current world economy has observed a surge of tax amnesty on undisclosed 
offshore income offered by governments of different developed countries, such as the 
US, the UK, Australia and Italy. The money held by citizens in foreign banks is black 
and untaxed money. As aforementioned, the remarkable success of offshore tax 
amnesty in the US has encouraged the IRS to conduct amnesty for the third time in 
2012. In addition, such amnesty has also been a huge success in Western European 
countries, such as Italy and the UK.841 
 
Encouraged by this, Spain has also announced an offshore amnesty program. The UK 
and Liechtenstein launched the Liechtenstein Disclosure Facility in 2009, and, due to 
its huge success, extended it until 5 April 2016. HM Revenue and Customs initially 
expected to recover one billion pounds, but has since revised its estimate to over three 
times this figure. Meanwhile, an Italian tax amnesty launched in 2009 has yielded over 
80 billion euros.842 Portugal has also launched a similar amnesty program to recoup 
tax from citizens who keep money in foreign accounts. This is Portugal’s third 
amnesty, announced in 2012.843 
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Now is the right time for Bangladesh to declare amnesty on the money and assets held 
by Bangladeshi citizens in foreign jurisdictions. While exact statistics are not available 
on the volume of such assets held by Bangladeshi nationals, it is assumed that a huge 
quantity of money is syphoned away from Bangladesh every year. According to the 
NBR’s estimate, every year, Tk 2,000 crore exits Bangladesh. Another estimate states 
that Tk 1,400 crore are syphoned away from Bangladesh each year. The political circle 
is involved in the process of sending money out of the country.844 The money goes out 
in the first and last days of the government and a vicious political nexus could be 
behind this capital flight.845 The 2012 Global Financial Integrity report reveals that a 
total of US$14.059 billion had been taken away from Bangladesh in the 10 years since 
2001, through trade mis-invoicing, corruption, bribery and tax evasion.846 The NBR 
states that this occurs through back-to-back letters of credit definition; people buying 
second homes in foreign countries, such as Malaysia; and hundis.847 One recent 
example of money laundering is the case unearthed by the Bangladesh Bank in which 
one leading business institution in Bangladesh (Destiny Multipurpose Cooperative 
Society Ltd) laundered money and took an amount of Tk 70 crore out of the country 
via one of its foreign directors.848 It has been alleged that a number of corrupt suspects 
transferred around Tk 20,000 crore via illegal channels to 12 countries, including 
Malaysia, Thailand, Switzerland, Singapore, the Philippines and Hong Kong.849 
 
The government finds it difficult to retrieve this syphoned money from foreign 
countries due to the lengthy legal process involved. Bangladesh does not have the 
necessary bilateral pacts and legal framework to obtain cooperation from the countries 
to which money has been syphoned.850 Bangladesh has an Anti-Money Laundering Act 
2012; however, this does not appear to be functioning successfully. Under pressure 
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from the UN, Bangladesh first enacted an anti–money laundering Act in 2002. This 
Act made provision for a maximum of 12 years jail term for this crime in order to 
strengthen efforts to retrieve syphoned money from abroad. The law also provides for 
a minimum of four years’ imprisonment and a fine of Tk 1 million or twice the 
amount.851 In addition to the anti–money laundering law, the government committed 
to mutual legal assistance with the US, Singapore, the UK, the United Arab Emirates 
and Malaysia to curb money laundering. In this regard, the government has also signed 
a memorandum of understanding with 12 countries, including the US, Singapore, the 
UK, Malaysia, the Philippines, Cambodia, Sri Lanka, Afghanistan and Nepal.852 
This gives a picture of the government’s efforts to control money laundering in 
Bangladesh. However, the legal process is usually lengthy and depends on mutual and 
rapid assistance from the involved countries. This is sometimes difficult, time 
consuming and costly. Thus, alongside the different anti–money laundering laws, the 
government should consider conducting tax amnesty programs in the name of a 
voluntary disclosure regime, such as in Australia, the US, India and other countries. 
Such amnesty for a limited time might help the government retrieve money from 
abroad and gain a significant amount of tax. The experiences from foreign jurisdictions 
support the idea of conducting an offshore amnesty program in Bangladesh. 
 
To achieve this, Bangladesh can follow the legal mechanisms used in other countries, 
particularly OECD countries. For example, Germany, the UK and Austria are about to 
ratify ‘Rubik’ agreements with Switzerland to impose a one-off tax on all deposits of 
citizens with accounts in Swiss banks. This deal provides that Swiss authorities will 
deduct 40 per cent from all Swiss accounts of the citizens of these countries, which 
will be reimbursed to the governments of the respective countries. Further, Switzerland 
will tax dividends every year with 22 per cent, which will be reimbursed to the 
countries concerned.853 Currently, Belgium is also considering signing this agreement 
with Switzerland.854 In 2012, the Indian tax department declared amnesty for more 
than 100 wealthy citizens who evaded taxes by hiding funds in Switzerland’s HSBC 
branch. No criminal proceedings will be started against them, and no penalty will be 
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imposed, if the money is brought back into the country and has tax paid on it.855 
Bangladesh should strongly consider implementing similar agreements with the 
countries where money has been syphoned off by Bangladeshi citizens. The sooner 
these programs are conducted, the more quickly the tax situation will improve in 
favour of government revenue. 
 
5.5 Conclusion 
 
Tax amnesty is a tool used by tax administrations around the world to generate quick 
revenue and improve voluntary compliance, with the aim of curbing the problem of 
tax evasion. As stated in this paper, amnesty highlights the rampant tax evasion in an 
economy. Although tax amnesty is a popular program with a positive effect on national 
revenue collection, it also has a negative effect in the long term. It distorts tax 
legislation, affects tax equity, evidences the lack of capacity or resources of the tax 
administration to enforce tax legislation, causes honest taxpayers to perceive the tax 
system as unfair and subsequently resort to tax evasion, and encourages corruption in 
the tax department. At present, places such as Australia, the US and other OECD 
countries are conducting offshore amnesty programs, rather than domestic programs. 
 
In addition, tax amnesty programs have done little to improve voluntary compliance. 
In Bangladesh, amnesty programs have been conducted repeatedly over the years, but 
have produced limited success in terms of revenue generation, improving compliance 
and curbing the problem of the black economy. Tax amnesty programs in Bangladesh 
seem to be conducted for political motives, rather than in consideration of revenue. To 
improve the compliance culture in Bangladesh, while also occasionally conducting an 
amnesty program, the government should create other tools to enhance the national 
revenue and increase the tax roll. Tax amnesty in Bangladesh has now become an 
anticipated event because it is repeated at regular intervals. This repetition encourages 
corrupt people to indulge in further corruption by hoarding black money, and 
ultimately whitening it through amnesty programs.  
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Chapter 6: Improving Income Tax Compliance with a 
TIRS—Lessons from Foreign Jurisdictions 
 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
Taxes are endogenous with state governance. State building is viewed as a process to 
improve capacity, institutions and government legitimacy in terms of state–society 
relationships.856 Taxation remains vital to improving state capacity, which 
subsequently contributes to improving the state–citizen relationship. Thus, the 
government’s rule is accompanied by the system of raising tax, which is then 
accompanied by complaints from citizens,857 thereby giving rise to the perennial 
problem of compliance for tax administrations around the world. Tax is as old as 
civilisation, and so is tax evasion.858 This compliance problem remains more acute in 
developing countries. While developed countries have been successful in improving 
their tax administrations, developing countries face a formidable challenge to reform 
theirs.859 As a developing country, Bangladesh is trying to overcome this problem. 
 
The purpose of the chapter is to discuss the effectiveness of the information reporting 
system to ensure voluntary compliance in the field of income tax in developing 
countries—particularly Bangladesh. It discusses how developed countries such as 
Australia, the US, Denmark, Sweden and New Zealand are using the information 
reporting system to tackle tax evasion. It also discusses why and how Bangladesh can 
use this to improve tax compliance, as well as other relevant issues. The TIRS is 
suggested as one of the tools to curb the problem of noncompliance in Bangladesh. 
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To improve the poor state of income tax compliance, the ITDB is undertaking various 
reform programs and innovative steps, as discussed earlier in this thesis. However, 
while the ITDB is using a variety of tools to improve income tax compliance, a 
particular legal enforcement tool needs special attention—the TIRS. This particular 
tool needs special attention because it is an effective legal tool to improve compliance 
and ITDB does not a strong TIRS. The TIRS is an effective tool that has been proven 
to substantially improve tax compliance in different countries. The US, Australia, 
Denmark, Sweden and New Zealand all use this system effectively. There are 
taxpayers who tend to cheat if they have the opportunity to do so; thus, third-party 
reporting substantially reduces the scope of non-reporting or underreporting. Kleven 
et al. find that the compliance rate is high when income is subject to third-party 
reporting, rather than self-reporting.860 In the US, underreporting is very low among 
income that is subject to third-party reporting. Thus, this section of this thesis suggests 
that, by using the experience of foreign jurisdictions, Bangladesh can substantially 
improve its income tax compliance rate with a strong TIRS. 
 
6.2 Meaning of TIRS 
 
Third-party information reporting is a primary tax enforcement tool.861 It is a legislated 
requirement for organisations to report wage and non-wage payments made during 
their trade or business to the income tax authority. This can be standalone reporting, 
or coupled with tax withholding provisions.862 Brooks states that the TIRS is one of 
the most effective tools to increase voluntary compliance.863 Tax information reporting 
reduces the opportunity to cheat, while compulsory tax withholding and information 
reporting both improve tax compliance and reduce the tax gap.864 They reduce tax 
evasion and help taxpayers comply voluntarily.865 Tax enforcement through an 
information reporting system is less costly and much more effective than tax audits for 
detecting unreported income. Taxpayers’ actual income is made evident, which makes 
any attempt to conceal income futile, and taxpayers will subsequently avoid tax 
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evasion.866 Kreiner observes that ‘[a]ttempts at declaring less income than 3rd party 
reported income is extremely rare’.867 
 
6.3 Effectiveness of the TIRS 
 
Third-party information reporting can be used as a way to unearth taxpayers’ true 
income.868 In most cases, the tax authority either cannot obtain taxpayers’ information, 
or receives it at a later stage, which delays any timely action by the tax administration. 
Lederman identifies this as a problem of asymmetric information,869 which creates an 
easy avenue for tax evasion.870 An information reporting system can be a solution to 
this type of information problem. An information reporting system works in two ways. 
First, it gives taxation officers an opportunity to verify returns, thereby making 
noncompliance easy to detect. Second, once taxpayers know that the government has 
information about their income, it is less likely that taxpayers will be able to cheat.871 
 
A third-party reporting system can also help tax authorities minimise the high 
enforcement costs involved in traditional enforcement tools.872 It can be beyond the 
ambit of withholding provisions in a way that people other than bound by tax law can 
furnish any information regarding any kind of payment received by any taxpayer that 
is not reported in the tax returns. Again, this information return system is effective in 
two ways. First, in some countries, the information gathered from third parties is sent 
to taxpayers before they file their returns, which means they cannot be forgetful when 
reporting income. Second, since the tax department has information about taxpayers’ 
income, taxpayers are aware that if they do not report their income in their tax return, 
they might be selected for audit. In that case, the taxpayer will have to face legal 
complexities, including penalties. Taxpayers alone cannot perform intricate financial 
transactions—there are various people and institutions involved. As a result, the 
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transactions reported by the taxpayers and recorded by the involved institutions must 
be analysed and examined to determine the correct amount of income.873 
 
6.4 Information Return System: International Experience 
 
There is research evidence that information reporting systems help achieve a very high 
level of voluntary compliance.874 The same cannot be said for categories of income 
that are not subject to withholding and/or information reporting obligations.875 Thus, 
it is pertinent to discuss the positive experiences of selected countries that have 
successfully used the information return regime to combat tax evasion. 
 
6.4.1 Income Tax Provisions for Filing an Annual Information Return in India 
 
The Indian income tax law contains provisions for information reporting. However, 
the law regarding information reporting was not extensive before 2004. In 2003, 
Section 285BA was inserted in the Income Tax Act 1961, which provided for the 
submission of an annual information return (AIR). In 2004, Section 285BA was 
substituted and extensive provision for filing an AIR was made, with the substituted 
Section 285BA covering high-value financial transactions. An AIR for high-value 
financial transactions is required to be furnished by specified people for specified 
transactions that are registered or recorded during the financial year. In effect, it 
identifies the entities that function in the economy, such as banks, financial 
institutions, companies, motor vehicle registering authorities, land and other property 
registering authorities, and other such authorities with whom taxpayers may have 
transactions with financial implications. The specific nature of information to be 
collated by them to report to the tax administration is identified in the Act. The 
following table lists the specific transactions about which information must be 
supplied to the tax administration.  
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Table 6.1: Transactions subject to AIR  
 
Since its introduction in 2003 to 2004, the AIR system has yielded spectacular results. 
Income tax collection has increased by 370 per cent and the number of taxpayers has 
increased by 15.50 per cent.876 The AIR system in India has reduced the time needed 
for audit and assessment, and taxpayers’ grievances have been addressed. The system 
is cost effective, easy and user-friendly. The Indian AIR system is considered a 
successful legal regime that has created substantial improvement in voluntary income 
tax compliance.877 
 
6.4.2 The IRS and Information Reporting System 
 
Since its inception in the wake of the civil war in the US,878 the IRS has persistently 
sought to collect revenue for the government treasury. The vast majority of revenue 
comes from taxpayers who voluntarily report and pay the taxes that they owe. The IRS 
estimates an overall voluntary compliance rate of 84 per cent.879 However, despite the 
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Sl. No. 
(1) 
Class of Person Required to 
File AIR (2) 
Nature and Value of Transaction (3) 
1 Banking company  Cash deposits aggregating to 10 lakh rupees or more in 
a year in any savings account 
2 Any company or institution 
issuing a credit card 
Payments made in respect of a credit card aggregating 
to two lakh rupees or more in the year 
3 A trustee or authorised 
manager of a mutual fund  
Receipt from any person of an amount of two lakh 
rupees or more for acquiring units of that fund 
4 A company or institution 
issuing bonds or debentures 
Receipt from any person of an amount of five lakh 
rupees or more for acquiring bonds or debentures 
issued by the company or institution 
5 A company issuing shares 
through a public or rights 
issue 
Receipt from any person of an amount of one lakh 
rupees or more for acquiring shares issued by the 
company 
6 A registrar or sub-registrar  Purchase or sale by any person of immovable property 
valued at 30 lakh rupees or more 
7 An authorised officer of the 
Reserve Bank of India 
Receipt from any person of an amount or amounts 
aggregating to five lakh rupees or more in a year for 
bonds issued by the Reserve Bank of India 
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encouraging picture of compliance, the tax gap is alarming880 and one of the biggest 
contributors to this tax gap is underreporting.881 Thus, the IRS has taken 
comprehensive measures to reduce opportunities for tax evasion. These measures 
include strengthening reporting requirements for third parties and expanding IRS 
access to reliable data from third parties.882 In the IRS, reliable third-party information 
is considered pivotal to reducing tax evasion.883 In the US, one-third of the tax gap 
arises from unreported transactions.884 To address this problem, experts suggest 
expanding the list of transactions that must be reported to the IRS.885 It is thought tax 
revenues will jump if every taxable transaction becomes subject to reporting 
requirements.886 
 
Thus, the IRS is successfully using a tax withholding and reporting system to reduce 
the tax gap.887 Statistics published by the IRS in 2006 reveal that, every year, the IRS 
receives approximately 1.5 billion information returns from third parties.888 However, 
it still fails to obtain information regarding self-employment business income, which 
is a major source of the tax gap.889 There are currently more than 30 types of tax 
information returns required by the IRS, which provide the primary cross-checking 
measure the IRS uses to verify the accuracy of the tax returns filed by individual 
taxpayers. When tax returns are subject to both third-party information reporting and 
withholding, the compliance rate is very high. For example, salary and wages are 
subject to third-party reporting and withholding, and misreporting in this sector is only 
at one per cent.890 
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The information reporting regime started in the US with the Current Tax Payment Act 
1943, which established withholding and quarterly estimated tax payments.891 This 
Act established the broad-based income tax withholding system that has continued to 
the current day.892 The information return regime is used by the IRS for two main 
administrative purposes. First, it is used to encourage voluntary correct reporting of 
income. Second, it is used to assist in the detection of unreported income (including 
by non-filers) via matching reports received with tax records. Most information returns 
submitted to the IRS are matched to tax returns. According to the IRS, about 90 per 
cent of all received information returns are eligible to be used for matching 
purposes.893 Discrepancies are assigned to the Automated Under Reporter system. 
Technicians review and match the filed tax returns to the information submitted by 
payers. For those selected for audit, unresolved discrepancies are made known to the 
taxpayer through the issuance of a notice detailing the income type, and explaining 
why the agency feels the income is subject to reporting. In instances where there is no 
income tax return to match to the information returns, the agency files a return on 
behalf of the taxpayer and issues a notice detailing the income type. In addition, the 
Combined Annual Wage Reporting program matches reported withholding between 
information returns and employment tax returns to detect business non-filing or 
underreporting. Thus, a successful information network operates in the IRS, which 
plays a major role in improving compliance both in the field of income tax and in other 
areas of taxes. 
 
6.4.2.1 The IRS and a Successful TIRS 
 
Third-party information reporting remains a powerful tool to increase and maintain 
voluntary tax compliance in the US.894 The following chart shows the effect of 
information reporting on the compliance rate in the US.895 
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Figure 6.1: Effect of Information Reporting on Taxpayer Compliance in the US 
Source: IRS, December 2011 
 
The graph shows individual income tax underreporting gap and net misreporting 
percentage, by ‘visibility category’. In Figure 6.1, the dark bars represent the 
underreporting gap in billions of dollars, while the light bars show the net misreporting 
percentage, defined as the net misreported amount of income as a percentage of the 
true amount). 
 
The IRS’s 2011 data book shows that, in the previous year, the IRS received over 1.8 
billion information returns that reported income from employers, financial institutions, 
third-party payers, and state and federal governments.896 In the 2011 financial year, 
under its Automated Substitute for Return Program, the IRS closed almost 1.4 million 
cases in which a tax return delinquency was identified for non-filers, resulting in 
almost US$14.4 billion in additional assessments.897 However, the IRS still lacks 
reliable information on certain types of income—most importantly, income of small 
businesses and the self-employed.898 
 
                                                          
896 IRS, Enforcement: Information Reporting and Verification (2011), 35 
<http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs.soi/11 databank.pdf>. 
897 Ibid, 20. 
898 Striz, above n 883, 1069. 
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6.4.2.1.1 Prescribed Payment Categories for Withholding and/or Reporting Regimes 
 
Income or transactions that are subject to the information return regime include wages 
and investment incomes, agricultural payments, allocated tips, barter exchange 
incomes, brokers’ transactions, capital gains distributions, non-employee 
compensation and fees, fishing boat crew member proceeds, fish purchases for cash, 
prescribed gambling winnings, real estate transactions, rents, and sales of securities. 
 
6.4.2.2 FATCA: The New Information Reporting Regime of the IRS 
 
In an attempt to widen the net of the reporting system, the IRS introduced FATCA. 
This new law requires foreign financial institutions (FFIs) that are investing in the US 
to report information regarding the accounts of any US citizens held in their 
institutions. It requires reporting of worldwide information for US taxpayers. This law 
aims to curb offshore tax evasion by US citizens. It is part of Chapter 4 of the IRS 
Code. According to this Act, FFIs will have to enter into agreements to comply with 
FATCA. The FFIs entering into agreements under the new law consent inter alia to 
withhold 30 per cent FATCA withholding tax on any pass-through payment (referred 
to as a pass-through payment in FATCA) to a recalcitrant account holder or another 
FFI that has elected not to participate in FATCA (a noncompliant FFI). FATCA 
requires FFIs to look through the shell entities to detect whether a US citizen is the 
beneficial owner.899 FATCA became law in March 2010, and forms an important 
strategy to combat offshore tax evasion,900 with effect from 1 January 2013.901 
 
Other newly introduced important reporting regimes include the new cost-basis 
reporting introduced in 2011, following recommendations of scholars,902 and the IRS 
merchant card transaction reporting 6050w.The new cost-basis reporting regime 
makes tax preparation easier, can help give clients more information about their total 
                                                          
899 J Richard Harvey Jr, ‘FATCA—A Report From the Front Lines’ (2012) Tax Notes 714. 
900 Letter from Michael F Mundaca to the Department of Treasury on FATCA, 28 April 2011 
<http://www.bakerlaw.com/files/Uploads/Documents/FATCA/Comment%20Letters/Treasury_Depart
ment_Rubi_04282011.pdf>. 
901 Marnin Michaels, ‘FATCA Compliance: Preparing for 2013—Notice 2010-60 and Practical Steps 
to Take Now’ (2011) 24(4) Journal of Taxation and Regulation of Financial Institutions 5. 
902 Jay A Soled, ‘Homage to Information Returns’ (2008) 27 Virginia Tax Review 371, 378. 
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tax picture, and minimises year-end surprises.903 The law regarding merchant card 
transaction reporting was enacted with a view to further reducing the estimated 
US$345 billion tax gap from the business sector by providing additional information 
to the IRS on aggregate credit card transactions.904 
 
6.4.3 The ATO and the Information Reporting Regime 
 
Australia’s tax system is heavily dependent on personal income tax, which contributes 
around 47 per cent of all government tax revenue. Consequently, Australia needs to 
achieve and maintain a high degree of taxpayer compliance to facilitate efficient fiscal 
management.905 Thus, the compliance position in Australia is still considered 
unsatisfactory, and tax collection is low compared to other OECD countries.906 
Australia faces the formidable challenge of taxing its cash economy. However, this 
problem is not particular to Australia, with cash economies comprising the largest part 
of the world’s total economy.907 In Australia, it is recognised that the cash economy is 
not only living, but growing, with a rate of 14.1 per cent of the GDP. According to the 
Australian Cash Economy Taskforce, the existence and nature of the cash economy in 
Australia leads to tax evasion. The cash economy challenges governance by reducing 
the legitimacy of the taxation system.908 However, one of the major problems of taxing 
the cash economy is the invisibility of financial transactions performed under the cash 
economy system, whereas this invisibility of financial transactions is vital for ensuring 
voluntary compliance.909 
 
                                                          
903 Charles Schwab, Preparing for the New Cost Basis Regulations: How the Changes Will Affect 
Your Firm and What You Can Do Now to Get Ready (2010) 12 
<https://schwabpt.com/downloads/docs/pdflibrary/spt011651.pdf>. 
904 ‘New IRS Credit Card Transaction Reporting Requirements’, Virginia State Bar (online), 3 
December 2012 <http://www.vsb.org/site/news/item/new-irs-credit-card-requirements>. 
905 David Knox, ‘Statement of Reform Priorities’ (2011) Tax Forum 4 
<http://www.futuretax.gov.au/content/taxforum/statements/super/Mercer_Australia.pdf>. Regarding 
Australi’s dependence on personal income tax  see Australian Government, ‘Re:Think-Better Tax 
System Better Australia ‘Tax Discussion Paper, March, 2015 < 
http://bettertax.gov.au/files/2015/03/TWP_combined-online.pdf> 
906 Saul Eslake, Australia’s Tax Reform Challenge (2011) 3 
<http://www.grattan.edu.au/publications/111_eslake_tax_reform_parl_library.pdf>. 
907 Stuart Staniford, ‘Size of the US Underground Economy’ (2011) Energy Bulletin 
<http://www.energybulletin.net/stories/2011-11-14/size-us-underground-economy>. 
908 Monika Reinhart, Jenny Job and Valerie Braithwaite, Untaxed Cash Work: Feeding Mouths, 
Lining Wallets (Report for the Department of Family and Community Services, Australian National 
University, 2004), <http://vab.anu.edu.au/pubs/FACS_FINAL_March_04_1.pdf>. 
909 Neil Brooks, ‘Individual Income Tax’ in China Tax Reform and WTO Accession Report 
(International Bureau of Fiscal Documentation, 2004), 39. 
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In recognising the importance of curbing the cash economy, Australia has adopted 
several measures. Based on the Cash Economy Taskforce Report of 1997 and in 
response to the grievances of the Australian larger community towards the taxation 
office,910 the ATO commenced a new tax system on 1 July 2000. Before introducing 
this new system, the ATO employed strategies such as a record keeping program, 
serious evasion program, prosecution investigation program and special investigations 
program. They also required cash dealer reporting requirements under the Financial 
Transaction Reports Act 1988, a Prescribed Payments System and a Reportable 
Payments System, among others. However, these initiatives were not considered 
sufficient to curb the problem of tax noncompliance in Australia.911 Based on this, one 
of the major recommendations of the Cash Economy Taskforce was to strengthen the 
information reporting regime. 
 
6.4.3.1 Current Australian Tax Information Reporting Regime 
 
In Australia, compliance with personal income tax is greatly facilitated by operation 
of tax withholding and information reporting obligations. Although not measured 
scientifically by the ATO, the difference in rates of compliance between incomes 
subject to withholding and information reporting requirements and incomes that are 
not is likely to be significant, based on the results of ATO compliance programs and 
observations from compliance-related research by other revenue bodies (such as in 
Denmark, Sweden, the UK and the US). However, as Highfield observes, compared 
to other developed and OECD countries, the use of an information reporting system in 
Australia is not extensive.912 The present income tax law regarding third-party 
information reporting does not cover a minimum of 30 to 35 per cent of the total 
income of individual taxpayers.913 As a result, in 2009, there was a tax gap of around 
A$32 billion.914 The below table presents information on the withholding and 
information reporting obligations for Australia’s personal income taxation, and 
indicates the gaps in coverage. 
 
                                                          
910 Robert Whait, ‘Developing Risk Management Strategies in Tax Administration: The Evolution of 
the Australian Tax Office’s Compliance Model’ (2012) 10(2) eJournal of Tax Research 436 
<www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/eJTR/2012/20.pdf>. 
911 ATO, Improving Compliance in the Cash Economy (1997) 15 
<http://www.ato.gov.au/content/downloads/SB39065.pdf>. 
912 Highfield, above n 872, 2. 
913 Ibid. 
914 Ibid, 17. 
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Table 6.2: Personal Income Tax—Use of Withholding and Information 
Reporting Obligations 
Income Category Withholding Requirement Reporting Requirement 
Employment Yes Yes 
Government benefits Yes Yes 
Pensions Yes Yes 
Interest Generally not—only for TFN 
non-quotation 
Yes 
Dividends Generally not—only for TFN 
non-quotation  
Yes 
Capital gains No No 
Rental properties  No No 
Self-employed/business Generally not—only for ABN 
non-quotation, which is rare 
Generally not—only for ABN 
non-quotation, which is rare  
Note: TFN = Tax File Number and ABN = Australian Business Number. 
(Source: Australian Government Tax Forum) 
 
This table indicates that there are gaps in the legislative framework. The legislation 
does not cover all items in the withholding or reporting system, and around 40 per cent 
of assessable personal income is not subject to systematic reporting to the ATO.915 The 
data the ATO receives through the reporting system are used to provide pre-filling 
information to taxpayers and their agents to help them correctly complete their income 
tax return, identify discrepancies between the information reported by taxpayers in 
their tax returns against details reported by third parties, identify particular 
noncompliant behaviour in selected target groups, conduct risk assessments, and so 
forth. More than 600 million transactions are reported to the ATO annually.916 In the 
2010 to 2011 fiscal years, through using the data received from information reporting, 
matching activity was facilitated and revenue rose substantially.917 
 
                                                          
915 Eddie Kutner, ‘A Tax Plan for Our Future’ (2011) Tax Forum 
<http://www.futuretax.gov.au/content/taxforum/statements/academics/OECD_Centre_for_Tax_Policy
_and_Administration_Highfield.pdf>. 
916 ATO, Compliance in Focus 2013–14, 4 
<http://www.ato.gov.au/uploadedFiles/Content/CS_C/downloads/CSC35735NAT74689.pdf>. 
917 ATO, Annual Report 2010–2011 <https://www.ato.gov.au/Print-publications/Previous-
years/Commissioner-of-Taxation-Annual-Report-2010-11/?page=89>. 
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6.4.3.2 Information Reporting Requirements for Payment to Contractors of Building 
and Construction Industry 
 
One of the major fields of tax noncompliance is that of contract work.918 Although 
about one million independent contractors currently operate throughout Australia,919 
there is a high level of noncompliance by contractors in the building and construction 
industries, particularly in relation to lodging correct reporting and payment.920 Of those 
who lodge a tax return, 40 per cent do not lodge their activity statements on time, while 
10 per cent do not lodge at all.921 To address this problem, the government has 
introduced a new reporting regime for building contractors to report annually all sub-
contract payments to contractors providing building and construction services. The 
new reporting regime is currently in operation; however, it is believed that this regime 
will raise compliance costs for both the reporting entities922 and the government.923 
Therefore, the government might face resource constraints while implementing the 
regime;924 however, the ATO expects to collect A$400 million per annum in the 2013 
to 2014 financial years due to this reform.925 
 
6.4.3.3 Withholding and Reporting Requirements for Closely Held Trusts 
 
The ATO introduced legislation requiring trustees of closely held trusts to divulge 
certain details about the trust’s ultimate beneficiaries and tax-preferred distributions to 
beneficiaries.926 From 1 July 2010, all targeted trusts must comply with the new 
reporting regime. If a beneficiary does not quote their Tax File Number (TFN) to the 
trustee before a payment is made to them, the trustee must withhold from that payment 
(and any future payments unless a TFN is quoted), lodge an annual TFN withholding 
                                                          
918 Australian Government Treasury, Reporting of Taxable Payments for Contractors in the Building 
and Construction Industry (Consultation Paper, May 2011) 2 
<archive.treasury.gov.au/documents/2046/.../cp_building_construction.rtf>. 
919 Australian Bureau of Statistics, ‘Decline in Independent Contractors’ (Media Release, 19 April 
2013) 
<http://www.abs.gov.au/ausstats/abs@.nsf/mediareleasesbytitle/7F849D8157174167CA2575D2002B
1C98?OpenDocument>. 
920 Australian Government Treasury, above n 918, 2. 
921 Australian Government Treasury, Contractor Compliance Improvement Proposal—Regulation 
Impact Statement, 4 <http://ris.govspace.au/files/2011/06/contractors_compliance.pdf>. 
922 Pitchers Partners, Submission in Response to the Consultation Paper on Reporting of Taxable 
Payments for Contractors in the Building and Construction Industry, 1 
<http://www.treasury.gov.au/documents/2095/PDF/Pitcher_Partners.pdf>. 
923 Australian Government Treasury, above n 918, 20. 
924 Ibid, 22. 
925 Ibid, 27. 
926 Frank Gilders et al, Understanding Taxation Law 2013 (Lexis Nexix Butterworths, 2013) 1071. 
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report that contains details of all payments that were subject to withholding and any 
withheld amounts, provide a payment summary to the beneficiary, register for ‘pay as 
you go’ withholding for closely held trusts, and pay any withheld amounts to the ATO. 
 
6.4.3.4 Reporting Requirements for Investment Bodies 
 
In Australia, investment bodies, such as companies and financial institutions, are 
required by law to provide the ATO with an Annual Investment Income Report (AIIR) 
that contains details of investment income paid to the concerned party, including 
quoting TFN numbers.927 A TFN is designed to trace non-disclosure of income and 
enable the ATO to match the details of income divulged in taxpayers’ income tax 
returns with details obtained from other sources. If an incorrect TFN or Australian 
Business Number (ABN) is supplied in the AIIR, the tax office will contact the 
investor, using the address supplied by the investment body, and advise them to correct 
their TFN or ABN with their investment body.928 Other important items covered by 
the reporting regime include payments by governments (all levels) for services 
provided, and assessable grants and payments made by governments to small 
businesses or self-employed taxpayers. 
 
It is believed that there is considerable noncompliance among small businesses and 
self-employed taxpayers when reporting business-related income in the absence of 
systematic withholding and reporting mechanisms.929 Thus, it is suggested that the 
government should implement a comprehensive information reporting regime and 
expand the withholding and reporting regime in specific areas, such as payments by 
national and sub-national governments to businesses for goods and services.930 It is 
argued that this reform might cause an imbalance of costs and benefits of tax reforms 
and also lobbying for tax concessions by the vested corners.931 
 
                                                          
927 ATO, About Investment Income Reporting for Investment Bodies (6 December 2012) 
<http://www.ato.gov.au/Business/Annual-investment-income-reporting/In-detail/Investment-income-
reporting/About-investment-income-reporting-for-investment-bodies/>. 
928 Ibid. 
929 Highfield, above n 872, 25. 
930 Ibid, 25–26. 
931 Richard Eccleston, The Thirty Year Problem: The Politics of Australian Tax Reform (Australian 
Tax Research Foundation, 2004) 7. 
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6.4.4 Information Reporting Regime in New Zealand 
 
Income tax accounts for 70 per cent of the total tax revenue collected by the IRD in 
New Zealand.932 The information reporting regime is coupled with the tax withholding 
system. Subpart BE of the Income Tax Act 2007 deals with tax withholding liabilities. 
New Zealand’s tax withholding rates vary from 15 to 33 per cent, along with monthly 
electronic reporting obligations.933 Withholding tax deductions are generally required 
from scheduler payments. Scheduler payments934 include directors’ fees; honoraria 
(payments to members of councils, boards, committees, societies, clubs and so 
forth);935 salespeople’s commissions;936 the income of primary production 
contractors;937 the income of contractors in the television, video and film industries; 
and the income of non-resident contractors.938 The payee must provide his or her TIN 
to the payer; otherwise, an additional 15 per cent tax is deducted from the payment.939 
 
The system followed by New Zealand for withholding tax provisions is called the 
‘Scheduler Payment System’ and was introduced in 1979.940 A range of activities are 
liable for tax on scheduler payments, as follows: 
x agricultural contracts for maintenance, development or other work on farming 
or agricultural land 
x agricultural, horticultural or viticultural contracts by companies and other 
contractors 
x apprentice jockeys or drivers 
x cleaning offices, businesses, institutions or other premises (except residential) 
x cleaning or laundering plants, vehicles, furniture and so forth 
x commissions to insurance agents and sub-agents 
x fees of salespeople, company directors and others.941 
                                                          
932 Bob Buckle et al, ‘A Tax System for New Zealand’s Future’ (Report of the Victoria University of 
Wellington Tax Working Group, January 2010) 12 <http: //www.victoria.ac.nz/sacl/centres-and-
institutes/cagtr/pdf/tax-report-website.pdf.>. 
933 OECD, above n 125, 12. 
934 Inland Revenue, Taxing Activities Called Scheduler Payment <http://www.ird.govt.nz/payroll-
employers/make-deductions/withholding-tax/emp-deductions-salaries-wt-activities.html>. 
935 Income Tax Act 2007, sch 4, pt B. 
936 Ibid, sch 4, pt G. 
937 Ibid, sch 4, pt C. 
938 Ibid, sch 4, pt A. 
939 OECD, above n 125. 
940 Inland Revenue, above n 934. 
941 The Income Tax Act 2007, sch 4, pt A describes in detail the items covered by the withholding and 
reporting system. 
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6.4.4.1 How the Information Reporting Regime Helps the IRD 
 
The IRD uses the reported information to unearth the income not declared by 
taxpayers. After receiving the information, the IRD matches it with the return 
submitted by the taxpayers. This matching process is considered highly effective, with 
over 95 per cent of reports instantly matched to select high-risk cases.942 Thus, the 
information regime is effective to a great extent943—it helps the tax department locate 
taxpayers who are not in the tax net.944 Withholding payments are separately recorded 
and matched to information supplied by payers through inserting separate key points 
in the returns.945 The risk and intelligence unit employ a data mining technique to 
select high-risk cases found through computer matching activity.946 Although data are 
not available to support the notion, it can be claimed that the tax information reporting 
regime in New Zealand is comprehensive and effective.947 
 
6.4.5 Revenue Canada and the Information Reporting Regime 
 
The CRA is the central body in Canada responsible for administering Canada’s tax 
system. Like any other tax administration, Canada has a strong informal economy.948 
To maintain public confidence in the fairness and integrity of Canada’s tax system, the 
CRA is persistently seeking to combat the underground economy.949 Among many 
legal tools to ensure tax compliance, the CRA uses a broad-based information 
reporting system. There are specific legal provisions regarding the information return 
regime in the Income Tax Act 1985 and Income Tax Regulations. The information 
reporting regime in Canada has dual features. In some cases, it is coupled with the tax 
withholding system, yet generally it is an independent, standalone regime. 
 
 
 
                                                          
942 OECD, above n 125, 48. 
943 Ibid, 24. 
944 Ibid, 48. 
945 Ibid. 
946 OECD, above n 125, 48. 
947 Ibid. 
948 James Alm and Abel Embaye, ‘Using Dynamic Panel Methods to Estimate Shadow Economies 
Around the World, 1984–2006’ (2013) 41(5) Public Finance Review 510, 534. 
949 As of 2009, the Canadian underground economy was estimated at $35 billion—a 77 per cent 
increase from 1992. CRA, Statistics Canada Study on the Underground Economy in Canada, 1992–
2009 <http://www.cra-arc.gc.ca/nwsrm/fctshts/2012/m09/fs120927-eng.html>. 
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6.4.5.1 Provisions of the Third-party Information Reporting System 
 
The Canadian Income Tax Act 1985 contains detailed provisions regarding the third-
party information reporting system. Section 233 of the Income Tax Act 1985 deals with 
submitting the information return, while other provisions deal with different types of 
taxpayers and payments required to be reported to the CRA. According to Section 
233(1) of the Income Tax Act 1985, every person who is legally obliged to submit an 
information return and has not done so as per the income tax regulation, upon written 
demand from the concerned minister, must file the information return to the minister 
within the prescribed time. 
 
6.4.5.2 Information Return under Section 153 of the Income Tax Act 1985 
 
Section 153 of the Income Tax Act 1985 deals with the payer’s liability to deduct or 
withhold tax at the time of paying salary, superannuation and others, and to furnish 
information on these payments.950 Under Section 200(2) of the Income Tax Regulation, 
the payer must make an information return in the prescribed form in respect of such 
payment or benefit. Payment under this includes scholarships, fellowships or 
bursaries; prizes for achievement; research grants; payments by the government to 
obtain and keep employment; and payments made by the Canada Employment 
Insurance Commission or any government agency. In addition, information must be 
submitted regarding payment of certain investment incomes given to any Canadian 
resident.951 
 
Other areas subject to information reporting are: 
x information return on behalf of a negotiator of a bearer coupon952 
x a person or partnership in respect of debt or obligation953 
x a person or partnership in respect of an indexed debt or obligation954 
x a person or partnership acting as a nominee or agent of a taxpayer in respect of 
a debt obligation or indexed debt obligation955 
                                                          
950 Income Tax Act 1985, s 153(1). 
951 Income Tax Regulation, s 201(1). 
952 Ibid, s 201(3). 
953 Ibid, s 201(4). 
954 Ibid, s 201(4.1). 
955 Ibid, s 201(4.2). 
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x a return by an insurer956 
x payment in respect of a disposition or redemption of a debt obligation in bearer 
form957 
x information return in the case of payment to a non-resident958 
x payment to a non-resident actor959 
x return in respect of payment to a non-resident under Section 202(2) of the ITR 
x information return for a contract payment reporting system (reporting only).960 
According to the CRA, if more than 50 per cent of a business’s income-earning 
activities involve construction, its primary source of business income is deemed to be 
construction.961 
 
Another important reporting regime is the reporting of tax avoidance transactions, 
which was introduced in 2013. This regime requires the submission of information 
return about reportable or tax avoidance transactions to the CRA. This law is already 
in force in the UK, the US and Québec.962 To tackle the problem of tax evasion through 
tax avoidance transactions, the government made the current law of information 
reporting regarding reportable transaction.963 A ‘reportable transaction’ under Section 
237.3 of the Income Tax Act (Canada) is an avoidance transaction, as defined in 
Section 145(3) of the Income Tax Act 1985.964 
 
Subsection 237.1(7) of the Act makes it obligatory for the promoters of tax shelters to 
file an information report regarding the tax shelter, where:965 
A tax shelter is defined as any property of which it is expected, based on 
statements or representations made or proposed to be made in connection 
with the property, that the aggregate of the losses or other amounts, 
calculated in any of the relevant years, which a purchaser will be entitled to 
deduct in taxation years ending within four years of the date of acquisition 
                                                          
956 Ibid, s 201(5). 
957 Ibid, s 201(6). 
958 Ibid, s 202(1). 
959 Ibid, s 202(1.1). 
960 CRA, Fact Sheet: Contract Payment Reporting System <http://www.cra-
arc.gc.ca/nwsrm/fctshts/1999/m12/cnfct-eng.html>. 
961 Ibid. 
962 McMillan, ‘Budget 2010: Information Reporting of Tax Avoidance Transactions’ (2010) Tax Law 
Bulletin <http://www.mcmillan.ca/Files/Budget-2010_Information_Reporting_0310.pdf>. 
963 CRA, New Reporting Requirements: Reportable Transactions <http://www.cra-
arc.gc.ca/nwsrm/fctshts/2013/m08/fs130830-eng.html?rss>. 
964 Ibid. 
965 Revenue Canada Taxation, Information Circular Number: 89-4 (14 August 1989) 
<http://www.cra-arc.gc.ca/E/pub/tp/ic89-4/ic89-4-e.txt>. 
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of the property will exceed the cost of the interest in the property (less 
prescribed benefits) to the purchaser.966 
 
6.4.5.3 Summary 
 
Canada’s broad-based TIRS indicates two things. First, it is indicative of considerable 
tax evasion. Second, it shows the ability of the CRA to ensure compliance—it clearly 
demonstrates that the CRA has the requisite political backing to implement such a 
reform. Developing countries have much to learn from the CRA regarding the reform 
and effective implementation of a strong and comprehensive broad-based third-party 
TIRS. 
 
6.4.6 Information Reporting Regime in Bangladesh 
 
Until 2011, there was no standalone tax information reporting regime in the income 
tax law of Bangladesh. However, after realising the effectiveness of third-party 
information reporting, NBR inserted a new Section 75B in the 1984 ITO that deals 
with the obligation to submit an AIR by certain entities. According to the new law, the 
government may require any specified entity to submit an information return regarding 
any specific financial transaction. 
 
Before making the separate law, there were a few provisions regarding an information 
reporting system combined with the law regarding withholding of taxes. The 1984 ITO 
contains elaborate provisions regarding withholding taxes in scheduler form. Schedule 
VIII and Chapter 7 of the ordinance deal with the provisions of withholding taxes. 
Section 75A of the 1984 ITO makes provisions to file a return of withholding tax. The 
section states that every company must file a quarterly return of withholding tax 
collected or deducted as per law to the income tax authority. 
 
It should be noted that, before the promulgation of the 1984 ITO, the Income Tax Act 
1922 was in force in Bangladesh.967 This Act also contained no provisions regarding 
an information return system, although it contained some provisions regarding 
                                                          
966 Income Tax Act 1985, s 237.1(1). 
967 The Income Tax Act 1922 was applicable to Bangladesh until 1971. After independence, the 
Income Tax Act 1922 was adapted by enactment of The Bangladesh Taxation Laws (Adaptation) 
Order 1972 (Presidential Order). 
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deduction of tax at source from income from salary and income from interest on 
securities.968 Section 21 of the 1922 Act provided that the authorities who paid salaries 
to employees must submit an annual return to the income tax officer furnishing the 
particulars of salary paid. No other arrangements were made in the 1922 Act regarding 
an information return system. In contrast, the 1984 ITO contains much broader 
provisions regarding withholding taxes. As of 2012, 55 items are subject to 
withholding tax, while very few items are subject to information reporting provision. 
The items subject to information reporting provision and withholding provision are 
salary income, interest and dividend income. 
 
Sections 108, 109 and 110 contained in Chapter 12 of the Act deal with the provisions 
of law regarding the information reporting of items. According to Section 108, 
employees must deduct tax from their salary and submit it to the treasury, as well as 
providing information to the tax office. According to Section 109, every person 
responsible for making any payment of interest under the head ‘Interest on securities’ 
must furnish information to the tax officer. Section 110 requires an information return 
to be submitted in the prescribed form regarding payment of dividends. Sections 108, 
109 and 110 are complemented by Rules 11, 20 and 21 of the Income Tax Manual Part 
II, which contains further details regarding particulars to be furnished in the form 
containing information. The provisions of information returns appear scant. Against 
this backdrop, the new law was introduced. 
 
Perusing Section 75B indicates that the law is deficient in some respects. First, the law 
provides that the income tax department may ask for information regarding any 
financial transaction when it considers necessary. Thus, it is not mandatory to ask for 
the information, but discretionary. This is a major weakness of the law. In comparison, 
the Indian law of AIR is compulsory.969 Since the Bangladesh income tax authority 
can use its discretion to ask for information, this power might be used inappropriately 
or might not be used in cases that require it. Second, the law does not specify the nature 
and volume of transactions, which makes its application uncertain. Section 285BA of 
the Indian Income Tax Act contains specific financial transactions.970 Under Section 
75B, a large transaction might not be reported by the department because of bias, 
                                                          
968 Income Tax Act 1922, s 18. 
969 Income Tax Act 1961, s 285BA(1). 
970 Ibid, s 285BA(3). 
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corruption and influence. In addition, the law does not define or identify the people or 
group of people who will be subject to furnishing information. In contrast, the Indian 
law specifies the entities who must submit information returns.971 The 1984 ITO 
defines the people in Section 2(46) who are bound by the law, yet Section 75B does 
not make clear whether this definition is applicable when furnishing an information 
return. Thus, the law appears faulty and might not yield the expected results in terms 
of attaining information about taxpayers’ true income. The law should be amended in 
a way that removes the unnecessary discretionary powers of tax officers. In addition, 
new areas must be discovered and brought within the law of the information reporting 
system. 
 
6.4.6.1 Areas that Can be Brought in the Ambit of the Information Reporting System 
6.4.6.1.1 Banks Paying or Receiving Interest on Deposits, Bonds and Loans 
 
Section 53F of the 1984 ITO makes provisions of deduction of tax at source at 
prescribed rate from interest on the saving deposits and fixed deposits paid to taxpayers 
by banks and other financial institutions. It does not specify about filing an information 
return regarding the payment of interests and profits of share given by a bank operated 
on Islamic principles. This can be brought under the mandatory annual information 
filing provision to ascertain the true income of the assessee. 
 
6.4.6.1.2 Building Societies and Other Holders of Mortgages 
 
There are currently 450 registered and 350 unregistered real estate companies in 
Bangladesh, which sell land and apartments. These companies generate Tk 20 billion 
in turnover each year.972 The real estate sector is a booming industry in Bangladesh;973 
however, currently, there are no information reporting obligations for real estate 
companies. As a result, the income tax office is in an information asymmetry situation 
regarding the amount of actual investments in the real estate sector. If mandatory 
information reporting provisions are made for real estate companies regarding 
                                                          
971 Ibid, s285BA(1). 
972 Suborna Barua et al, ‘Housing Real Estate Sector in Bangladesh Present Status and Policies 
Implications’ (2010) 4(1) ASA University Review 239, 241. 
973 Numbeo, Cost of Living in Bangladesh <http://www.numbeo.com/cost-of-
living/country_result.jsp?country=Bangladesh>. 
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purchase of apartments and lands by taxpayers, the tax office will be able to match this 
information with that supplied by taxpayers in their returns. 
 
6.4.6.1.3 Stockbrokers, Banks and Others Dealing in Shares and Unit Trusts 
 
There are a number of commercial banks, stockbrokers’ houses and other financial 
institutions dealing with stock trading business on behalf of their customers. The 
current law provides for the deduction of tax at source at a certain percentage from the 
value of shares, debentures, mutual funds or securities transacted by a member of a 
stock exchange at the time of payment for such transaction.974 However, there are no 
specific requirements for reporting the details of payments to the clients of the 
stockbroker house. Thus, there should be an information reporting system in the 
income tax law regarding the payments made by any stockbroker houses, banks and 
related institutions. 
 
6.4.6.1.4 Companies Providing Deferred Payments to Their Customers 
 
As a business practice, it is common for companies to settle their account balances 
with customers at a later period, and vice versa. As a result, transactions can remain 
outside the tax parameters during the relevant income years. Currently, there is no law 
in Bangladesh regarding any information report filing of deferred payments made by 
or to the companies. Thus, there should be provisions of submitting information returns 
about these transactions so that the income tax authority can attain a complete picture 
of the income of the related taxpayers. 
 
6.4.6.1.5 Education Expenses 
 
Private education in Bangladesh is very expensive975 for both primary and secondary 
education. Only those with high incomes can afford to send their children to costly 
private schools and colleges. However, the high fees paid for private education are not 
divulged in the wealth statements of taxpayers, submitted with their income tax return. 
Verifying these fees is time consuming and costly. Thus, if the fee recipient academic 
                                                          
974 Income Tax Ordinance 1984, s 53BBB. 
975 Md Abdullah Al Helal, ‘Expensive Private Higher Education in Bangladesh: Who Can Afford’ 
(2012) 2(2) Asian Journal of Business and Economics 17. 
167 
institutions like schools, colleges and universities, are brought under the mandatory 
information reporting law, a full picture of the income and expenditure of many 
taxpayers could be presented. Under the proposed system, all institutions would submit 
an AIR that would contain the taxpayer’s name, identification number and amount of 
fees paid. If the expenditure incurred for education is higher than the shown income, 
or is asymmetrical, the tax office could take action. This might have a substantial effect 
on improving tax compliance. 
 
6.4.6.1.6 AIR for High-value Financial Transactions 
 
High-value transactions by taxpayers have tax implications; however, the present 
income tax law of Bangladesh has no provision to deal with such transactions. In India, 
when an individual conducts a high-value transaction (such as investment in property 
or mutual funds), this transaction is automatically reported to the income tax 
department by banks and other authorities, through the annual information report.976 
Bangladesh could learn from this neighbouring country to make appropriate provisions 
of law to ensure high-value transactions are visible. The task is not an easy one. The 
Indian system has been modelled on advanced countries such as the US, Britain, 
France and Germany.977 Bangladesh can follow suit and make necessary provisions of 
law to make submission of AIR mandatory. 
 
6.4.6.1.7 Additional Transactions 
 
In addition to the specific items mentioned above, the following types of transactions 
can also be brought under the mandatory reporting requirements: 
x companies, banks and other financial institutions providing loans to their 
employees 
x service payments to corporations and other unincorporated people or 
businesses 
x service payments made by landlords 
x stock income (Denmark has this law) 
                                                          
976 Income Tax Act 1961, s 285BA. 
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x fringe benefits (Denmark has this law) 
x purchases and sales of assets. 
 
6.4.6.2 How an Information Reporting System Would Benefit ITDB 
 
A strong and comprehensive information reporting regime should help the ITDB in 
many ways, some of which are discussed below: 
 
6.4.6.2.1 Effective Tax Audit 
 
Auditing tax returns is a common enforcement measure adopted by almost all tax 
administrations of the world. Although modest,978 effective and quality audits 
successfully deter taxpayers from future underreporting of income. Less qualitative 
audits unearth less situations of underreported income, which affects taxpayers’ 
perceptions of the effectiveness of the audit.979 One of the impediments to a quality 
audit is a lack of information about the true state of taxpayers’ financial transactions. 
Thus, an efficient information reporting system can improve the success of the audit 
program, making audits specific and targeted. Income that cannot be detected through 
the audit can be identified from the information return furnished by the third parties. 
 
In Australia, tax audits are an important feature of the tax administration.980 In 2012 to 
2013, the ATO received 600 million pieces of information from banks and health 
companies that were designed to be used for data matching programs and auditing.981 
In addition, targeted auditing based on risk assessment and data matching has become 
the CRA’s preferred approach.982 Accordingly, if Bangladesh can have a broad-
ranging TIRS, audit work would be simple and effective. Through this system, the tax 
office would have the requisite information from third parties to assess the correct 
income of taxpayers through auditing. 
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6.4.6.2.2 Effective Data Matching 
 
Matching information is considered a vital component of compliance by tax 
administrations.983 It is a tactical weapon that is very effective to improve compliance 
and raise revenue. For example, the ATO successfully matches millions of pieces of 
information every year, which it derives through third-party reporting. This data 
matching system helps the ATO better understand the risk, and effectively uses the 
business performance benchmark system introduced by the ATO.984 The CRA also 
uses a data matching system effectively to verify income declared by taxpayers in their 
tax returns. 
 
6.4.6.2.3 Positive Effect on Tax Culture 
 
The tax culture refers to the tax mentality of taxpayers to comply—it is the pervasive 
culture of compliance among taxpayers. Creating a tax culture in a country necessitates 
a fusion of correctly designed incentives and sanctions.985 Bangladesh has a poor tax 
culture dominated by a mentality and habit of tax avoidance and evasion. The apathy 
of taxpayers towards paying tax appears to be entrenched in the culture. However, if 
the scope of evasion can be reduced through introducing a successful tax information 
reporting regime, people will be bound to report their true income. This will 
subsequently create a forced tax culture initially, which will become a spontaneous tax 
culture if sustained over a period. 
 
6.4.6.2.4 Reduced Shadow Economy 
 
As observed earlier, the informal economy in Bangladesh is strong, and widespread 
tax evasion has caused it to thrive. Extensive and efficient third-party information 
reporting regimes can substantially curb the problem of tax evasion that leads to the 
informal economy. A European Commission report suggests extending the use of 
                                                          
983 ATO, Information Matching System Letters <http://www.ato.gov.au/General/How-we-check-
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third-party information to reduce the size of the informal economy.986 Phua argues that 
lack of data by the tax administration is the main obstacle to successfully waging war 
against tax evasion.987 Thus, if an effective third-party information reporting regime 
can be established, the ITDB will be able to attain the necessary data that can be used 
to fight the growing informal economy. 
 
6.4.6.2.5 Reduced Enforcement Costs 
 
Tax enforcement is costly.988 These costs include the direct costs of the tax 
administration and the cost of private agents, such as compliance costs.989 For 
example, in the US, 10 per cent of the total tax collected is spent on tax enforcement.990 
Developing country tax administrations cannot properly enforce tax statutes because 
of resource constraints that cause administrative incapacities.991 Information regarding 
tax enforcement costs is not available in Bangladesh because there has been no 
research on this issue; however, the poor state of compliance can be attributed to the 
high cost of enforcement. Thus, it is suggested that a strong information reporting 
regime might reduce the additional costs of tax enforcement. 
 
6.4.6.2.6 Reduced Tax Corruption 
 
Corruption reigns in almost all revenue departments of developing countries,992 and 
corruption causes tax evasion.993 Likewise, in Bangladesh, corruption in the ITDB is 
a cause of tax evasion. Survey evidence supports this, with more than 50 per cent of 
surveyed taxpayers stating that they had been asked by tax officers to pay bribes. In 
addition, 58.5 per cent of the survey respondents believed that corruption in the tax 
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department is a cause of tax evasion.994 A third-party information system can be used 
to reduce corruption. Through third-party reporting, the ITDB will receive data that 
will be permanently stored in the data bank. These data cannot be destroyed or hidden, 
and can be accessed at any time, even if it is possible for the time being to suppress it 
by giving bribe to the officials. As a result, taxpayers will not be interested in 
corruption, which will reduce the opportunity for tax officers to indulge in corrupt 
practices. 
 
6.4.6.2.7 Tax Law Simplification 
 
The taxpayers and tax administrations of developing countries have limited capability 
to manage tax law complexity.995 Tax law complexity is not peculiar to developing 
countries—developed countries face the same problem. Even the IRS tax 
commissioner admits that the US tax law is complex,996 and Australian tax legislation 
is also complex.997 However, a TIRS can help developing countries such as 
Bangladesh simplify the tax system for both taxpayers and tax administrations. An 
information reporting system provides easy flow of information to tax administrations 
regarding the true income of taxpayers. In addition, taxpayers can benefit because the 
system facilitates the use of prefilled tax returns, which reduce the time and resources 
needed to file tax returns. Places such as Australia, Denmark and other OECD 
countries are successfully using the system of prefilled returns, greatly facilitated by 
the tax information return system.998 With rapid modernisation of the e-filing 
system,999 Bangladesh could implement a prefilled tax return system based on an 
efficient information reporting system. This would substantially reduce the complexity 
of the tax system by reducing compliance costs and simplifying tax return submissions 
for taxpayers. 
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6.4.6.2.8 Improved Capacity of the Tax Administration 
 
One of the prerequisites of improved tax compliance is the efficiency and capacity of 
tax administrations.1000 The tax system should be designed to reflect the ability of tax 
administrations to administer it.1001 A strong third-party information reporting system 
can enhance the capacity of the tax administration to achieve low-cost tax enforcement 
and identify tax evaders with an enhanced capacity augmented by information. 
 
6.4.6.2.9 Additional Benefits 
 
Other benefits related to information reporting systems include revenue being 
increased, which benefits society;1002 improved community perceptions about the 
fairness of the tax system; more straightforward compliance and a lesser administrative 
burden on the taxpayer as a result of introducing a prefilled return system, like many 
other countries, or potentially by eliminating the requirement to submit a tax return.1003 
 
6.4.6.3 Conditions of a Successful TIRS 
 
Recognising the fact that information reporting influences taxpayers’ behaviour and 
that compliance is substantially augmented by successfully information reporting,1004 
it is argued that, before Bangladesh can use a third-party information system 
successfully, certain conditions must be met. These conditions are discussed below. 
 
6.4.6.3.1 Data Security and Taxpayers’ Privacy 
 
One problem associated with the information reporting regime is taxpayers’ data 
security and privacy. Under the information reporting system, a huge amount of data 
and taxpayer information is transmitted to the tax authority. These data need to be safe 
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from unwanted and unauthorised leakage that might infringe taxpayers’ 
confidentiality. Thus, any such system must have data security as a precondition.1005 
 
6.4.6.3.2 Data Follow-up System 
 
Data received from third parties must be stored, processed and monitored regularly; 
otherwise, the system will not meet its essential goal. To achieve this, there must be a 
central data receiving, processing and monitoring cell in the NBR. India has 
established such a cell to manage the information received from third parties. It has an 
online monitoring system to ensure follow-up action and track return filing and tax 
payments. However, experience, expertise, resources and modus operandi can be 
shared with other regions, such as Australia, India and other OECD countries. 
 
6.4.6.3.3 Efficient and Well-trained Staff 
 
For the successful implementation and operation of a reporting regime, efficient and 
well-trained staff are necessary. These staff require specific training that focuses on 
developing human resources to deal with information technology and analysis, and 
implementing and monitoring the data received through third-party reporting. In this 
respect, the ITDB can receive help from countries where strong information reporting 
regimes are operating. 
 
6.4.6.3.4 Successful Tax Advisers’ Role 
 
Tax advisers play a very important role in tax compliance.1006 Tax administrations 
around the world agree that the tax intermediaries’ role is critical to improving tax 
compliance.1007 These advisers have dual roles to play.1008 In most cases, taxpayers 
depend on tax advisers to resolve their tax issues. For example, in Australia during 
2011 to 2012, 72.8 per cent of individual taxpayers lodged their return through a tax 
agent.1009 Taxpayers face diminishing expertise in preparing and filing tax returns 
                                                          
1005 OECD et al, above n 375, 23. 
1006 OECD, Study into the Role of Tax Intermediaries (2008) 13 
<http://www.oecd.org/tax/administration/39882938.pdf>. 
1007 Ibid, 14. 
1008 Steven Klepper and Daniel Nagin, ‘The Role of Tax Preparers in Tax Compliance’ (1989) 22(2) 
Policy Sciences 167, 168. 
1009 ATO, Annual Report 2011–2012, 41 
<http://annualreport.ato.gov.au/uploadedFiles/Content/Downloads/n0995-10-2012_js23899_w.pdf>. 
174 
because of the infrequent nature of return filing.1010 Tax advisers can make taxpayers 
aware of the enforcement priorities of tax administrations.1011 If they represent 
taxpayers before the tax department, they actively participate in the tax system.1012 
 
However, Book argues that return preparers also have an affirmative obligation to 
enhance the tax system integrity, particularly in respect to unacceptable error rates and 
high preparer usage.1013 This issue is particularly important for Bangladesh for several 
reasons. First, tax advisers in Bangladesh prepare returns for taxpayers, and represent 
them before the income tax department. This is true for both individual and corporate 
taxpayers. They exert considerable influence on the compliance behaviour of 
taxpayers. Thus, for any successful reform implementation, their role is very 
important, and it is of utmost importance that the income tax advisers of Bangladesh 
play a positive role in improving tax compliance. 
 
6.4.6.3.5 Research on Compliance Costs for Reporting Entities 
 
Placing reporting obligations on third parties, such as employers, imposes compliance 
costs on them.1014 Under the information reporting system, third-party reporters incur 
a variety of compliance costs, known as administrative costs.1015 In addition, 
information reporting requires the reporting bodies to file multiple returns to the tax 
authorities. This multiple return filing is viewed as one of the causes of tax regime 
complexity. This complexity also increases compliance costs for the reporting 
authorities.1016 Thus, before implementing a third-party reporting system, research on 
the administrative and compliance costs of the third parties is recommended.1017 
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6.4.6.3.6 Assistance with Administrative Costs to Manage the TIRS 
 
Administrative costs inter alia refer to the operating costs that must be spent to 
implement tax policy and collect revenue.1018 Operating costs are necessary for internal 
resource mobilisation;1019 however, these costs can deter the implementation of a 
TIRS.1020 Given that Bangladesh lacks resources, the government should seek the 
advice of donors such as the IMF and World Bank regarding how the TIRS can be 
implemented and operated. 
 
6.4.6.3.7 Effective Taxpayer Identification Mechanism 
 
To ensure information reporting regimes are effective, a high-integrity taxpayer 
identifying mechanism must be used so that information reports can be readily and 
accurately matched with taxpayers’ records. In a survey conducted by the OECD Tax 
Forum in selected countries—including Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the US—
it was found that, for the above reason, most countries incorporate features to ensure 
the accurate quotation of TINs by payees.1021 
 
6.4.6.3.8 Paper Reporting 
 
Paper-based information reports receive low priority by the tax authority, and thus 
escape the matching system. As a result, the system fails to identify any non-reported 
income by these taxpayers.1022 This is a significant problem for the ITDB, given that 
almost all information reports sent to the department are paper based. The reports 
receive low priority and are rarely analysed and matched, whether the taxpayer has 
reported correct income or not. This is because the staff find this work tedious, time 
consuming and lacking in incentive. The reports are kept in piles in one corner of the 
office, year after year, and are then destroyed without any action being taken. 
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6.4.6.3.9 Appropriate Information and Communication Technology 
 
If a successful information reporting regime is to operate on a large scale, electronic 
reporting and information processing systems must be available. This is because of the 
need to quickly capture and match a huge amount of data with taxpayers’ records, then 
action this information systematically—all at minimal cost. Currently, except in the 
US IRS, most tax jurisdictions of the world gather information manually.1023 
 
6.4.6.3.10 Additional Conditions 
 
Some other conditions to ensure a successful TIRS include creating awareness and 
disseminating appropriate knowledge to reporting authorities regarding the laws and 
regulations of information reporting;1024 a strong political will to introduce the TIRS 
in the face of resistance from various bodies,1025 given that political will remains 
essential for tax reform;1026 and identifying the appropriate reporting authorities. 
 
6.5 Conclusion 
 
This chapter has observed that a tax information reporting regime is an important 
compliance tool in revenue departments around the world, and that most information 
reporting regimes are coupled with a tax withholding system.1027 The country-specific 
information reporting regimes as discussed in this part of the thesis bear the 
characteristics as observed by the OECD. As revealed in this chapter, Canada has some 
standalone information return submission provisions that are not coupled with 
withholding laws. This chapter also observed that, while some countries’ information 
reporting regimes are more comprehensive than others, every tax administration is 
aware of the importance of the system in ensuring tax compliance. 
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Bangladesh has demonstrated a sincere attempt to use this system to improve 
compliance. However, to improve its effectiveness, Bangladesh must follow the 
regimes employed in Australia, New Zealand, Canada and India. In addition, some 
preconditions must be fulfilled to implement a comprehensive TIRS. The NBR should 
immediately establish a committee to examine the probability of improving the regime 
by receiving assistance from developed and developing countries that are currently 
using a TIRS effectively. Bangladesh currently has a fairly strong tax withholding 
regime; however, some of these deducting authorities report information, while most 
do not. The law should be amended so that the tax deducting authorities mandatorily 
report tax deduction information, along with the total amount paid or disbursed to 
recipients. It should be remembered that a TIRS is not the ultimate solution to the tax 
compliance problem; however, it is one of the most effective means to address this 
issue. As such, Bangladesh would strongly benefit from using a broad-based TIRS. 
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Chapter 7: Conclusion and Policy Recommendations 
 
 
7.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter contains concluding remarks based on the discussions presented in the 
previous chapters. This thesis observes that the tax compliance problem is endogenous 
to the taxation system itself. Every country is beset by this problem, although its 
pervasiveness is more marked in developing countries, such as Bangladesh. In 
Bangladesh, the compliance rate in the income tax department presents a dire picture, 
with the total number of taxpayers negligible compared to the overall population. A 
point to ponder here is that while the total number of taxpayers is compared against 
the total number of population, it is true that among the total population not all are 
eligible to pay income tax. As observed in chapter three of the thesis tax expenditure 
is one of the reasons of low number of taxpayers. Besides, all the companies set up in 
the exclusive economic zones enjoy repeated tax exemptions. However relevant data 
are not readily available from the National Board of Revenue and there is no authentic 
research to support the number of people who can be potential taxpayers in 
Bangladesh. The informal economy is continuously expanding, with the ratio 
alarmingly high compared to other countries. The NBR is apparently failing to enforce 
the tax statute to improve voluntary compliance, and prosecutions for tax evasion are 
compromised by inappropriate motivations and legal and technical flaws. In some 
cases, the legal framework is not sufficiently effective or comprehensive to encompass 
the complete problem of noncompliance. 
 
Against this backdrop, this thesis suggests that it is time for the ITDB to implement a 
comprehensive approach to secure compliance. It is argued that no sole solution can 
singlehandedly overcome the problem of tax noncompliance. Rather, compliance 
strategies should be pragmatic and modelled on a combination of successful existing 
approaches, according to the needs and nature of the problem specific to Bangladesh. 
Based on this comprehensive approach, this thesis suggests that the ATO compliance 
model would be the most effective model to be adopted by the NBR. The ATO 
compliance model presents an approach that ranges from the persuasion to the 
prosecution of tax evaders. 
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This thesis first sought to redefine the state–taxpayer relationship as a fiduciary one. 
This is a major shift from the traditional, adversarial relationship between the state and 
taxpayer. This thesis argued that the state–taxpayer relationship is based on trust and 
good faith. The state remains the trustee for the taxpayer, and it is the duty of the state 
to collect and spend tax money appropriately for the betterment of taxpayers. The state 
must perform for taxpayers in domains in which any individual taxpayer cannot 
perform, without the help of state power. Taxpayers entrust the state with their money 
in the belief that the state will complete the necessary tasks as per the requirement of 
its fiduciary obligations. If the state becomes oblivious to the importance of this 
relationship, this can negatively affect the taxpaying culture. It is also argued that the 
relationship is subliminal. 
 
Once the state–taxpayer relationship was identified, this thesis proceeded to examine 
the current income tax system of Bangladesh. Although Bangladesh has a very old 
history of taxation, dating from the early Hindu period, the income tax system was 
established for the first time in 1861 by the English rulers. The pre- and post-colonial 
periods of the income tax system were marked by events and developments that 
culminated in post-liberation Bangladesh adopting the 1984 ITO. The causes of tax 
evasion were also discussed, as were the attempts of the government to address this 
issue. 
 
Chapter 5 discussed the issue of the tax amnesty program in Bangladesh. Tax amnesty 
remains a popular tool to improve voluntary compliance in the field of income tax 
around the world. Some countries allow the scheme on a repeated basis, while others 
offer time-limited amnesty. There is mixed evidence about the effectiveness of such 
amnesty programs. It has been found that repeated amnesty is not good for revenue, 
does not improve voluntary compliance, and can even encourage noncompliance and 
tax evasion. Likewise, it was observed that the tax amnesty in Bangladesh has not 
resulted in the intended level of revenue collection. In Bangladesh, there is evidence 
of political motives and corruption behind the implementation of tax amnesty schemes. 
Thus, it is suggested that the tax amnesty scheme be implemented only occasionally 
and for short periods. Repeated amnesty erodes the tax base and affects voluntary 
compliance. In addition, every year, a huge amount of untaxed money is syphoned 
away from Bangladesh into overseas banks. Considering the extent of illicit capital 
flight and money laundering, the Bangladesh government should consider an overseas 
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tax amnesty, rather than allowing repeated domestic tax amnesty. Regions such as 
Australia, the US and various European countries are currently successfully 
conducting overseas tax amnesty schemes to repatriate money taken away from the 
country. 
 
Chapter 6 observed that a third-party TIRS plays a vital role in improving voluntary 
compliance. An effective third-party TIRS has the effect of deterring taxpayers from 
not reporting or underreporting their income to the tax authority because the tax 
authority receives information from the third party about the nature of taxpayers’ 
financial transactions throughout the year. Evidence suggests that the rate of 
compliance is much higher when income is subject to tax withholding and reporting 
requirements. Self-employment and small businesses remain an area where reporting 
requirements are less effective. However, regions such as the US, New Zealand, 
Australia, Denmark, Sweden and other OECD countries are successfully using third-
party reporting systems to curb such tax evasion. Even Bangladesh’s neighbour, India, 
has a strong reporting regime that is operating effectively. Some countries have 
reporting regimes alongside tax withholding provisions, while others have standalone 
reporting provisions for certain income groups. Researchers strongly suggest this tool 
to be implemented by tax administrations around the world. 
 
Like other countries, Bangladesh has a fairly strong tax withholding system and a 
third-party reporting regime; thus, the regime is not a standalone system. However, the 
regime contained in the 1984 ITO is not comprehensive, and does not specifically state 
which incomes are covered by the reporting regime. Rather, the tax authority may use 
discretion to ask for information about particular transactions, if it deems this to be fit 
and necessary. Therein lies the weakness of this regime. Given the poor picture of 
voluntary compliance, it is imperative that Bangladesh has a strong and comprehensive 
third-party tax TIRS. To achieve this, Bangladesh must change its law by following 
the example of India and other countries that are successfully and effective using this 
system to determine the true incomes of taxpayers. 
 
This chapter of the thesis also suggested some additional tools for the income tax 
administration of Bangladesh that are imperative to improve compliance. The 
following section identifies some of the factors that are considered essential to 
improving taxpayer compliance in the income tax administration of Bangladesh. 
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7.2 Creating an Overall Tax Compliance Culture in the Country 
 
The tax culture is essential to ensuring the sustainable development of a country.1028 
This culture reflects the tax mentality of a region’s taxpayers in general terms. It is 
understood in terms of taxpayers’ consciousness regarding payment of tax—that is, 
taxpayers pay tax because of the tax culture.1029 However, the tax culture encompasses 
more than the tax mentality, and varies from country to country. As Nerré states: 
A country-specific tax culture is the entirety of all relevant formal and 
informal institutions connected with the national tax system and its practical 
execution, which are historically embedded within the country’s culture, 
including the dependencies and ties caused by their ongoing interaction.1030 
Thus, the tax culture is more than what is generally meant and demonstrates the 
embeddedness of different actors in the national culture, of which the tax culture is 
only a subsidiary part. Actors include taxpayers, politicians, tax officials, experts (such 
as tax intermediaries) and academics.1031 The tax culture denotes not only the tax 
system and existing tax practice, but also the relationship between the tax 
administration and taxpayers.1032 This relationship is based on trust and belief, and can 
be termed a fiduciary one 
 
Poor tax compliance reflects a poor tax culture. Thus, Bangladesh’s poor income tax 
compliance indicates the country’s insufficient tax culture. It is urgent that this culture 
be improved to achieve sustainable economic and social development in the face of 
the current global financial crisis. Against this backdrop, tax administrations around 
the world are persistently creating new techniques to improve tax culture.1033 To have 
a sustainable tax culture, awareness must be created among citizens of their obligations 
to pay tax and the rights they have as taxpayers. There must be a congenial atmosphere, 
in which taxpayers are encouraged and feel obliged to pay their share of tax. To create 
                                                          
1028 United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), Revenue’s Role in the Quest for Inclusive 
Development: What Works and What Can Work Better? (2008) 14 <ww2.s4tp.org/wp-
content/uploads/2010/10/inclusivedev.pdf>. 
1029 Birger Nerré, ‘The Concept of Tax Culture’ (Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the 
National Tax Association, November 8-10, 2001, Baltimore, US) 288 
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and Policy 155. 
1031 Ibid, 156. 
1032 Raymond Atuguba, The Tax Culture of Ghana (Research Report Prepared for the Revenue 
Mobilisation Support, February 2006) 9 
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1033 OECD et al, Building Tax Culture, Compliance and Citizenship: A Global Source Book on 
Taxpayer Education (2013) 13 <http://www.oecd.org/ctp/tax-global/sourebook-taxpayer-
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this awareness among taxpayers, appropriate education and tax-related information 
must be disseminated. Torgler argues that, ‘[f]iscal ignorance might be an important 
contributor to the development of negative feelings towards taxation’.1034 Different tax 
administrations are using different techniques in an effort to educate taxpayers and 
create awareness.1035 
 
The NBR in Bangladesh is the central body in charge of direct tax administration. This 
organisation understands the importance of taxpayer education in enhancing 
compliance. Thus, to improve this, the NBR has undertaken some important and 
innovative taxpayer education programs. These programs are gradually being 
implemented by the NBR to create awareness about tax legislations and procedures, 
improve voluntary compliance, educate tax officers to perform their duties efficiently, 
help taxpayers prepare returns and pay taxes, educate taxpayers why they should pay 
taxes, and increase taxpayers’ literacy.1036 
 
One important innovative step the NBR takes as part of a taxpayer education program 
is observing a national income tax day. Every year on 15 September, the NBR observes 
this day, and has done so since 2008 to motivate the people of the country. On that 
day, the income tax department holds rallies, seminars and workshops; displays 
banners and posters; distributes leaflets; holds discussions and conferences; and 
presents awards to the highest taxpayers. Special programs are broadcast on radio and 
television to help build tax awareness among the people. In 2013, the slogan of the 
income tax day was ‘Boost income tax, bring prosperity to the nation and the 
people’.1037 Under the Taxpayer Recognition Policy (introduced in 2008), the three 
highest- and two longest-paying income taxpayers from each of the 64 districts and six 
city corporations are given social recognition (certificates and crests) at a state 
function. In addition, under the National Tax Card Policy (introduced in 2010), the 10 
highest personal and 10 highest corporate income taxpayers are accorded CIP status 
every year. Due to the innovative measures of the NBR in recent years, it is claimed 
that two to five million taxpayers every year are brought into the tax net. These 
                                                          
1034 Torgler, above n 571, 12. 
1035 OECD et al, above n 1033. 
1036 Ibid, 24. 
1037 ‘National Income Tax Day Observed’ Bangladesh Sangbad Sangstha (online), 15 September 2013 
<http://www1.bssnews.net/newsDetails.php?cat=0&id=358259$date=2013-09-
15&dateCurrent=2013-09-25>. 
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measures have also improved the image of the income tax department in the eyes of 
the media and taxpayers, which has had a positive effect on taxpayers’ compliance.1038 
 
Despite the apparent success of these initiatives, the overall tax compliance rate 
remains very low in Bangladesh. In 2013, less than one per cent of people paid tax in 
Bangladesh, the informal economy was growing and tax evasion was rampant.1039 
Thus, the steps taken by the NBR to educate people about their taxpaying obligations 
are insufficient to create awareness. This is evidenced by the NBR admitting that 
taxpayers in Bangladesh are unaware of their obligations to pay tax and the outcomes 
of doing so. Taxpayers are habitual defaulters and are inclined to disobey tax laws.1040 
Thus, it is imperative that the NBR takes more effective steps to educate people to 
improve their tax compliance. Taxpayer education programs help boost the tax morale 
of the people. In this respect, Odinkonigbo states: 
the enlightenment or educational program must involve all segments of the 
society. Taxpayers, future taxpayers, government officials, and third parties 
who are involved in tax administration must be involved in this 
enlightenment program. However, the main questions here are: what are the 
modalities or avenues through which these enlightenment campaigns will be 
carried out? And what should be the contents of the campaign programs for 
each of the targeted groups?1041 
 
In framing the taxpayer education programs with appropriate contents and aimed at 
the right target groups, Odinkonigbo highlights the relevance of both economic 
deterrence models and psychological models in providing guidelines.1042 In 
acknowledging the utility of combining deterrence and psychological theories of tax 
compliance in taxpayer education programs, this thesis agrees with Odinkonigbo that, 
in Bangladesh, the taxpayer education program must be framed in a way that creates 
awareness among taxpayers of all the adverse and positive effects of compliance and 
noncompliance. 
 
                                                          
1038 OECD et al, above n 1033, 26. 
1039 Karim, above n 419. 
1040 Ibid. 
1041 Odinkonigbo, above n 80, 232. 
1042 Ibid, 238. 
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7.3 Proposed Programs and Initiatives 
 
In addition to the programs currently being implemented by the income tax 
department, Bangladesh would also benefit from considering undertaking the 
following activities. 
 
7.3.1 Holding Income Tax Fairs at Upazila Level 
 
To raise awareness among taxpayers, the ITDB took the unique step of organising an 
income tax fair. On its first occasion, this income tax fair was held for five days in 
September 2010 in Dhaka and Chittagong—two divisional headquarters of 
Bangladesh. At this fair, both old and new taxpayers could submit income tax returns 
with the assistance of income tax staff. At the first fair, there was a huge response from 
taxpayers who took the opportunity to submit their income tax returns without delay 
or difficulty.1043 The taxpayers’ reactions were very positive about the fair, and it was 
widely discussed in the national and international media. The fair of 2013 also 
generated a huge amount of revenue and was considered a success.1044 Since its 
inception, the income tax fair has been organised regularly in the large cities and 
divisional headquarters of the country. However, this study also suggests that the fair 
should be organised biannually at the upazila level. Each year, the income tax fair 
should be hold in every upazila income tax office, and the duration of the fair should 
be extended based on responses received from the taxpayer in the concerned areas. 
 
7.3.2 Introducing Tax Education to the Academic Curriculum 
 
Tax education plays a vital role in ensuring younger generations will be tax compliant. 
Thus, Kasipillai, Aripin and Amran suggest introducing tax education to all social 
science and business courses at university level.1045 Most countries’ universities offer 
tax-related education in business and law graduate and undergraduate courses. 
However, in other social science courses, tax is not taught. Bangladesh is no exception 
                                                          
1043 Bin Mustafa, above n 398. 
1044 Hisham Bin Mustafa, ‘Income Tax Fair ends: Record Collection by NBR’, Priyo News (online), 
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to this and, to improve the tax culture in Bangladesh, tax knowledge must be 
disseminated from the primary level of education. The tax syllabus must be included 
in all disciplines of education. If regular tax education is provided, the younger 
generation will be morally encouraged to be future compliant taxpayers, and learn to 
dislike tax evaders. Bangladesh should take immediate steps in this respect. 
 
7.3.3 Establishing a Tax Museum 
 
A tax museum can be an effective mechanism to educate taxpayers. Israel, Ireland and 
Rotterdam have such museums. Tax museums create awareness among people of why 
they should pay taxes, and where and how their tax money is spent. These museums 
also detail the consequences of noncompliance. Establishing a tax museum has been 
suggested for developing countries, such as Nigeria.1046 If a tax museum was 
established in Bangladesh, this could play an important role in improving tax education 
and creating awareness among the people of Bangladesh. 
 
7.3.4 Using Religious Clergies in Mosques, Churches and Temples 
 
Taxpayer compliance has rarely been considered from a religious perspective; 
however, religion is a non-economic factor that can work as an intrinsic motivator for 
compliance because religious beliefs shape tax morale.1047 Religion can supply the 
moral constitution of a society1048—it can provide a system of moral rules that form 
the basis of individuals’ moral constraints. While morality can exist independent of 
religion, in most cases, the system of moral rules is provided by religious 
institutions.1049 Thus, religion is viewed as providing a ‘supernatural police force’ that 
can create additional enforcement of moral behaviour.1050 In the field of tax 
compliance, taxpayers’ religion can play a vital role, and can be ensured by religious 
institutions, such as churches and mosques. Religious institutions, such as churches, 
have been successfully used to enforce law and reduce crime in society.1051 Thus, the 
government can build partnerships with religious institutions to ensure tax compliance. 
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Afield notes: ‘These partnerships [state–church] can tap into the increasing trend of 
scholarship to consider tax policy issues in religious terms and thus can be instrumental 
in helping to create the desired norm shift’.1052 
 
In Bangladesh, if the government builds a partnership with the major religious 
institutions, there might be a norm shift in the tax compliance culture. Religious 
clergies working in mosques, churches and others can influence taxpayers to pay tax 
as per the law by preaching that tax evasion is wrong and religion does not endorse it. 
Clergies have the moral authority to influence citizens’ behaviours and, by using that 
authority, can create a new norm, thereby leading to increased compliance. This could 
cause a paradigm shift in the field of tax compliance. 
 
7.3.5 Strictly Enforcing Tax Laws 
 
Chapter 3 briefly discussed that the ITDB has a lack of enforcement of tax laws. The 
NBR admits that taxpayers are habitual defaulters and disobey tax laws.1053 As a means 
of securing tax compliance, deterrence has been largely discredited, and other 
psychological and behavioural determinants have taken place in recent years.1054 
However, deterrence is still an effective measure of securing tax compliance, 
particularly in developing countries. For example, based on the deterrence theory, in 
2005, the Philippines tax administration launched the ‘Run After Tax Evaders’ 
(RATE) program to tackle rampant tax evasion in the country. The RATE program 
was introduced to enable criminal prosecution of tax evaders. Immediately after 
commencement of the program, the Bureau of Internal Revenue achieved a 43.6 per 
cent increase in the overall revenue collection compared to the previous year.1055 
 
Empirical evidence also suggests that strong enforcement measures improve voluntary 
compliance.1056 One of the weaknesses of the income tax administration of Bangladesh 
remains its poor enforcement efforts. The current researcher has anecdotal evidence 
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from 20 years of service in the department that enforcement mechanisms—such as 
audits, imposing penalties for tax evasion, imprisoning those involved in significant 
tax fraud, and third-party information reporting systems—are ineffective and rarely 
applied. 
 
The current enforcement measures of the department include administrative penalties, 
interruptions (such as freezing bank accounts and ceasing transactions), criminal 
prosecution, raising risk points and the probability of being selected for audit.1057 Tax 
auditing is the most widely used deterrent tool employed by tax administrations to 
verify the accuracy of the income declared by taxpayers in their returns. Evidence 
suggests that tax audit has a direct effect on revenue collection and penalties, and 
indirectly makes taxpayers aware of detection and deters them from engaging in 
noncompliance acts.1058 Auditing is the most traditional regulatory approach to 
addressing the risk of taxpayers’ noncompliance.1059 According to the OECD, tax 
audits play a vital role in tax administration. They promote voluntary compliance, 
detect noncompliance at the individual taxpayer level, gather information on the 
‘health’ of the tax system, gather intelligence, educate taxpayers, and identify areas of 
the law that require clarification.1060 However, for tax audits to be successful, certain 
conditions must be met. In this respect, the OECD notes: 
there are a number of common pre-requisite features and requirements that 
need to be in place to ensure a good level of effectiveness and efficiency from 
audit activities and to support continuous improvement. They are: 
x A comprehensive legal framework, including an appropriate regime of 
sanctions. 
x Well-defined organizational and management processes, including a 
comprehensive performance measurement framework. 
x Well-defined audit techniques and adequate support arrangements; 
and. 
x Adequate human resource management and development 
programs.1061 
 
Like all tax administrations, Bangladesh’s tax law also makes provisions for audits to 
improve compliance by deterring taxpayers from noncompliance. Chapter 3 observed 
how audit functions for individual taxpayers are conducted. Taxpayers who file returns 
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under universal self-assessment systems are audited following the guidelines given by 
the NBR. Around the world, the audit rate for corporate taxpayers is high compared to 
individual taxpayers, which is also true for Bangladesh.1062 Large corporate taxpayers’ 
files are dealt with by the LTU. Audit functions are conducted on the basis of the pre-
fixed audit rules approved by the NBR, and audits are mainly two types: desk audits 
and comprehensive audits. Although the tax audits conducted by the LTU appear to be 
somewhat successful and regular, audits do not work well in the majority of income 
tax departments. This is evident from the poor revenue collection in tax zones other 
than the LTU.1063 Thus, it is apparent that audits in the ITDB fail to work properly to 
improve compliance. Probable causes of this audit ineffectiveness include the 
unavailability of information and evidence to detect true incomes by auditing, 
inefficiency of audit officers due to lack of proper training, corruption of the officers 
involved in audit functions, inadequate guidelines from the NBR and lack of 
monitoring. 
 
To use the audit tool effectively, the income tax administration of Bangladesh must 
take appropriate steps, such as strengthening the third-party information reporting 
system, training audit officers inside and outside of Bangladesh, creating an 
appropriate legal frame, reducing corruption in the department, ensuring taxpayers’ 
rights, educating taxpayers about their obligations and rights, providing clear 
guidelines from the NBR, establishing a functional system of tax assessment, making 
appropriate provisions for sanctions for noncompliance, and strengthening monitoring 
of audit performance. A broad range of tools is imperative to make audit effective. 
According to the OECD: 
The efficiency and effectiveness of a revenue body’s audit activities depends 
critically on the nature and scope of powers in the underlying legal 
framework in place, including the provision of adequate powers for obtaining 
information and an appropriate regime of sanctions to deter and penalize non-
compliance. Revenue bodies should aim to achieve a balanced program of 
audits—one that balances ‘coverage’, ‘audit quality’, and ‘overall deterrent’ 
considerations. Audit policies and procedures should be based on principles 
of accuracy, efficiency, fairness, objectivity, transparency, completeness, 
consistency, and defensibility.1064 
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Auditing is a strong deterrent tool that, if used efficiently, can deter taxpayers from 
noncompliance. A clear message must be sent to taxpayers that they will be subject to 
a comprehensive audit if there are any anomalies in their tax returns. 
 
Another deterrent tool is the imposition of administrative penalties on taxpayers for 
different types of noncompliance acts. Though controversial in terms of the fairness of 
tax statutes, penalties work to reduce noncompliance, and, under the self-assessment 
system, where the determination of tax liability lies with the taxpayers, penalties set a 
boundary for taxpayers to restrict their conduct—that is, whether to face or avoid legal 
sanctions.1065 Despite the presence of empirical evidence indicating that unfair 
penalties create a negative attitude towards tax administrations and place the taxpayer 
and tax administration in a competing and adversarial position, it is not always possible 
to prescribe universal rules of fairness because taxpayers always think about the causes 
of tax evasion when taking decisions on punishment.1066 
 
The 1984 ITO provides for imposition of monetary penalties for different types of 
noncompliance behaviour, as discussed in Chapter 3 of this thesis. However, the rate 
of monetary penalty prescribed by the Act for various acts of noncompliance appears 
to be low and insignificant, and low penalty regimes do not provide an effective 
deterrence to noncompliance.1067 Monir argues that, ‘the rates of penalties in the 
Ordinance are not significant for making tax evaders aware of the payment they would 
need to make for non-compliance’.1068 Moreover, income tax officers have discretion 
regarding whether to apply a penalty. While discretion can be positive when imposing 
penalties on taxpayers who make honest mistakes, it can be misused to exonerate 
dishonest taxpayers from penalties. Thus, the government must determine the standard 
monetary penalty of an amount that has the effect of strongly discouraging taxpayers’ 
noncompliance. In addition, the discretionary power of tax officers must be reduced. 
 
The government must tailor the penalty structure according to the nature and gravity 
of specific acts in order to target taxpayers who defy the norms.1069 Anecdotal evidence 
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shows that tax officers sometimes impose penalties on taxpayers, but ultimately they 
remain uncollected as arrear tax. The department fails to collect them either because 
the taxpayer does not care about them or because the penalty amount of penalty is so 
low that the officer does not bother to collect it. Of course, if a taxpayer does not pay 
his or her fair share of tax, he or she may also avoid paying the penalty. In this respect, 
Doran argues: 
After all, if a taxpayer does not comply with an obligation to pay a tax, it is 
not immediately obvious that the imposition of a tax penalty—in effect, a 
second tax—will cause her to pay both the tax and the penalty.1070 
 
Another deterrent tool in the tax statute is prosecuting taxpayers for serious 
noncompliance acts. Tax administrations around the world prosecute taxpayers for 
serious tax evading crimes. For example, in Australia, the ATO takes harsh measures 
against taxpayers who flout tax legislation and evade taxes. The Australian judiciary 
also takes tax evasion cases seriously, and frequently delivers custodial sentences for 
such fiscal crimes.1071 Chapter XXI of the 1984 ITO provides punishment for tax 
evasion cases. For tax evasion offences, there are provisions of imprisonment from 
one to five years, depending on the nature and gravity of the offence. There is also 
provision for the trial of income tax evasion cases by a special judge in the first 
instance.1072 However, income tax evaders are rarely prosecuted in the courts. Despite 
rampant tax evasion, there is not a single instance of exemplary punishment for this. 
The reasons for this lack of prosecution range from corruption, the inefficiency of the 
administration, and political interference in tax evasion cases. 
 
During the last caretaker government in 2007, the army-backed government filed many 
tax evasion cases against a handful of political leaders and businesspeople. However, 
unfortunately, these cases were in most cases stayed by the higher judiciary, and some 
were dismissed because of the lack of evidence. The income tax department loses the 
case because the state attorneys representing the case either have insufficient 
knowledge of the tax law or are biased towards the tax evaders for reasons such as 
corruption and nepotism. There are provisions to hire experts for the state prosecution; 
however, that requires a large amount of money. Due to resource constraints, it is not 
possible for the department to represent tax evasion cases through expert lawyers. 
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The judicial perspective on this issue also deserves consideration. In Bangladesh, the 
judiciary holds three views of interpreting and applying taxing statutes. One view 
favours the strict construction of the fiscal statutes and, in case of any ambiguity, the 
benefit of doubt is given to the taxpayers. According to this view, if two equally 
reasonable constructions are possible, the construction favourable to citizens should 
be given priority.1073The second view favours the purpose of the statute, as opposed to 
the interest of the taxpayers. In the case of any ambiguity, the court should construe 
the legislations, being guided by the principles of justice and fairness and considering 
equality and impartiality in the incidence of taxation, rather than favouring individual 
taxpayers.1074 The third view also favours the taxpayers in the case of any ambiguity. 
If the language is clear enough to imply the imposition and realisation of revenue 
beyond doubt, it should not be construed contrary to the intention of the legislature, 
which has the effect of stopping the realisation of revenue.1075 In Bangladesh, because 
of the problems of framing tax evasion cases, the judiciary exhibits a pro-taxpayer 
attitude. As a result, the department loses cases, which promotes future tax evasion by 
encouraging noncompliance. Most importantly, if tax evaders are not properly 
punished, the rule of law is questionable and the community loses trust in the taxation 
system, which is not congenial to healthy compliance. 
 
The government must have an honest political willingness to punish tax evaders. 
Sufficient budget should be allocated so that income tax cases can be represented by 
reputed lawyers in the higher courts. The law should be changed to allow departmental 
officers to represent in the courts during income tax cases. In addition, political 
interference must be faced with courage to prevent immunity being provided to tax 
evaders. Overall, necessary reforms are imperative to solve the enforcement problem. 
 
7.3.6 Tax Advisers and Tax Compliance 
 
Although tax advisers play a crucial role in shaping the attitudes of taxpayers towards 
compliance, there is a gap in the field of tax research on the influence of tax 
professionals on taxpayers’ compliance behaviour.1076 Taxpayers rely on tax advisers 
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for several reasons. They may need assistance interpreting the complexities and 
uncertainties of tax laws, they may wish to take advantage of loopholes in the law to 
evade or avoid tax, or they may need assistance in order to save time completing their 
tax.1077 Thus, the competence and ethics of tax advisers is very important, considering 
their effect on tax compliance.1078 Every year, tens of millions of taxpayers go to tax 
advisers either for advice or to prepare returns. From that perspective, tax advisers’ 
primary responsibility is to their clients.1079 In Australia, for example, around 75 per 
cent of taxpayers receive help from tax advisers while resolving their income tax 
issues.1080 
 
If tax advisers are incompetent or unethical, they may, for example, overstate claims 
in tax returns, so they are rejected by the tax authority under scrutiny; they may 
understate to the prejudice of the taxpayer; or they may encourage taxpayers to employ 
aggressive tax planning with the aim of evading tax.1081 Through an empirical study 
with Australian taxpayers, Devos finds that there is a statistically significant 
relationship between hiring a tax adviser and compliance behaviour.1082 Although 
there are no statistics available from the income tax department, it can be presumed 
from the number of tax professionals in Bangladesh that millions of people visit tax 
advisers each year to receive advice regarding tax affairs.1083 The government also 
recognises the role of the tax advisers in mobilising internal resources, and emphasises 
their efficiency, knowledge and experience.1084 Since tax advisers have special, 
technical knowledge of the intricate income tax law and accounting, they are in a 
position to either facilitate compliance or help taxpayers undermine the tax statutes. 
Thus, tax advisers could help improve compliance and educate taxpayers about their 
taxpaying obligations and rights. Regarding the role of tax advisers, Brooks states that 
these advisers can perform the following acts in a tax administration: 
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1. By assisting taxpayers to comply with their legal obligations accurately and in 
a timely manner, they can significantly reduce the tax department’s burden of 
taxpayer education and assistance. 
2. By acting as taxpayer representatives in proceedings before the tax authorities, 
they can increase the efficiency with which tax disputes are resolved. When 
taxpayers who do not understand the system well represent themselves before 
the tax department, the proceedings are inevitably more drawn out and 
misunderstandings frequently arise. 
3. The presence and availability of private-sector tax advisers and preparers 
increase the general level of comfort that taxpayers have with the tax system, 
and thereby increase their level of voluntary compliance. 
4. In the discharge of their professional responsibility to protect the integrity of 
the tax system, private-sector tax advisers can play an important role in 
assisting the tax department to ensure that the tax system is operating as 
intended, and in encouraging taxpayers to fully comply with the rules.1085 
 
The income tax department should have a mechanism to control the behaviour of 
income tax advisers, and use them as an effective channel to improve tax compliance. 
It is necessary to analyse the mechanism used by the NBR to regulate the conduct of 
income tax advisers. In Bangladesh, tax advisers can be categorised into four distinct 
groups: registered chartered accountants, registered cost and management accountants, 
income tax advisers with a Bachelor of Commerce degree, retired income tax officers 
registered as ITPS with the NBR, and advocates registered with the Bangladesh Bar 
Council. Among these four groups, only income tax advisers with Bachelor of Law 
degrees are enrolled by the NBR. Occasionally, the NBR issues circulars for income 
tax practitioner (ITP) registration, and requests applications from commerce graduate. 
Upon receiving applications, the NBR conducts a written examination. Following this, 
the successful candidates have to appear for an oral examination. The NBR then issues 
the successful candidates an ITP licence to practice. After attaining this licence, the 
ITPs enrol with a taxes bar association as members before starting tax practice. 
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These requirements are presented in Section 174 of the 1984 ITO. Section 174 deals 
with all provisions regarding income tax advisers’ qualifications and entitlement to 
work as an ITP. According to Section 174, taxpayers who are required to appear before 
the income tax authority can do so through their authorised representative. Authorised 
representatives inter alia include legal practitioners who are entitled to practice in civil 
courts in Bangladesh and are advocates, chartered accountants or cost and management 
accountants, members of an association of accountants recognised by the board, and 
ITPs registered by the board in accordance with the rules made by the board (subject 
to those rules, the practitioner must be registered with a taxes bar association). 
 
Income tax advisers remain an integral part of tax compliance in tax administrations 
around the world. While their primary allegiance is with their clients, and they have a 
duty to represent the clients and give them the best advice,1086 it is equally important 
that they should be pro-revenue from an ethical and legal perspective. Hence, 
regulating the conduct of tax advisers is essential. Thus, like any other tax 
administration, the NBR should have a mechanism to control the conduct of ITPs and 
ensure their positive role in taxpayer compliance issues. The following discusses how 
the NBR could regulate the behaviour of tax advisers, and what relationship should 
exist between them and the income tax department. 
 
Like in any other country, the tax advisers in Bangladesh owe their loyalty to their 
clients, and have a duty to represent them and offer the best tax advice. However, a 
problem in Bangladesh is that tax advisers do not have any direct responsibility to the 
income tax department—legally, ethically or professionally—except for the 
overarching necessity to comply with the tax statute. The NBR does not have any 
overseeing body to monitor advisers’ conduct. They are self-regulated within the 
frameworks provided by their own professional bodies—for example, chartered 
accountants are regulated by the Institute of Chartered Accountants of Bangladesh, 
advocates are regulated by the Bangladesh Bar Council, and other advisers are 
regulated by their respective taxes bar associations. The only tool that the NBR can 
use is Section 174 of the 1984 ITO. 
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All four groups of tax advisers can represent taxpayers before the tax authority. In 
addition, Section 174(2) provides for the disqualification of advisers. According to 
Section 174(2), no person is qualified to represent the taxpayer if he or she is: 
dismissed from government service … a legal practitioner, or a chartered 
accountant, a cost and management accountant, or other accountant … who, 
having been found guilty of misconduct in his professional capacity 
i. by any authority empowered to take disciplinary action against him, 
or 
ii. by the Board, in connection with any income tax proceeding, and, on 
account of that finding, he stands disqualified from practising his 
profession for so long as such disqualification continues. 
A person disqualified and barred from the profession is given an opportunity to be 
heard and appeal in a higher forum. However, no tax adviser in Bangladesh has been 
found guilty of misconduct and barred for practice, despite the fact that the advisers in 
this country mainly focus on their own monetary interest, to the disadvantage of 
revenue and sometimes clients. 
 
Anecdotal evidence shows that the relationship between tax advisers and the income 
tax department is not based on mutual trust and respect. The department does not 
believe in the advisers’ integrity, while the advisers do not believe they have any 
responsibility to the department—only to their clients. They also complain that the 
NBR does not offer them the respect they deserve. Thus, there exists an unstable 
relationship between tax advisers and the department. As a result, tax advisers only 
think of their clients and personal gains, and most are involved in aggressive tax 
evasion planning. The NBR should consider this issue and be vigilant in regulating tax 
advisers’ behaviour and ensuring their role in promoting voluntary compliance. The 
following presents some suggestions for the NBR to consider. 
 
It is necessary to motivate and monitor the tax advisers’ regulatory bodies. As 
aforementioned, income tax advisers are categorised into four groups, each of which 
have a separate regulatory institution. For chartered accountants, the regulatory body 
is the Institute of Chartered Accountants of Bangladesh, established under the 
Bangladesh Chartered Accountants Order 1973 (PO Number 2 of 1973). The 
profession of chartered accounts and their conduct are regulated by this order. Every 
chartered accountant must be registered with the institute by law before started 
practising as an independent accountant or member of any chartered accountant firm. 
The institute has a separate code of ethics that enables punishment for professional 
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misconduct. This includes reprimands, fines, payment of costs, withdrawal of 
practising rights, suspension and expulsion from membership.1087 
 
Likewise, cost and management accountants in Bangladesh are regulated under the 
Cost and Management Accountants Ordinance 1977 and Cost and Management 
Accountants Regulations 1980. Under this regulation, the Institute of Cost and 
Management Accountants of Bangladesh was established as the professional body. 
There is a separate code of conduct and ethics to define and regulate the professional 
conduct and responsibility of cost and management accountants. If any member is 
accused of misconduct, as defined in Schedule IV attached to the regulation, 
membership can be suspended and an inquiry committee may be commissioned to 
examine the matter relating to misconduct. If the council finds the member guilty of 
misconduct after a proper inquiry, and after giving the member an opportunity to be 
heard, the council can reprimand the member or suspend the member from 
membership for a period not exceeding five years, as the council may think fit, or may 
exclude the member from membership. 
 
The professional misconduct of the advocates is managed by the Bangladesh Bar 
Council, constituted under the Bangladesh Legal Practitioners and Bar Council Order 
1972. According to Section 32(1) of the order, an advocate registered with the bar 
council will be reprimanded, suspended or removed from practice if he or she is found 
guilty of professional or other misconduct. The professional misconduct of other tax 
advisers to those mentioned above is regulated by the constitution of the respective 
taxes bar associations. For example, Article 10 of the constitution of the Dhaka Taxes 
Bar Association states that, if any member is guilty of violation of the constitution; if 
the conduct of any member is considered undignified, dishonourable or unprofessional 
by the executive committee; or if any member organises any other association 
activities that are likely to jeopardise the interest of the association, the member may 
be expelled from the association or subject to any penalty that may be deemed proper 
and imposed by the executive committee. If found guilty of any misconduct by the 
committee, the member may be expelled from the bar. Similar provisions are found in 
the constitutions of other local taxes bar associations’ constitutions. 
 
                                                          
1087 Nasir U Ahmed, Code of Ethics for Professional Accountants (2008) 
<www.icab.org.bd/.../CPE%20Seminar%20Paper_Nasir%20U%20Ahmed>. 
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The NBR can monitor the conduct of tax advisers through these professional 
regulatory bodies by informing them of any misconduct and maintaining regular 
liaison. In addition, the government can establish a separate overseeing body to 
provide guidelines and closely monitor the conduct of tax advisers. In the US, an 
official body called the Office of Professional Responsibility sits within the IRS under 
the Deputy Commissioner, Services and Enforcement, and is responsible for 
establishing, communicating and enforcing standards of competence, integrity and 
conduct among tax practitioners.1088 In Australia, tax advisers are regulated by the Tax 
Practitioner’s Board constituted under the Tax Agent Services Act 2009. This board is 
an independent statutory body in charge of implementing and administering the 
Act.1089 Following the Australian example, the government of Bangladesh could 
establish a separate regulatory body with the NBR to comprehensively manage issues 
ranging from registering ITPs, to setting a code of conduct and professional ethics, to 
penalising ITPs for professional misconduct. This could be one of the institutional 
measures through which the NBR could ensure the role of tax advisers in improving 
compliance. 
 
An enhanced relationship between the income tax department and tax advisers is 
imperative, given the vital role played by tax advisers in tax administrations. The 
relationship between the income tax department and tax advisers is focused on two 
issues: tax issues and non-tax strategic issues.1090 First, tax issues are always important 
due to the position of tax advisers as agents of taxpayers. If there is a good relationship, 
tax advisers can be positively influenced to make taxpayers comply. Thus, this study 
argues that tax advisers can be included in the ATO regulatory pyramid as one of the 
actors taking part in negotiations with taxpayers. Thus, the department could regulate 
tax advisers, along with taxpayers, through the regulatory pyramid. Anecdotal 
evidence shows that tax advisers can help income tax offices fulfil the budget target 
by influencing taxpayers to pay tax. Second, the NBR can establish an enhanced non-
tax strategic relationship with tax advisers based on trust and mutual respect. Such a 
relationship would have significant benefits for the department, as the OECD notes: 
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There is the potential for a form of enhanced relationship to develop in 
appropriate circumstances between tax advisers and revenue bodies. This 
would be based on the premise that greater openness can lead to better 
relationships. For revenue bodies, the principal benefit is greater 
understanding of how tax advisers go about their business, what drives their 
business practices, how they can be equitably influenced and, most 
importantly, what impact they have on the decisions made by their clients in 
relation to tax.1091 
 
In addition, tax advisers could also benefit from this relationship by developing and 
maintaining policy awareness. The OECD states: 
Policy awareness is the ability to predict which transactions and issues the 
revenue body will want to be disclosed. By gaining greater understanding of 
revenue bodies, their decision-making processes and general areas of 
concern in relation to tax planning, tax advisers should be better placed to 
give best advice to their clients. This may include advice on the tax control 
frameworks needed and the levels of disclosure and transparency that 
revenue bodies expect in order to maintain the enhanced relationship. The 
enhanced relationship between tax advisers and revenue bodies should also 
result in opportunities for tax advisers and revenue bodies to collaborate on 
projects such as the production of early explanations of new tax laws, or 
greater consultation in respect of law-reform proposals.1092 
Thus, the ITDB can use tax advisers to improve compliance issues. To achieve this, 
the NBR should make provisions to regulate and monitor tax advisers’ conduct. In 
addition, a relationship of mutual trust and respect must be established, recognising 
advisers’ vital role in mobilising internal revenue. The NBR should work to build this 
relationship for the interest of national revenue. 
 
7.3.7 Reducing Compliance Costs 
 
Compliance costs are the burden that taxpayers bear in terms of the time and expenses 
involved in meeting their tax obligations. The widely cited definition of tax 
compliance cost is given by Sandford as: 
Costs incurred by taxpayers in meeting the requirements laid on them by the 
tax law and the revenue authorities … over and above the actual payment of 
tax; costs which would disappear if the tax was abolished.1093 
According to Shome, Aggarwal and Singh: 
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199 
A good tax administration should … concern itself with compliance costs of 
the taxpayer—lost time, stress, visits to the tax office, standing in queues, 
charges by accountants and lawyers-associated with a given tax payment.1094 
 
There are three major components included in compliance cost: money, time and 
psychological costs to taxpayers.1095 These costs can be pre- and post-compliance 
(including the costs involved in filing appeals against assessment orders). Monetary 
costs may vary according to the classes of taxpayer. The monetary compliance cost 
can be much higher for corporate taxpayers than individual taxpayers. Monetary costs 
involve the professional fees of tax advisers, accountants, lawyers and investment 
advisers, as well as the amount spent to collect taxation guides and books, travelling 
costs, communications and stationery. The time costs involve the time individuals 
spend to complete their tax return themselves, or preparing information for tax 
advisers.1096 The psychological costs include the stress and anxiety experienced by 
taxpayers while coping with the complexities of tax returns and other information.1097 
 
High compliance costs have a negative effect on taxpayer compliance. The greater the 
costs, the less taxpayers are willing to comply. It is argued that high compliance costs 
encourage taxpayers to evade tax.1098 Odinkonigbo argues that high compliance costs 
affect the motivational posture of a taxpayer, thereby creating a threat of compliance 
by the tax authority and keeping the taxpayer away from the authority.1099 This 
distance increases the administrative costs of the tax department in its attempt to make 
the taxpayer compliant. 
 
Tax compliance costs are very high in developing countries compared to developed 
countries.1100 As a developing country, Bangladesh is no exception. Taxpayers in 
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Bangladesh incur monetary costs at various stages every year. They must pay the fees 
of tax advisers, consultation fees to the staff of income tax officers (if they do not use 
a tax adviser), the costs of travelling to and from the income tax office, the cost of 
collecting income tax returns and other forms, and sometimes bribes to the tax office. 
In terms of time costs, taxpayers spend time preparing the return themselves, or 
providing information to tax advisers to prepare the return; travelling to the tax office 
or tax adviser’s office; and waiting in the income tax office for hearings and to collect 
related documents. In terms of psychological costs, taxpayers in Bangladesh may 
undergo considerable anxiety and stress when dealing with income tax matters. The 
complexities of the tax statute and uncertainty arising from such complexities are one 
of the psychological costs of tax compliance.1101 Other psychological costs derive from 
the unfriendly behaviour of the tax authority, travelling to the sparsely and 
inconveniently located income tax offices, feelings of uncertainty and insecurity in 
terms of properly finalising the tax assessment process without difficulty, and an 
overall negative perception that nothing can be achieved easily in the income tax 
department without money or harassment. 
 
Based on this, it is imperative that the government takes immediate steps to reduce the 
compliance costs of taxpayers. Some effective measures to lower compliance costs 
include removing the complexities of the tax law, establishing a centrally located 
income tax office, establishing good public relations with taxpayers, ensuring that tax 
returns and other tax-related books and information are easily accessible to taxpayers, 
eradicating corruption from the department, establishing a centrally located taxpayer 
service centre, and improving the overall image of the income tax department. 
 
7.3.8 Using Patriotism to Improve Compliance 
 
Patriotism has a deep and historical relationship with taxation. For example, income 
tax in the US, the UK and India was introduced during wartime or immediately 
afterwards. In addition, in Australia, income tax was introduced in 1915 to finance 
Australia’s involvement in World War I.1102 Innovative politicians exploited citizens’ 
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patriotism and introduced an income tax to fill the treasury. Even now, politicians tend 
to invoke patriotism to impose taxes.1103 Konrad and Quari state, ‘Especially in times 
of war, politicians appeal strongly to patriotism and to citizens’ national pride trying 
to increase their tax compliance or to implement tax reform’.1104 They argue that 
patriotism increases tax compliance—it increases during wartime and, during 
peacetime, can be an influencing factor to improve compliance.1105 Quari, Konrad and 
Geys argue that patriotic sentiments can also play a significant role during peacetime 
because they relate to a warm glow of paying taxes that manifests a close link between 
patriotism and personal income tax.1106 The influence of patriotism in personal income 
tax was recognised by Hill long ago: 
An income tax has the considerable advantage of being responsive to the 
influences of patriotism, which are certain to be strong whenever a serious 
war is undertaken by a democratic country. Indirect taxes have not this 
quality … But the productiveness of an income tax depends, in large 
measures, upon the readiness of men to reveal their incomes and meet the 
tax. To this extent it assumes the nature of a voluntary contribution, to which 
men will respond more freely when they realize that the hour is one of the 
sore need and perhaps, of peril to the country.1107 
 
Thus, Hill observes that personal income tax is a voluntary contribution made 
spontaneously and more freely during wartime. He wonders why this ethos of 
contribution should not continue during other times: ‘It would have been strange, 
indeed, if the patriotism which led men to volunteer for the field in such numbers had 
been inoperative when contributions of money were called for’.1108 
 
Patriotism is a loyalty and benevolent feeling among individual citizens related to their 
country or fellow citizens. The individual creates such feelings, and they are direct and 
spontaneous. Zamir and Horowitz argue: 
Patriotism is a kind of loyalty a person has for his country that is not the 
result of cost–benefit considerations. Like altruism, patriotism requires the 
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individual to sacrifice personal interests for the sake of others. Patriots’ 
concern for their country is unconditional and exists for its own sake.1109 
 
However, as aforementioned, the patriotism of citizens becomes most prominent 
during wartime. During times of national crisis, people focus on the safety and security 
of the country, which relates to the personal safety and security of the citizen. If the 
state is not secure, personal liberty and safety are at stake. Thus, citizens of the US and 
UK pay income tax generously to ensure their personal safety and liberty, and above 
all their belief. Thus, it appears that patriotism does not consider cost–benefit analysis, 
but in the final analysis patriotism is no devoid of any profit loss accounting. This 
might explain one of the reasons that patriotic feelings remain dormant during 
peacetime and manifest strongly during wartime. If patriotism could be made more 
active during peacetime, there is no doubt that it would positively affect tax 
compliance. 
 
Quari, Konrad and Geys suggest that people might be willing to pay higher income tax 
to their country not because it is their patriotic duty, but because they live in this 
country.1110 The question is how to make patriotism active when there is no war or 
issue of national interest. One suggested way is to educate young generations to 
activate and nurture patriotism.1111 Another way could be upholding good governance. 
Good governance ensures the rule of law is upheld, better functioning of the state, fair 
competition, quality delivery of public goods, the accountability and transparency of 
government institutions, and the correct spending of taxes. In summary, good 
governance ensures a liveable country. According to the World Bank, good 
governance is defined as, ‘the manner in which power is exercised in the management 
of a country’s economic and social resources for development’. According to the 
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), good governance can be defined 
as the exercise of economic, political and administrative authority to manage a 
country’s affairs at all levels.1112 Sound fiscal policy and efficient internal resource 
mobilisation form an integral part of good governance in a country. 
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Shah and Huther develop indices of good governance that could be important for tax 
compliance issues in Bangladesh.1113 These indices relate to a government’s capability 
to: 
1. ensure political transparency and a voice for all citizens 
2. provide efficient and effective public services 
3. promote the health and wellbeing of citizens 
4. create a favourable climate for stable economic growth.1114 
If taxpayer compliance is to be improved in Bangladesh, there must be evidence of 
good governance, which would awake the dormant patriotism of the people to pay tax 
as an obligation to their motherland. However, good governance is a major challenge 
for the government of Bangladesh.1115 Multi-party democracy is still in a fragile state, 
parliamentary and institutional accountability and transparency have not been ensured, 
corruption reigns in almost all government sectors, law enforcement is weak and 
politically biased, the judiciary’s role is not beyond question, and state institutions’ 
performance is unsatisfactory. The absence of watchdog offices, such as an 
ombudsman, all demonstrate that good governance is yet to be achieved in Bangladesh.  
 
As a result of Bangladesh’s lack of good governance, many people are migrating to 
other countries. There is also alarming capital flight, and illicit financial flows have 
been observed in recent years. Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi find that the 
governance indicator scores of Bangladesh are very low.1116 They select the following 
criteria to score the governance practice of a country: voice and accountability, 
political stability and the absence of violence/terrorism, government effectiveness, 
regulatory quality, the rule of law, and control of corruption.1117 The following table 
gives an overview of current governance quality in Bangladesh.1118 
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Table 7.1: Current Governance Quality in Bangladesh 
TI 2012** Worldwide Governance Indicators 2011* 
Corruption 
Perception 
Index 
Voice and 
Accountabilit
y 
Political 
Stability and 
Absence of 
Violence 
Government 
Effectiveness 
Regulatory 
Quality 
Rule 
of 
Law 
Control of 
Corruption 
Bangladesh 26 -0.31 -1.50 -0.81 -0.72 -1.00 
India 36 0.41 -1.20 -0.34 -0.08 -0.56 
Pakistan 27 -0.83 -2.70 -0.61 -0.90 -0.1 
Nepal 27 -0.53 -1.55 -0.72 -0.99 -0.77 
Sri Lanka 40 -0.53 -0.54 -0.09 -0.07 -0.42 
* Estimate of governance (ranges from approximately-2.5 [weak] to 2.5 [strong] governance 
performance). 
** Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index Score (ranges from zero [most 
corrupt] to 100 [least corrupt]). 
Note: TI = Transparency International. 
Source: World Bank and Transparency International 
 
Miazi and Islam’s social survey on the governance quality of Bangladesh1119 finds that 
most participants expressed an opinion that there is no alternative to good governance, 
and the present governance quality is not satisfactory. Based on the survey results, the 
authors conclude: 
On the basis of the … findings, it might be remarked that the current state of 
governance of Bangladesh is poor as almost all the aspects of good 
governance are severely absent in the country. At present, Bangladesh has 
been facing a number of challenges in the path of democratic or good 
governance like uninstitutionalised political parties, lack of accountability 
and transparency, lack of rule of law, inefficient leadership, ineffective 
political institutions, rampant corruption, and widespread poverty and so 
on.1120 
 
It is imperative that there exists good governance in Bangladesh. Good governance 
can play an important role in nurturing patriotism among citizens, which is positively 
related to tax compliance. High tax compliance is related to the delivery of quality 
public goods and services, which improves the liveability of a country.1121 Thus, the 
delivery of quality public goods and services is hindered due to lack of good 
governance. However, patriotism can be an effective tool to improve tax compliance. 
Based on this, the government of Bangladesh should take appropriate steps to nurture 
patriotism among its people. 
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7.3.9 Curbing Corruption in the Income Tax Department 
 
Corruption remains a severe problem in the tax administration of developing 
countries.1122 In particular, it is argued that corruption has a higher negative effect on 
direct taxes, such as income tax.1123 As a developing country, Bangladesh is no 
exception, with its income tax administration beleaguered by corruption among 
income tax officers.1124 The UNDP defines corruption as ‘the misuse of public power, 
office or authority for private benefit-through bribery, extortion, influence peddling, 
nepotism, fraud, speed money, or embezzlement’.1125 According to Li, tax corruption 
can be defined as the behaviour of tax officials aimed at unjustly enriching themselves 
or other close people by the misuse of the public power entrusted to them.1126 
 
Li categorises tax corruption into two groups. The first includes embezzlement, graft, 
bribery, fraud, stealing state property, living a luxurious life, receiving gifts and 
enjoying entertainment opportunities offered by taxpayers.1127 The second involves 
activities or behaviours that are very often considered corrupt.1128 Both categories are 
present in the ITDB. Taxpayers or their agents pay bribes, forward gifts and provide 
entertainment opportunities to tax officials to reduce their tax liabilities. Some tax 
officials influence the higher authority to gain a better posting in a ‘wet’ workplace.1129 
 
One vital issue of tax corruption is how it can be measured, given that it is very difficult 
to measure corruption.1130 The main problem in quantifying corruption is the lack of 
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data.1131 Moreover, the quantity of corruption or corrupt transactions is not finite or 
amenable to measurement by research.1132 However, there are some methods available, 
such as the perception survey method.1133 Transparency International’s Annual 
Corruption Perception Index and the World Bank’s Control of Corruption Index are 
based on the perception survey method. Other methods of measuring corruption 
include the expert survey method,1134 estimating bribery1135 and the direct observation 
method.1136 
 
TIB employs the household survey method to measure the extent of corruption in the 
public sector of Bangladesh, including the tax administration. The first survey was 
conducted by TIB in 1997. Then, in 1998, it investigated corruption in different sectors 
of Bangladesh, including the income tax department.1137 There are other ways to 
measure corruption in the income tax department, including external audits by the 
Office of the Comptroller and Auditor General of Bangladesh, internal audits by the 
Office of the Director General of Taxes Inspection, and regular internal audits by the 
Inspecting Additional/Joint Commissioner of Taxes. Although audits are a potential 
source of attaining data about corruption, they have limitations.1138 However, 
performance appraisal through improved auditing processes can play a useful role in 
unearthing cases of corruption.1139 
 
Numerous causes of tax corruption have been identified,1140 including tax officials’ 
low salaries, lack of professional ethics and ambitions to become wealthy quickly; 
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legal loopholes; conflicts of interest; and bureaucratic red tape.1141 Tax corruption 
manifests in various ways1142 and, in transitional economies, the transition process 
paves the way for corruption.1143 As Nobel laureate Gary Becker says, ‘There is no 
sure fire way to eliminate corrupt behaviour, but certain steps would certainly reduce 
the temptations’.1144 The municipal and international community agree about the 
damaging effect of corruption, and have begun fighting corruption concertedly.1145 
Tax corruption is an institutional problem;1146 thus, curbing corruption in the ITDB 
requires a holistic approach that includes methods that are universal, state centric and 
society centric.1147 Some of the measures to combat corruption include providing 
adequate remuneration for income tax officers, establishing a separate semi-
autonomous revenue authority, reducing opportunities for corruption by simplifying 
tax legislation, reducing discretionary power, eliminating the need for personal contact 
with taxpayers, introducing a 100 per cent self-assessment system, punishing corrupt 
officers, increasing integrity among income tax officers, and limiting the scope of post-
retirement employment. 
 
Thus far, the government of Bangladesh has undertaken several measures to combat 
corruption in the administration, including in the income tax department. The Anti-
Corruption Commission Act 2004 established a separate anticorruption institution—
the Anti-Corruption Commission (ACC) of Bangladesh—in November 2004. 
However, with the exception of the army-backed government regime, the role of the 
ACC to curb tax corruption appears ineffective.1148 Although, by law, the commission 
is required to be independent and impartial, the reality is that it has always been under 
political influence.1149 The institution is largely used as a tool by the ruling government 
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to harass or subdue opposition party leaders.1150 In addition, the corruption cases filed 
by the commission against different politicians and government officials have been 
dropped by the commission due to political pressure, the inefficiency of commission 
officials to make cases, a lack of cooperation from other government agencies, and the 
corruption of the investigating officers of the ACC.1151 
 
The dropping of graft cases by the commission is viewed as being a result of the moral 
vulnerability of the commission.1152 The commission is not independent in its work, 
and is under-staffed to deal with the huge volume of corruption cases. In addition, 
there is corruption in the commission itself because it hired most of the personnel from 
the earlier anticorruption commission, which was branded a corrupt institution.1153 
Above all, lack of political will remains a strong barrier to the successful functioning 
of the ACC.1154 The ACC was not established because the government wished to curb 
corruption—the government had no political will to establish the ACC. Rather, it was 
established at the behest of donors and due to the pressure of civil societies.1155 
However, despite this, the ACC seems to be active in recent days. A separate cell in 
the commission has been established to deal with the political corruption of members 
of parliament and ministers.1156 In addition, recently, the commission started 
investigating the wealth of some top bureaucrats of the government after the highest 
court in the country ruled that an attempted amendment of the ACC law that sought to 
protect government officials was illegal.1157 Thus, it is hoped that the commission will 
play a vital role in reducing corruption in the income tax department. 
 
Another way to curb corruption in the income tax department is to introduce the 
responsive regulatory pyramid as an internal mechanism in the department. The 
pyramid suggests using persuasion as a value-based approach to regulation, as opposed 
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to a rule-based approach.1158 In Bangladesh, deterrent legislation is rarely applied and, 
even when it is applied, does not produce the intended result.1159 The ATO and other 
government regulatory organisations in Australia use the regulatory pyramid.1160 Mills 
proposes the regulatory pyramid for anticorruption agencies with some modifications, 
1161 and it can be a useful device to reduce corruption.1162 The proposed pyramid is 
presented in the figure below. 
 
 
Figure 7.1: The Responsive Regulatory Pyramid 
Source: Charlotte Wood et al (2010) 
 
According to the regulatory pyramid, to control corruption, the department must start 
at the base of the pyramid by raising awareness through educating, socialising, 
researching and increasing knowledge of the organisation’s integrity and code of 
conduct. The next step up provides for managing implementation of organisational 
design, policy frameworks and procedural standards. The next step up involves 
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monitoring and supervising corruption by the authority. If any case of corruption is 
reported or brought to the notice of the authority, it must be investigated and a report 
prepared. The next step up provides for punishments, such as suspension, demotion or 
counselling, depending on the circumstances. As a final measure, a corrupt 
noncompliant tax officer can be dismissed by the authority. Another attempt by the 
government to tackle tax corruption involved establishing the office of the tax 
ombudsman in 2005;1163 however, this office was abolished in 2010. 
 
7.3.10 Introducing Adequate Information and Communication Technology 
 
Technology such as the internet and information and communication technology (ICT) 
systems and devices has transformed the ways that governments operate,1164 and the 
revenue department is no exception. As in developed countries, technology has 
affected the design and implementation of the tax systems in developing countries.1165 
To establish an efficient and transparent tax system, appropriate ICT must be 
implemented.1166 ICT can help tax administrations in a variety of ways. It can: 
x help establish an efficient and transparent tax administration 
x help the income tax department establish an e-tax system 
x help reduce tax compliance costs for taxpayers 
x help reduce administrative costs for the income tax department 
x help gather third-party information about taxpayers’ income, making taxpayer 
tracking an easy job 
x make tax withholding more sophisticated and efficient 
x help remove complexities in tax legislations 
x make taxpayers’ record keeping easy 
x make internal management and control over resources easy 
x enable taxpayer audit to be smoothly performed 
x enable returns and payments to be easily processed. 
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Overall, improved tax compliance and better management of the administration could 
be achieved through proper use of ICT in the Bangladesh income tax department. 
There is evidence from developing countries in this respect.1167 
 
Given the poor capability of the income tax administration of Bangladesh in managing 
and collecting income tax, it is imperative that the efficiency and transparency of the 
department be increased. One of the tools to increase the efficiency of the income tax 
department to improve the assessments and collection system is the effective use of 
ICT. However, the income tax department has been unable to introduce ICT in a 
pragmatic manner. It still uses the traditional manual system to make assessments and 
collect income taxes.1168 Only two tax zones use an e-filing system—the LTU and Tax 
Zone 8 (Dhaka)—which are administrative zones working with professional 
taxpayers, such as doctors and lawyers. In other tax zones, computers are used, but 
remain instruments for typing only.1169 
 
In recognising this deficiency of ICT and considering its importance in internal 
resource mobilisation, the NBR has undertaken a modernisation project to equip the 
income tax department with proper ICT. Automating the tax processes and establishing 
an integrated revenue management system remain the core purposes of this 
modernisation.1170 From 2011 to 2016, the modernisation plan is being implemented 
with the help of donors such as the World Bank and IMF. Under this modernisation 
and automation project, in 2013, the NBR was able to implement the automated 
issuance of TINs, linked with the national identification database. This was a 
benchmark project implemented in June 2013 under the guidance and financial 
assistance of the IMF.1171 Thus far, the automated TIN issuance program remains a 
substantial achievement in the process of automating the income tax department. 
Under this system, by the end of September 2013, more than 530,000 taxpayers had 
been issued with TIN registration, including over 90,000 new taxpayers. This 
automated system of issuing TINs is considered a success because the collection of 
income tax has increased.1172 It is anticipated that the automation process of the 
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department will continue with full strength to improve income tax collection and 
ensure sustainable tax compliance.1173 
 
Another important achievement in the process of automation and providing taxpayers’ 
service is the NBR’s introduction of an online tax calculator. The objective of hosting 
a tax calculator on the NBR website is to provide an online service to taxpayers to 
calculate their taxable income and payable tax. This calculator is hosted by the NBR 
in consideration of the technicality of calculating income tax among nonprofessional 
taxpayers. The online calculator contains income tax returns, wealth statements and 
head-wise income and tax calculation guides. This is a simple and helpful guide for 
taxpayers who do not possess much technical expertise to deal with complicated 
income tax issues. It is expected that the tax calculator will be an excellent tool in 
helping taxpayers derive their total income and tax liability, without needing much 
knowledge about income tax law and rules. 
 
Another important advancement in the field of automation is the online portal for 
paying income tax. The NBR has launched this e-payment portal to make tax payments 
easy and hassle free for taxpayers. Through this portal, taxpayers can pay their income 
tax without going to the bank or income tax office to collect challans (a traditional 
invoice used to pay tax by physically visiting the collecting banks). However, current 
online facilities do not allow taxpayers to submit their returns online. This is a 
drawback of the automation system. While taxpayers can register, calculate their tax 
liability using the tax calculator, and pay tax using the online portal, to submit their 
income tax return, they must physically visit the income tax office or appoint an 
income tax adviser to prepare and submit their return. However, the NBR could 
introduce an e-tax system to enable taxpayers to lodge electronic returns. For example, 
Australia currently uses an electronic return filing system.1174 This e-tax system could 
facilitate a free and secure return lodgement option for individual taxpayers via the 
internet. This system could include in-built checks and calculators to help ensure the 
tax return has been completed correctly, as well as a tool that provides an estimate of 
the taxpayer’s tax assessment. This system could also facilitate pre-filling of tax return 
by obtaining data from previous returns and current information from organisations, 
including employers, banks and government agencies. The NBR should actively 
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consider introducing a comprehensive e-filing system. Income tax officials can gain 
experience from the ATO about the operations and technology needed to create an e-
filing system in Bangladesh. 
 
7.3.11 Introducing Qui Tam Legislation 
 
Every year, Bangladesh loses a huge amount of revenue due to fraudulent claims of 
tax deductions, underreporting and non-reporting. As mentioned earlier in the thesis, 
the exact amount of revenue lost because of the tax gap cannot be determined due to 
the lack of data; however, the severity of the problem can be perceived by the size of 
the informal economy in the country. The income tax authority is constantly seeking 
to curb this problem via various legal measures, including prosecution of tax evaders. 
However, this public law enforcement process often proves insufficient. This is not 
only an issue in Bangladesh, but also in developed countries, such as the US. As an 
alternative to public enforcement, ‘qui tam’ actions are becoming a popular and 
powerful enforcement tool, particularly in the public sector, such as healthcare and 
procurement fraud.1175 
 
The term ‘qui tam’ is derived from the Latin phrase ‘qui tam pro domino rege quam 
pro se ipso in hac parte sequitur’, meaning ‘who pursues this action on our Lord the 
King’s behalf as well as his own’.1176 Qui tam cases are a class of civil law case that 
whistle-blowers file in the courts on behalf of the government. In the US, such actions 
are a popular and effective enforcement tool that are brought by whistle-blowers under 
the False Claim Act, which rewards whistle-blowers if their actions recuperate lost 
funds for the government. Although qui tam actions do not have a place in federal tax 
legislation, several US states have introduced laws authorising qui tam suits for 
violations of the state tax law.1177 In 2010, New York became the first state to explicitly 
authorise the application of its FCA to tax claims. 
 
Qui tam proffers private enforcement as an alternative to traditional public law-
enforcement actions. The prominent aspects of private enforcement are as follows. 
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First, it provides incentives to private citizens to bring action regarding monetary fraud 
committed against the government. Second, enforcement agencies can reduce the huge 
costs involved in enforcement activities, and divert resources to pursue other priorities. 
Third, since private enforcement provisions allow standing to a large number of 
potential enforcers, it might mitigate the problem of regulatory capture.1178 Hertel 
argues that, ‘[b]y introducing a virtually unlimited number of new “regulators”, private 
enforcement actions greatly reduce the possibility that all enforcers may be improperly 
influenced by the industry they seek to regulate’.1179 Regulatory capture is a common 
phenomenon in the tax departments of developing countries. It is a breeding ground of 
corruption, where tax officers are captured by taxpayers through the process of giving 
and taking bribes to evade tax. Ventry suggests that public law enforcement by private 
individuals can be an effective monitoring and prosecutorial mechanism in the field of 
law when the institutional mechanism fails due to information asymmetry, active 
concealment by regulated parties and weak enforcement.1180 The ITDB has all three of 
these negative attributes. 
 
In Bangladesh, a Whistleblowers Protection Act 2011 was enacted. This Act provides 
for the protection of whistle-blowers who provide information about any government 
fund irregularities. However, there is no legislation authorising qui tam actions, and 
the Act does not contain specific provision for qui tam action. The ITDB administers 
its own whistle-blower program under the 1984 ITO. Section 184D of the ordinance 
makes provisions for rewarding officers or employees of the board and its subordinate 
tax offices for outstanding performance collecting taxes and detecting tax evasion, and 
for any other person who provides information leading to detection of tax evasion. 
Under this program, the finance minister is authorised to approve rewards to the 
informants of tax detection cases. 
 
However, a new law should be made to deal with false claims and wrongdoing 
involving government funds. This new law will provide for qui tam actions by private 
individuals in sectors such as procurement and healthcare, including income tax fraud. 
This would substantially contribute to improving voluntary compliance. As Ventry 
argues, ‘If sunlight is the best antiseptic, the looming possibility of qui tam actions 
                                                          
1178 Ibid, 1903. 
1179 Ibid, 1903–1904. 
1180 Dennis J Ventry, ‘Whistleblowers and Qui Tam for Tax’ (2008) 61(2) Tax Lawyer 359. 
215 
could alter risk assessments of reporting positions by taxpayers and their advisors and 
thereby improve tax compliance’.1181 
 
7.4 Conclusion 
 
Taxation is the principal source of revenue that is the lifeblood of governments. It is 
imperative that governments are able to collect sufficient revenue to reduce poverty 
and provide social infrastructure, healthcare, education, security, transport, pensions 
and public goods that are necessary for citizens and to ensure good governance. 
However, this much-needed revenue source is affected by increasing tax evasion and 
avoidance. This is a global problem, to which Bangladesh is no exception. Tax evasion 
and noncompliance pose a major challenge for the ITDB. As such, the government 
should seek to reform the personal income tax system to ensure just distribution of 
wealth against the backdrop of the current market economy, considering the horizontal 
and vertical equity of taxation, as well as social outcomes, rather than only the 
traditional fairness of the taxation system.1182 
 
This thesis has sought to determine the causes of income tax noncompliance and to 
suggest potential tools to manage this problem. It is proposed that the relationship 
between taxpayers and the state is a fiduciary one, based on the trust and good faith of 
the taxpayer in the state. If the state fails to comply with its fiduciary obligations, this 
is likely to affect tax compliance behaviour. The current state of the income tax 
administration and tax compliance has been examined in detail in this thesis. It has 
been observed that, despite a variety of efforts, the ITDB has not notably improved the 
poor state of tax compliance. Its inappropriate compliance strategy and inadequate 
legal tools remain the principal causes of this. 
 
Thus, this thesis suggests a new approach to tackle the problem of noncompliance. The 
suggested strategy is to adopt the ATO compliance model, together with necessary 
legal reforms. This thesis has presented a set of policy suggestions. It is expected that, 
if these are applied by the ITDB and tax policy is crafted accordingly, the overall 
compliance rate will be improved, and Bangladesh will be able to generate suitable 
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revenue from income tax. However, it should be noted that the tools suggested are not 
intended as ultimate solutions to the noncompliance problem. The tax noncompliance 
problem is intertwined with the taxation system itself, which means it cannot be 
eradicated permanently. However, the current enormity of the problem can be reduced 
substantially by employing appropriate legal tools and creating a comprehensive and 
pragmatic compliance strategy. 
 
This thesis examines selected issues regarding taxpayers’ compliance in the field of 
income tax. A key issue identified is the fiduciary relationship between the state and 
taxpayers. The analysis presented above of this important concept calls for empirical 
investigation and thus for future research. Similarly the thesis examines various tax 
compliance models and theories in a critical manner, in order to evaluate their relative 
merits both as to explanation and as to effectiveness. The emphasis throughout is on 
the future improvement in effectiveness of taxation policy in the context of developing 
countries. Empirical evaluation of implemented policy will be vital to this project. The 
policy suggestions made in the thesis should provide some valuable guidelines for the 
tax administrations of developing countries particularly for Bangladesh.  
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